Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (ACN 004 551 473) v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (ACN 000 498 386) [2007] FCAFC 70

EVIDENCE – Admissibility of opinion evidence – not admissible unless opinion based on specialised knowledge – whether rule excluding opinion evidence as to matter of common knowledge is applicable – operation of s 80 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Act’) - requirement to consider probative value of opinion evidence – whether evidence might cause or result in undue waste of time – discretion to exclude evidence under s 135 the Act

TRADE PRACTICES – competitors in retail chocolate market – use of colour purple – principles relating to passing off – whether exclusive reputation required under Part V Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – whether use of colour purple likely to mislead or deceive consumers

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 28(1)(f)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 55(1), 56(1), 76(1), 79, 80, 135
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Part V

Cat Media Pty Ltd v Opti-Healthcare Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 133 cited
Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Ltd [2004] FCAFC 247 cited
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 cited
Reckitt and Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc (1990) 17 IPR 1 cited
Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v The Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 cited

The Law Reform Commission, Evidence, Interim Report, No. 26 (1985), [743]

CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD (ACN 004 551 473) v DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LTD (ACN 000 498 386)

VID774 OF 2006

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & MIDDLETON JJ
21 MAY 2007
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID774 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD (ACN 004 551 473)
Appellant

AND:

DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LTD
(ACN 000 498 386)
Respondent

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & MIDDLETON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2007

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Court made on 27 April 2006 and 6 July 2006 be set aside.

3.The matter be remitted to the trial judge for further hearing.

4.The parties within 14 days file and serve written submissions to the Court on the question of the costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID774 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD (ACN 004 551 473)
Appellant

AND:

DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LTD
(ACN 000 498 386)
Respondent

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, EMMETT & MIDDLETON JJ

DATE:

21 MAY 2007

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE PROCEEDING
THE QUESTIONS IN THE APPEAL
PRIMARY QUESTION: ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DISPUTED EVIDENCE

The Evidence Act
Cadbury’s Case Before the Primary Judge

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Details
Case
[2007] FCAFC 70
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd initiated legal proceedings against Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd, challenging Darrell Lea's use of the colour purple in its branding, which Cadbury claimed was distinctively associated with its own products. The case revolved around whether Darrell Lea's use of purple in its packaging misled consumers into believing its products were associated with Cadbury. The legal dispute reached the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary issue was the admissibility of expert evidence tendered by Cadbury.

The court had to determine whether the expert evidence provided by Dr Gibbs, an expert in marketing and consumer psychology, could be admitted under the Evidence Act. Dr Gibbs' evidence aimed to establish that Cadbury had a significant, exclusive reputation associated with the colour purple, and that Darrell Lea's use of purple created a misleading association with Cadbury in the minds of consumers. The central legal issues included whether the expert opinions were based on specialised knowledge and whether they could be admitted despite the general rule excluding opinion evidence. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of causing undue waste of time.

The Full Court held that the primary judge erred in applying an incorrect principle to reject the disputed evidence. While the evidence might have been wholly inadmissible if proper objections were taken, the court found it was not appropriate to speculate on potential objections or their outcomes. The Full Court emphasised that Cadbury should be given the opportunity to apply for leave to elicit further evidence to overcome any valid objections. The court concluded that a new trial was necessary to allow the primary judge to consider the evidence fairly, ensuring a just resolution of the case. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the primary judge for further hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Court made on 27 April 2006 and 6 July 2006 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the trial judge for further hearing.

4. The parties within 14 days file and serve written submissions to the Court on the question of the costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

A number of detailed sections followed the executive summary. In those sections, Dr Gibbs expressed the opinions that Cadbury wishes to have admitted as evidence of the facts to which they relate. Relevant Basic Principles and Background Issues First, the affidavit dealt with general marketing concepts and theories under five headings. It is desirable to summarise what Dr Gibbs said about them. 1. The Brand Concept And Brand Equity: In contemporary marketing theory and practice a brand is understood to be an essentially psychological entity. A brand is a set of associations in the mind of the consumer. The importance and value of a brand to its owner lies in the ability of this mentally held set of associations to influence consumer behaviour, especially information processing associated with product perception, evaluation and choice. Consumers often buy the brand rather than the product itself. The brand transcends the product in that extra dimensions have been added to the core product in order to differentiate it from other products designed to satisfy the same needs. Such differentiation may be based on tangible, rational differences related to product performance or on intangible differences of an emotional or symbolic nature related to what the brand represents. A brand can be highly valuable to its owners. The notion of the value attributable to a brand is captured by the concept of brand equity.2. Nature And Storage Of Brand Associations In Memory: An essential function of memory is to draw together similar experiences to enable one to discover patterns in one’s interactions with the environment. Thus, memory serves to make current perceptions meaningful by relating them to knowledge that has been distilled from previous experiences. In the field of consumer behaviour, the issue of how brand associations are stored in the minds of consumers and accessed by them, as they form judgments and make decisions, is typically understood in terms of “the associative-network model of memory”. That type of model has a long history in psychology. On that model, a brand is conceptualised as a set of nodes that represent concepts or other information stored in memory and are interconnected in a network of links. This network of nodes in memory can include a wide variety of brand associations, which are created through actual use of the branded product or through exposure to advertising or other marketing. Those networked associations comprise all the explicit or implicit pieces of knowledge that the consumer retains about the brand. Brand associations are formed in the mind of a consumer through a process of learning. However, not all such consumer learning is conscious. A key feature of associative-network models is the concept of spreading activation. Nodes vary in their activation levels, with some nodes having more activation and others having less at any given moment. A node is activated when the consumer perceives a stimulus or cue corresponding to that node. The extent to which activation spreads between two nodes depends on how closely they are linked in the associative network. The associative network conceptualisation of brands has two particularly important marketing implications as follows:·The complex amalgam of activated nodes in a consumer’s associative network for a particular brand is what constitutes the brand’s meaning or image for that consumer and is the basis for the brand’s brand equity. It is therefore a crucial responsibility of brand management to maintain control over what associations become linked into the brand’s network. ·Because typically only a subset of nodes in a brand’s network is activated at once, a brand’s meaning or image is not fixed, even for a given consumer, but varies with the cues or activators present in the specific context. This context sensitivity of brand meaning creates the potential for the strategic activation of specific portions of the associative network, and a great deal of marketing effort can be understood as being directing at activating some portions of the network and not activating others. However, certain nodes in a brand’s network, by virtue of being easily and strongly cued or closely linked to many other nodes in the network, can serve as “primes” or “triggers” to prompt consumers to retrieve a full range of brand associations. A major responsibility of marketing management and practice, therefore, is to establish such primes or triggers, often in the form of tangible brand elements, such as names, logos, symbols, slogans, signage and packages.3. Role of Packaging as a Marketing Communication:

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Cadbury asks, if it succeeds on the principal question, that there be a new trial. If it fails on the principal question but succeeds on the secondary question, Cadbury asks the Full Court to grant appropriate relief. It is convenient to deal with the evidentiary question first. PRIMARY QUESTION: ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DISPUTED EVIDENCE The Evidence Act Under s 56(1) of the Evidence Act, except as otherwise provided by that Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. Section 55(1) relevantly provides that evidence that could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in a proceeding is relevant in that proceeding. It is not disputed that the disputed evidence was relevant in the proceeding. Section 76(1) of the Evidence Act otherwise provides that evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed. That principle is defined as the opinion rule. However, under s 79 of the Evidence Act, if a person has specialised knowledge, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion given by that person about the existence of a fact in issue that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. The specialised knowledge, however, must be based on the person’s training, study or experience. Section 80(b) relevantly provides that evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is a matter of common knowledge. However, even if particular opinion evidence is not excluded by the operation of the opinion rule, the Court has an overriding discretion under s 135 of the Evidence Act to refuse to admit evidence in certain circumstances. In particular, the Court may do so if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might cause or result in undue waste of time. For the purposes of the Evidence Act, probative value of evidence means the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. Cadbury’s Case Before the Primary Judge The disputed evidence consists of opinions about the existence of facts in issue in the proceeding. Darrell Lea contends that the relevant facts in issue are as follows:·Cadbury had exclusive repute in the colour purple;·Darrell Lea, by its use of the colour purple, represented that its products originate from or are associated with Cadbury. In order to place the disputed evidence in its context, it is necessary to explain the case that Cadbury wished to mount against Darrell Lea. Essentially, Cadbury claimed an exclusive association with a colour purple in connection with the marketing of its products in Australia. Cadbury says that Darrell Lea has used Cadbury’s colour purple for its own benefit so as to convey to reasonable consumers a representation that its products originated from or are associated with Cadbury. The relevant allegations in the statement of claim concerning Cadbury’s association with the colour purple may be summarised as follows:·Since approximately 1985, Cadbury has, in and throughout Australia, promoted the colour Cadbury Purple in such a manner as to lead the Australian public to associate the colour Cadbury Purple with:(a)Cadbury chocolate confectionary products;(b)Cadbury; and/or(c)the name “Cadbury”.·Since 1995 at the latest, the colour Cadbury Purple:(a)constituted a separate component of the Cadbury trade indicia;(b)has created an association among the Australian public separate from the name Cadbury in distinctive cursive script and the depiction of a glass and a half of full cream milk;(c)signified and distinctively indicated to the Australian public, Cadbury;(d)signified and distinctively indicated to the Australian public, that the source of chocolate confectionary sold by reference to the colour Cadbury Purple was Cadbury;(e)caused the Australian public to recall Cadbury chocolate confectionary products, Cadbury and/or the name “Cadbury”.·Accordingly, by no later than 1995 Cadbury had achieved a substantial, exclusive and valuable reputation and goodwill throughout Australia in the colour Cadbury Purple.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge rejected the disputed evidence by the application of an incorrect principle. While, if proper objections were taken, the disputed evidence might be wholly inadmissible, it may be that such objections could be overcome by eliciting further evidence. It is clearly not appropriate for the Full Court to endeavour to consider what objections could properly have been taken and what objections would be upheld. Cadbury would be entitled to the opportunity of applying for leave to elicit further evidence to overcome such objections. Conclusion As To New Trial There is no basis for concluding that there was no miscarriage of justice. It cannot be said that the disputed evidence is of so little weight that it could not influence the result of a new trial, so as to produce a different result. Cadbury says that it would be inappropriate for the proceeding to be remitted to the primary judge. Cadbury contends that, in the light of comments made by the primary judge in the course of ruling on the admissibility of the affidavits of Dr Gibbs, his Honour expressed views that indicated his Honour no longer has an open mind concerning the weight that should be accorded to the disputed evidence. Cadbury draws particular attention to the observation made by the primary judge that much of the factual material relied on by Dr Gibbs is vague, tendentious and of little weight. However, in making those comments, his Honour was not referring to the opinions of Dr Gibbs but only to the factual material upon which his opinions were based. There is no reason to conclude that his Honour would not bring a fair and open mind to the question of specific objections to the disputed evidence and the resolution of the issues in the light of any part of the disputed evidence that might ultimately be admitted, consistently with these reasons. In the circumstances, there is no reason why the proceeding should not be remitted to the primary judge for further hearing. Of course, if the primary judge were prepared to entertain a submission that he would not be able to bring an open mind to the resolution of the proceeding in the light of his Honour’s earlier rulings both on the disputed evidence and in the final decision, it would be a matter for his Honour to decide whether he considered it was appropriate for the proceeding to be referred to another judge for a retrial ab initio. COSTS On 21 September 2005, with the consent of the parties, the primary judge directed that:·Cadbury’s evidence in chief be filed by 18 November 2005;·Darrell Lea’s evidence in chief be filed by 23 December 2005; ·Cadbury’s evidence in reply be filed by 20 January 2006;·the trial of the proceeding commence on 20 March 2006.Cadbury filed eight affidavits on 18 November 2005. However, Cadbury filed a further affidavit on 21 November 2005, four more on 23 November 2005 and another one on 1 December 2005. Four of those 14 affidavits were by experts. On 23 December 2005, Darrell Lea’s solicitors wrote to Cadbury’s solicitors foreshadowing objection to parts of the experts’ affidavits on the basis that those parts constituted commentary on consumer research reports carried out by third parties, which had not been proved. On 9 January 2006, Cadbury’s solicitors replied, indicating that all parts of the affidavits would be relied upon.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.