FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Pokémon Company International, Inc. v Redbubble Ltd [2017] FCA 1541
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1541
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Redbubble Ltd had indeed infringed the plaintiff's copyright by reproducing and selling the copyrighted works without authorisation. The court held that the reproduction was not covered by the fair dealing exception, as it was not for the purposes of research or study, criticism or review, or reporting news. The court also found that Redbubble Ltd had engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by representing an affiliation with the plaintiff, which was not the case. The court relied on the provisions of the Copyright Act and the Australian Consumer Law to make these determinations.
The court awarded the plaintiff nominal damages of $1 and ordered Redbubble Ltd to pay 70% of the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding. The court also set out detailed orders for the assessment and determination of costs, including a schedule for the filing of costs summaries and responses, and a hearing to determine the amount of the lump sum costs. The court's decision provides guidance on the scope of copyright protection and the application of the fair dealing exception, as well as the requirements for establishing misleading and deceptive conduct under Australian consumer law.
Orders
Orders of the court
4. The Applicant be awarded nominal damages of $1.
5. The Respondent pay 70% of the Applicant's costs of the proceeding, excluding those costs referred to in Order 4 of the Orders made by Pagone J on 14 March 2017, such costs to be agreed or, in the absence of agreement, to be determined by the Court, in accordance with order 7 below.
6. If the parties reach agreement on the amount of costs to be paid, the parties are to notify the Court of such agreement and provide to the Court short minutes of appropriate orders to be made by consent.
7. If the parties have not reached agreement on the amount of costs to be paid by 12 noon on 19 January 2018, the parties are to notify the Court of the failure to reach agreement by 4pm on 19 January 2018, following which the amount of costs will be determined by the Court in accordance with the Costs General Practice Note (GPN-COSTS), such that:
(a) costs be awarded in a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth);
(b) a Costs Summary, not exceeding 5 pages in length (omitting formal parts), be filed and served by 4pm on 16 February 2018;
(c) any Costs Response, not exceeding 4 pages in length (omitting formal parts), be filed and served by 4pm on 2 March 2018; and
(d) the proceeding be listed for a hearing before a Registrar of the Court to determine the amount of the lump sum at 9.30am on 12 March 2018 or such other time and date as the Court may order.
Schedule 1
Schedule 2
Schedule 3
Schedule 4
Schedule 5
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The permissive system for registration in the United States permits only the owner to be registered. Section 408(a) and (b) of the United States provisions provide:s 408 Copyright registration in general(a)REGISTRATION PERMISSIVE. – At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published or unpublished work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and during the subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.(b)DEPOSIT FOR COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION – Except as provided by subsection (c), the material deposited for registration shall include – (1)in the case of an unpublished work, one complete copy or phonorecord;(2)in the case of a published work, two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition;(3)in the case of a work first published outside the United States, one complete copy or phonorecord as so published;(4)in the case of a contribution to a collective work, one complete copy or phonorecord of the best edition of the collective work.A system of registration which does not confer ownership is consistent with the general rules concerning the ownership of copyright in works. The general rule of ownership of copyright in a work does not depend upon registration but upon identification of the author. Section 126B was inserted into the Copyright Act by the Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Act 2003 (Cth) with effect from 13 May 2003. The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum described the mischief to which it was directed as being to address the “concern about the difficulty and/or expense of proving copyright subsistence and ownership in infringement cases in Australia where evidence to the contrary is not provided”. The section was amended in 2006 by altering the effect of the provision from being prima facie evidence of the matters shown on the face of the certificate with a “stronger presumption that the statements contained on the labels, marks, certificates or other chain of ownership documents are presumed to be stated ‘unless the contrary is established’”: see Explanatory Memorandum to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), paragraph 2.2. It was submitted for Redbubble, however, that the presumption created by s 126B did not, and could not, apply to a certificate of registration of the kind provided in the United States and relied upon by TPCi, because the certificate did not state in express words that the person claiming to be the owner was the owner of copyright in the works. A submission to that effect found favour in Dallas Buyers Club v iiNet (2015) 245 FCR 129 where Perram J concluded that copyright in a film had originally been owned by Dallas Buyers Club LLC and, in reaching that conclusion, disregarded the certificate produced which had also showed that it was the owner of copyright on 1 November 2013. At [35]-[36] his Honour said:35I infer from this evidence that the contractual arrangements which were entered into in order to bring Dallas Buyers Club into existence were made by Dallas Buyers Club LLC. From this I conclude that it was the original copyright owner. It might be noted that the only other possible candidate for the role of producer would have to be Voltage. The ISPs did not submit that the copyright was originally vested in any other entity apart from these two companies. In any event, I conclude that the copyright in the film was originally owned by Dallas Buyers Club LLC.36In reaching that conclusion, however, I disregard the certificate produced by Mr Wickstrom which, according to him, showed that Dallas Buyers Club LLC was the copyright owner on 1 November 2013. Although that is factually correct, the certificate does not advance this case. It is not a certificate which ‘states that a person was the owner of copyright in the work’ within the meaning of s 126B(3) of the Copyright Act so the certificate does not have prima facie effect under that provision. All that the certificate says is that Dallas Buyers Club LLC claims to be the copyright owner. This is not sufficient but, given my conclusions, neither is it relevant.His Honour’s observations about the certificate were, strictly speaking, obiter dicta and were not necessary for the determination of the issues which had arisen before him in interlocutory proceedings. The view expressed by his Honour at [36] that the certificate was not one within the meaning of s 126B(3) of the Copyright Act because the certificate was not one which “states that person was the owner of the copyright of the work”, however, was given in a reasoned decision and should be followed unless persuaded that his Honour’s decision was clearly wrong or plainly wrong: Undershaft (No 1) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 175 FCR 150, [68]-[88]; Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 189 FCR 189, [56]; see also Prebble v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 131 FCR 130. In that context it is relevant that his Honour did not appear to have the evidence about the system of registration in the United States that was in evidence in this proceeding, and that the issue before his Honour may not have been as fully argued as it was in this proceeding.