FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Goodman Fielder Pte Ltd v Conga Foods Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1808
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1808
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues revolved around whether the defendant's use of the trade marks was deceptively similar to the plaintiff's marks, whether the goods in relation to which the defendant's marks were used were of the same description as those covered by the plaintiff's marks, and whether the defendant's use was likely to deceive or cause confusion. Additionally, the court had to determine if the defence under section 120(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) required pleading or if it could be established without pleading.
The court found that the defendant's use of the marks was likely to deceive or cause confusion, as the inclusion of the word "Rana" alone was not sufficient to prevent consumers from associating the goods with the plaintiff's marks. The court also concluded that the defence under section 120(2) required a pleaded case to establish that the use was not likely to deceive or cause confusion. The defendant failed to provide such a case, and therefore, the defence was not successfully raised. The court further granted partial rectification of the Register to confine the designated goods for the marks to specific categories.
The court ordered the parties to confer and jointly provide short minutes of order, giving effect to the court's reasons and any other matters agreed upon by the parties. The proceeding was listed for a case management hearing to finalise the orders. The reasons for judgment were to be published and disclosed only to the parties and their external legal representatives who were party to confidentiality arrangements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. By 4.00pm on 1 February 2021 the parties are to confer and provide proposed short minutes of order to chambers, with any areas of disagreement noted in mark-up, which:
(a) Give effect to these reasons;
(b) Provide for any proposed suppression order pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in respect of any evidence read or tendered in this proceeding; and
(c) Provide for any proposed redactions of the reasons for judgment published today.
2. The proceeding be listed for case management hearing at 9.30am on 5 February 2021.
3. Until further order, the text of the reasons for judgment published today is to be published and disclosed only to the parties to these proceedings and their external legal representatives who are party to confidentiality arrangements.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The defence may give rise to consideration of what additional features are used in conjunction with the trade mark, which may suggest that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion. This was alluded to by Yates J in Optical 88 (No 2) at [99] (emphasis added):So too it is recognised that, for the purposes of considering infringement under s 120(1), it is beside the point that the alleged infringer has added other material to the impugned trade mark, even if those steps were taken to avoid the likelihood of deception: Saville Perfumery Ltd v June Perfect Ltd (1941) 58 RPC 147 at 161 (Sir Greene MR) and at 174 (Viscount Maugham); Lever Brothers, Port Sunlight Limited v Sunniwite Products Ltd (1949) 66 RPC 84 at 89; Mark Foy’s Ltd v Davies Coop and Co Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 190 at 205; Polaroid Corporation v Sole N Pty Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 491 at 495; New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray Goulburn Co-Operative Company Limited (1989) 86 ALR 549 at 589; Polo Textile Industries Pty Ltd v Domestic Textile Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 227 at 231-232. Considerations of this kind, if raised by an alleged infringer, are relevant when considering infringement under s 120(2) and may be relevant when considering infringement under s 120(3). However, the general position under s 120(1) is that infringement cannot be avoided by, for example, the use of additional matter if the mark itself is taken and used. Once again, if the test is not applied in this fashion a trade mark owner may be deprived of the monopoly conferred by registration. The learned authors of Shanahan’s suggest that the only aspects of a respondent’s use that should be considered relevant to the defence are those in some way peculiar to the respondent’s own product, such as the use of some special get-up or the inclusion of the respondent’s label of its company or business name (at [85.765]). The comparator, for the purpose of the defence, is not, however, against any actual use by the registered trade mark owner, but rather against the fair and normal use of its trade mark within the scope of its registration. Such an approach was adopted by the Full Court in Gallo (FC) at [78], no doubt to accommodate the statutory language “using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion” – the likelihood being judged against such notional use. In Lift Shop Pty Ltd v Easy Living Home Elevators Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 75; 311 ALR 207 at [62], [67], [68] the Full Court (Besanko, Yates and Mortimer JJ) noted in obiter dicta that the primary judge’s findings that the term “lift shop” had an understood generic connotation, and that at the point at which certain web search results were displayed there was no respectable possibility of confusion that the respondent was associated with the applicant, were sufficient circumstances to give rise to the defence under s 120(2). Turning now to consideration of the issues, in my view the applicants’ first submission is to be accepted. To fall within the s 120(2) defence, a respondent to an infringement action must establish that its use of the impugned sign is not likely to deceive or cause confusion. That is what the words “if the person establishes” require: Gallo (Flick J) at [89]; Optical 88 (No 2) at [99]. This requires consideration of such matters as the respondent puts forward to establish the fact, and, in my view, a pleaded case to support that. It is not to the point to submit, as the respondents in this proceeding do, that their case relies on no matters that would be of an unexpected kind. That speaks only to the respondents’ position. Once made aware of the facts, matters and circumstances upon which a respondent may wish to rely, an applicant may wish to call evidence in answer, which is something that cannot be done if it has no notice of the case to be run against it. Accordingly, as a matter of principle in my view a respondent should plead or at the least provide notice of its intention to advance a positive case at trial that using the impugned mark as the respondent did was not likely to deceive or cause confusion. The respondents have not done so here.