Adelaide Corporation v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd

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40 CLR 481

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF

THE AUSTRALASIAN PERFORMING RIGHT

RESPONDENT.

ASSOCIATION LIMITED

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

SOUTH AUSTRALIA. Copyright--Musical work-Infringement-Permitting hall to be used for performance

- Hall let for concert-Control of owner over hall-Notice to owner of intended infringement-Omission of owner to do anything-Copyright Act 1912 (No. 20 of 1912), secs. 8, 15-Copyright Act 1911 (1 &2 Geo. v. c. 46), sec. 2 (3).

Sec. 2 (3) of the British Copyright Act 1911 provides that 'Copyright in a work shall also be deemed to be infringed by any person who for his private profit permits a theatre or other place of entertainment to be used for the performance in public of the work without the consent of the owner of the copyright, unless he was not aware, and had no reasonable ground for suspecting, that the performance would be an infringement of copyright."

The appellant corporation let its Town Hall to W. for a series of four vocal concerts. One of the conditions of the agreement was that, should the Town Clerk in the exercise of his judgment see fit, he might cancel the letting. Another condition was that the Town Clerk or City Treasurer might require a programme of the entertainment to be submitted to him and, if in his unfettered discretion he should decide that the programme or any item in it was objectionable or unsuited to the hall, he might prohibit the performance and if necessary stop; and that if the hirer refused, when required, to supply a programme the Town Clerk or City Treasurer might cancel the engagement, prohibit the use of the hall by the hirer and take possession thereof and eject

40 CLR 482

the hirer therefrom. The respondent informed the appellant that a song in which the respondent had the copyright would be sung without its authority in the Town Hall at concerts given by W. The song was sung at two concerts. The appellant did nothing beyond acknowledging the receipt of the information.

Held, by Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ. (Knox C.J. and Isaacs J. dissenting), that no inference should be drawn that the appellant permitted the song to be sung, and therefore that there was no infringement of copyright within the meaning of sec. 2 (3) of the Act.

Decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Full Court) reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of South Australia.

An action was instituted in the Supreme Court of South Australia by the Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. against the Corporation of the City of Adelaide in which the plaintiff, by its writ, claimed an injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing the plaintiff's copyrights and damages for infringement of such copyrights. The plaintiff then moved for an injunction pending the hearing of the action restraining the defendant from infringing the plaintiff's copyright in the musical work "I heard you singing," and in all other musical works whatsoever the copyright of which…

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Details
Case
[1928] HCA 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the Corporation of the City of Adelaide (appellant) and the Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. (respondent). The dispute arose from the respondent's claim that the appellant had infringed its copyright by permitting its Town Hall to be used for the public performance of a musical work, "I heard you singing," without consent. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia on appeal from the Supreme Court of South Australia, which had found in favour of the respondent.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellant had "permitted" the use of the Town Hall for the performance of the copyrighted song, thereby infringing the respondent's copyright under section 2(3) of the Copyright Act 1911 (as adopted in Australia). This section deems copyright to be infringed by any person who, for private profit, permits a place of entertainment to be used for the public performance of a copyrighted work without the copyright owner's consent, unless the person was unaware and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting infringement. The court had to determine if the appellant's actions, or inactions, after being notified of the impending performance, constituted such a "permission."

A majority of the High Court (Higgins, Gavan Duffy, and Starke JJ.) held that no inference of permission could be drawn. They reasoned that while the appellant had the power to cancel the hiring agreement under certain conditions, and had been notified of the potential copyright infringement, there was no positive act or omission that amounted to a "permission" in the legal sense. The court found that the appellant's failure to act beyond acknowledging the respondent's letters did not demonstrate a wilful allowance or sanction of the performance. The majority distinguished this case from situations where a party actively facilitates or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent a known infringement when they have direct control over the infringing act.

The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia was reversed. The High Court found that the appellant had not infringed the respondent's copyright by permitting the performance of the song.

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