Universal Protein Supplements Corporation v Orhan Nuredin
[2024] ATMO 191
•4 October 2024
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Oppositions by Universal Protein Supplements Corporation to registration of trade mark application numbers 2224286 and 2224287 (classes 3 & 5) THE ANIMAL LIFE and THE ANIMAL LIFE (figurative) - in the name of Orhan Nuredin
Delegate: | Timothy Brown |
Representation: | Opponent: Griffith Hack Applicant: YIP LEGAL Pty Ltd |
Decision: | 2024 ATMO 191 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – opposition under section 52 – ss 44, 42(b), 60 and 62A pressed – s 44 established – trade mark refused. |
Background
The decision concerns an opposition under section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)[1] brought by Universal Protein Supplements Corporation (‘Opponent’) to the registration of the following trade marks:
[1] Unless stated otherwise, each reference to a section or regulation is a reference to the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’).
| Trade Mark Number | 2224286 |
| Owner | Orhan Nuredin (‘Applicant’) |
| Filing Date | 1 November 2021 |
| Trade Mark | THE ANIMAL LIFE |
| Goods | Class 3: Cosmetic preparations for skin care; Essences for skin care; Aftershave moisturising cream; Body moisturisers; Facial moisturisers (cosmetic); Exfoliants for the care of the skin; Exfoliants for the cleansing of the skin Class 5: Medicated skin care preparations; Skin care creams for medical use; Skin care lotions (medicated); Medicated creams for moisturising the skin; Moisturisers (pharmaceuticals); Moisturising body lotion (pharmaceutical); Moisturising creams (pharmaceutical); Moisturising gels (pharmaceutical); Moisturising lotions (pharmaceutical); Dietary food supplements; Dietary nutritional supplements; Dietary protein supplements; Dietary supplements; Fibre supplements; Powdered whey protein being dietary supplements; Powdered whey protein being nutritional supplements; Protein dietary supplements; Protein supplements for humans; Vitamin preparations in the nature of food supplements; Vitamin supplements for foodstuffs for human consumption; Vitamin drinks; Vitamin preparations; Vitamin preparations in tablet form; Vitamin preparations for human consumption; Vitamin supplements; Vitamin tablets; Vitamins (‘Applicant’s Goods’) |
| Trade Mark Number | 2224287 |
| Owner | Orhan Nuredin |
| Filing Date | 1 November 2021 |
| Trade Mark | (‘Applicant’s Composite Mark’) |
| Goods | Applicant’s Goods |
For the purposes of this decision, I will refer to both of the above trade marks, collectively, as the ‘Trade Marks’.
The Trade Marks were examined, and acceptance of the Trade Marks was advertised on 2 April 2022. On 1 June 2022, the Opponent filed Notices of Intention to Oppose the registration of the Trade Marks, followed by Statements of Grounds and Particulars on 29 June 2022. The Applicant filed Notices of Intention to Defend on 8 August 2022.
The Opponent filed evidence in support of the oppositions on 9 November 2022. The Applicant filed evidence in answer on 13 February 2023. The Opponent did not file evidence in reply.
Following the end of the evidence stages, the Opponent requested a hearing by way of written submissions. The Opponent filed written submissions prepared by Shannon Fati and Nicola Scheepers of Griffith Hack. The Applicant filed written submissions prepared by Andrew Petale of YIP Legal Pty Ltd. The matter was subsequently allocated to me, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, to be determined.
Grounds, Onus and Relevant Date
The nominated grounds of opposition are ss 43, 44, 58, 60, 42(b), and 62A. In its written submissions, the Opponent indicated that they were not pressing s 43, and I consider the ground abandoned.
The Opponent bears the onus of establishing one or more of the grounds of opposition.[2] The required standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities.[3] The date at which the rights of the parties will be determined is 1 November 2021 (‘Relevant Date’), being the filing date of the Trade Marks and the priority date of the Trade Marks for the purposes of ss 44 and 60.
[2] Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP [2010] FCAFC 58, [32] ((Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot JJ).
[3] Pfizer Products Inc v Karam (2006) FCA 1663, [6]-[26] (Gyles J); Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 156, [133] (Besanko, Jagot and Edelman JJ).
Evidence
The following evidence was filed:
| Evidence in Support |
| Declaration of Michael Rockoff, President of the Opponent dated 1 November 2022 (‘Rockoff Declaration’) with Exhibits MR-1 to MR-17, including Confidential Exhibits MR-9, MR-10, MR-13, MR-14 and MR-15. |
| Evidence in Answer |
| Declaration of Orhan Nuredin dated 1 February 2023 (‘Nuredin Declaration’) with Annexure ON-1. |
Opponent
Mr Rockoff declares that the Opponent was established in 1977 in Linden, New Jersey, and is a leading manufacturer of sports and body building nutritional supplements.
Mr Rockoff declares that since 2003 the Opponent has sold products bearing a range of trade marks, all of which incorporate the word ‘Animal’. Examples specified in the Rockoff Declaration include ‘Animal Fury’, ‘Animal Energy’, ‘Animal Flex’, ‘Animal Greens’, ‘Animal Immune Pak’, ‘Animal Omega’, ‘Animal Meal, ‘Animal Pump’, ‘Animal Test’, and ‘Animal Whey’.[4] Annexed to the Rockoff Declaration is a screenshot of a product list taken from the Opponent’s Website, (‘Opponent’s Website’), showing the use of these trade marks.[5] In addition to nutritional supplements, Mr Rockoff attests that the Opponent has sold clothing and fitness accessories bearing these ‘Animal’ trade marks for the past 19 years.
[4] Rockoff Declaration [13].
[5] Ibid Exhibit MR-2.
The Opponent is the owner of the following trade mark registrations (‘Opponent’s Registrations’):
| Trade Mark No. | Trade Mark | Priority Date | Class[6] |
| 1289894 | 16 March 2009 | Class 5 | |
| 1289895 | ANIMAL PAK | 16 March 2009 | Class 5 |
| 1417132 | ANIMAL RAGE | 30 September 2010 | Class 5 |
| 1452544 | ANIMAL (‘Opponent’s Word Mark’) | 6 October 2011 | Class 5 |
| 1617653 | 16 April 2014 | Class 25 | |
| 1695425 | ANIMAL WHEY | 22 December 2014 | Class 5 |
| 1695426 | ANIMAL JUICED AMINOS | 22 May 2015 | Class 5 |
| 1726508 | ANIMAL MASS | 29 May 2015 | Class 5 |
| 1766864 | 26 April 2016 | Class 5 |
[6] The full specifications for each of the Opponent Registrations is included in Annexure A of this decision.
Mr Rockoff states that EMI Nutrition Pty Ltd (‘EMI’) was the exclusive distributor of the Opponent’s products in Australia. According to Mr Rockoff, EMI and the Opponent entered an arrangement on 9 February 2003 for distribution of the Opponent’s goods in Australia. Mr Rockoff notes that the parties did not enter into a written agreement. Exhibited to the Rockoff Declaration is an extract dated March 2010 from another of the Opponent’s websites, which specifies EMI as the Opponent’s Australian international distributor.[7] Mr Rockoff explains that EMI sold and distributed the Opponent’s products to various retailers in Australia, including gyms, health stores, pharmacies, online retailers and personal trainers. EMI was later acquired by Glanbia PLC (‘Glanbia’) in 2016, who currently operate as the Opponent’s Australian distributor. Exhibited to the Rockoff Declaration are screenshots from one of Glanbia’s websites, featuring the following trade mark:
[7] Ibid Exhibit MR-6.
The Opponent promotes its trade marks via the Opponent’s Website and through social media, including via Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter. Extracts from the Opponent’s social media accounts are exhibited to the Rockoff Declaration.[8] Other marketing initiatives include advertisements on its distributor’s websites,[9] and promotion of the trade marks at Australian fitness expos and trade shows, namely the FitX 2014 show in Melbourne, The World GPA Power Lifting Competition 2014 in Sydney, and the Arnold Classic in 2015 and 2016. Exhibited to the Rockoff Declaration are photographs from the 2015 Arnold Classic Fitness Expo, which show use of ‘ANIMAL’ on whey protein powder, T-shirts, drink bottles and gym bags,[10] and invoices for expenditure incurred by EMI at the FitX, and Arnold Classic 2016 trade shows.[11] The Opponent’s Registrations are also promoted on its distributor’s website.
[8] Ibid Exhibit MR-5.
[9] Ibid Exhibit MR-7.
[10] Ibid Exhibit MR-8.
[11] Ibid Confidential Exhibit MR-13 and MR-14.
The Rockoff Declaration exhibits a survey entitled Bold Discovery conducted during the Arnold Classic 2016 trade show, which includes the survey results from over 2000 responses to questions regarding, amongst other things, where consumers have heard or purchased the goods bearing the Opponent’s Registrations.[12]
[12] Ibid Confidential Exhibit MR-15.
The Rockoff Declaration includes wholesale sales between the Opponent to Glanbia from 2016 to 2022,[13] and between the Opponent and EMI from July 2013 to February 2016.[14] For context to those annual turnovers, the Rockoff Declaration also includes EMI’s price list from 2014 to 2016,[15] showing the specific individual unit prices for the Opponent’s products.
[13] Ibid Confidential Exhibit MR-10.
[14] Ibid Confidential Exhibit MR-9.
[15] Ibid Exhibit MR-11-12.
Applicant
The Applicant is a professional MMA fighter and founder of the Melbourne Muay Thai Academy. Mr Nuredin declares that in late 2020 he ‘came up with the name THE ANIMAL LIFE for a line of sports apparel and fitness equipment products’ targeted towards martial artists. Mr Nuredin states ‘THE ANIMAL LIFE’ was first used in relation to clothing and fitness equipment on 30 June 2021. Annexed to the Nuredin Declaration are screenshots of the Opponent’s Instagram Account showing use of the Trade Marks on clothing, skipping ropes, gym bags, beanies and boxing bags.[16]
[16] Nuredin Declaration Annexure ON-1.
Mr Nuredin explains that around October 2021 he decided to expand his business to include cosmetics and supplement products. This led to the filing of the applications to register the Trade Marks. Mr Nuredin declares that, at the time of the Nuredin Declaration, he has not released any cosmetic or supplements products.
Discussion and Reasons
Section 44 relevantly provides:
(1)Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant’s trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant’s goods) must be rejected if:
(a)the applicant’s trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:
(i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or
(ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and
(b)the priority date for the registration of the applicant’s trade mark in respect of the applicant’s goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.
To succeed under this ground, the Opponent must establish that the Trade Marks are substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, another trade mark with an earlier priority date, in the name of person other than the Applicant, in respect of goods that are similar, or services that are closely related, to the Applicant’s Goods.
In the SGP, the Opponent relies on the Opponent’s Registrations as the basis for this ground of opposition.
I note that each of the Opponent’s Registrations has an earlier priority date than the Trade Marks and are in name of someone other than the Applicant.
Comparison of Goods
Section 14 provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, goods are similar to other goods:
(a) if they are the same as the other goods; or
(b) if they are of the same description as that of the other goods.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, services are similar to other services:
(a) if they are the same as the other services; or
(b) if they are of the same description as that of the other services.
Whether goods are of the same description depends on ‘whether the goods belong to the same or different trades’[17]. This is determined through consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the goods,[18] the purpose for which the goods will be used,[19] and the trade channels through which the goods are bought and sold.[20] In Reckitt and Colman (Australia) Limited v Boden, Dixon J stated:
What forms the same description of goods must be discovered from a consideration of the course of trade or business. One factor is the use to which the two sets of goods are put. Another is whether they are commonly dealt with in the same course of trade or business.[21]
[17] Re Jellinek’s Application (1947) 63 RPC 59, 64 (Romer J).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid; see also: Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd [1954] HCA 82, [5] (Kitto J).
[21] (1954) 70 CLR 84, 94.
The goods specified in class 5 of the Opponent’s Registrations at their broadest are described as ‘health…supplements’[22], and include nutritional, dietary, herbal and mineral supplements, vitamins, protein powder and meal replacements. These goods are clearly the same as the Applicant’s Goods in class 5 relating to supplements and vitamins.
[22] See: Annexure A - specification for Trade Mark Application Number Trade Mark Registration 1452544.
The remainder of the Applicant’s Goods, in both classes 3 and 5, relate to skincare, and include moisturisers, lotions, exfoliators and medicated lotions. The Opponent submits that these goods are similar to the Opponent’s goods in class 5 on the basis that skincare and supplement products are sold via the same trade channels, such as pharmacies, supermarkets and department stores, often in the same aisle and in close proximity. The Opponent further submits that it is common for retailers who specialise in skincare products to also sell nutritional supplements. In its submissions the Opponent referred to, and included screenshots of, the websites of several cosmetic retailers, namely Mecca and Sephora. As this material was not included in the Opponent’s evidence or accompanied by a request for its consideration under regs 21.15(4) or 21.19, I have not taken it into consideration.
In contrast, the Applicant submits that the goods should not be considered similar because supplements and skincare products differ in use and application, the former being consumables while the latter being for cosmetic application to the body.
I acknowledge that there is a difference in the nature of the products. However, I do not consider the distinction between the goods to be as clear as characterised by the Applicant. Health supplements are not limited to consumables and are also sold in the form of topical applications, gels, lotions or ointments. One such example is magnesium cream. There is little difference between these goods and the medicated moisturisers and skin care preparations specified in class 5 of the Applicant’s Goods.
There is also common purpose between the goods with many dietary and nutritional supplements specifically sold for the purposes of skin care. Furthermore, many skincare topical applications are fortified with vitamins and minerals. These goods are provided by traders of both skincare products and vitamin supplements. For example, supplement brands Swisse and Blackmores provide, in addition to vitamins and supplements, moisturisers and topical skincare supplements:
This similarity extends to the channels in which the goods are bought and sold. Cosmetic retailers, such as Adore Beauty, provide both health supplements and skin care products. Similarly, both categories of goods can be found in relative proximity in pharmacies.
The consideration of ‘goods of the same description’ is not concerned solely with whether the goods the same, but with the need to avoid deception in the market place. As stated by Burley J in Goodman Fielder Pte Ltd v Conga Foods Pty Ltd:
Accordingly, courts in recent times have consistently found it to be of significance that the policy underlying the expression “goods of the same description” is the need to avoid any confusion and deception in the market place which would be likely to arise should a mark become available for use by two or more different companies upon goods of the same description. That policy, when considered in the context of modern shopping practices in large stores where multiple products can be displayed near each other, such as in supermarkets, tends to expand the likelihood that products that at first blush are of quite different character and which are manufactured differently will nonetheless be goods of the same description because there is an increased likelihood that goods will be placed in close proximity to each other in the same store.[23]
[23] [2020] FCA 1808, [286].
For all these reasons, I am satisfied that all of the Applicant’s Goods are similar to the Opponent’s goods in Class 5. The exception being the goods of trade mark registration number 1617653 in class 25 which relate to clothing and apparel. I consider these goods to be clearly distinct from the Applicant’s Goods.
I will now consider whether the Trade Marks are substantially identical or deceptively similar to the Opponent’s Registrations.
Comparison of Trade Marks
For the purposes of comparison, I have initially considered the Trade Marks and the Opponent’s Mark, which are shown below:
| Trade Marks | Opponent’s Mark |
| THE ANIMAL LIFE | ANIMAL |
| (‘Applicant’s Composite Mark’ |
In The Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (‘Shell & Esso’) Windeyer J explained the test for determining substantial identity:
In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.[24]
[24] [1963] HCA 66; (1963) 109 CLR 407, [12].
It is apparent on a side by side comparison that the Trade Marks are not substantially identical to the Opponent’s Mark. There are visual and aural differences between the trade marks, such as the additional element ‘LIFE’ and the heavily stylised features of the Applicant’s Composite Mark. Having regard to these features, I do not consider there to be a total impression of resemblance between the trade marks.
Section 10 defines ‘deceptive similarity’ in the following terms:
For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.
The approach for assessing whether trade marks are deceptively similar was outlined by Windeyer J in Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd:
The marks are not now to be looked at side by side. The issue is not abstract similarity, but deceptive similarity. Therefore the comparison is the familiar one of trade mark law. It is between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of the plaintiff's mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have; and, on the other hand, the impressions that such persons would get from the defendant's [mark].[25]
[25] [1963] HCA 66, [13].
The basis for any deception or confusion is the impression or recollection of the trade marks that is carried away and retained by the ordinary consumer.[26] Accordingly, an allowance is made for imperfect recollection of the trade marks.[27] The impression comes from the trade marks in their entirety,[28] and is informed by the look, sound and ideas conveyed by the trade marks.[29]
[26] Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641, 658 (Dixon and McTiernan JJ).
[27] Crazy Ron's Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196, [77] (Moore, Sackville, and Emmett JJ).
[28] Clarke v Sharp (1898) 15 RPC 141, 146 (Byrne J).
[29] Cooper Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Sigmund Pumps Ltd (1952) 86 CLR 536, 538 (Dixon, Williams and Kitto JJ).
For trade marks to be considered deceptively similar there must be a real and tangible danger of deception or confusion occurring.[30] This will be the case where there is a real likelihood that an ordinary person would be caused to wonder whether the goods or services come from the same trade source.[31]
[30] Southern Cross Refrigerating v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, 595 (Kitto J); Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020, [50] (French J).
[31] Ibid.
The Opponent submits that the dominant cognitive cue of the Trade Marks is the word ‘ANIMAL’, a word that is also common to the Opponent Registrations, and the leading element of each of the trade marks. Further, the Opponent contends that the idea left in the minds of consumers will be the reference to an ‘animal’.
The Applicant submits that the inclusion of the elements ‘THE’ and ‘LIFE’ in the Trade Marks is a significant point of differentiation between the trade marks. The Applicant contends that the comparison between the trade marks is analogous the comparison undertaken in the decision of Monster Energy Company v PepsiCo,[32] in which MONSTER MUNCH was found not to be deceptively similar to MONSTER MEAL DEAL, and the comparison of the trade marks VOGUE and EUROVOGUE in the decision of Conde Nast Publications Pty Ltd v Taylor,[33] in which VOGUE and EUROVOGUE were not considered deceptively similar.
[32] [2021] ATMO 85.
[33] [1998] FCA 864 (Burchett J).
The Applicant also submits that ‘THE ANIMAL LIFE’ has an entirely different connotation and meaning to the word ‘ANIMAL’. In the Applicant’s view, ‘THE ANIMAL LIFE’ alludes to a lifestyle that is animalistic, an idea not conveyed by the word ‘ANIMAL’ alone without any further qualification.
I do not agree with the Applicant’s submissions. The Trade Marks are comprised of the words ‘THE ANIMAL LIFE’ and, in the case of the Applicant’s Composite Mark, a depiction of a gorilla and encased in an ornate frame. The Opponent’s Mark is comprised solely of the word ‘ANIMAL’. As the Opponent notes, the word ‘ANIMAL’ is the leading element of each trade mark. Whilst I acknowledge the presence of the article ‘THE’ in the Trade Marks, in my view ‘THE’ does not change or overall idea of the Trade Marks or have some other impact that may serve to distinguish the Trade Marks from the Opponent’s Mark. I do not consider it an essential feature of the Trade Marks. Accordingly, visually and aurally, there is resemblance between the Trade Marks and the Opponent’s Mark due to use of the term ‘ANIMAL’ as the leading word component of the trade marks. It is well established that the beginning of a mark is generally the most important for the purposes of distinction.[34]
[34] London Lubricants (1920) Limited’s Application (1924) 42 RPC 264, 279.
Regarding the Applicant’s Composite Mark, I note that the ornate frame and the device depicting a gorilla are prominent stylised aspects of the trade mark. However, in my view, the gorilla device, while memorable, serves to further reinforce the ‘ANIMAL’ aspect of the trade mark. Furthermore, the Opponent’s Mark lacks any devices or stylised aspects that may serve to further differentiate the trade marks.
Turning to the conceptual differences asserted by the Applicant, I acknowledge the potential for consumers to construe the Trade Marks in the manner described by the Applicant. However, ‘LIFE’ is a word with meaning and connotations relevant to the Applicant’s Goods. In the context of health and wellness goods, ‘LIFE’ conveys notions of growth, vitality, vigor or general well-being. In my view, consumers are likely, in the context of health products, to consider the addition of ‘LIFE’ as an extension of the Opponent’s Mark, or otherwise have less regard to the element than the word ‘ANIMAL’. I also do not consider the idea or concept of an ‘ANIMAL LIFE’ to be sufficiently distinct from impression of the word ‘ANIMAL’. The overall impression consumers are likely to take away from each of the marks is very similar.
Although the Trade Marks each contain additional elements, in my view, ‘ANIMAL’, being the sole element of the Opponent’s Mark retains its identity within each of the Trade Marks. I consider that consumers with an imperfect recollection of the Opponent’s Mark would be caused to wonder whether goods bearing either of the Trade Marks are in some manner connected to the Opponent’s Mark. For these reasons I am satisfied that the Opponent’s Mark is deceptively similar to the Trade Marks. Accordingly, the section 44 ground of opposition has been established.
I note that the SGP also referred the remainder of Opponent’s Registrations. However, it is not necessary to consider these trade marks any further, noting my conclusions in relation to the Opponent’s Mark.
For completeness, the Applicant has not filed any evidence that would permit a finding of honest concurrent use or prior use.[35] Nor has the Applicant drawn my attention to any other relevant circumstances that may be considered under s 44(3)(b).
[35] Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 44(3)(a) and 44(4).
Decision
Section 55(1) of the Act relevantly provides:
Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:
(a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or
(b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;
having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.
The Opponent has established a ground of opposition under section 44. Accordingly, I refuse to register trade mark application numbers 2224286 and 2224287.
Costs
Both parties sought an award of costs. As the Opponent has been successful, I award costs against the Applicant under section 221 in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Regulations in respect of trade mark number 2224286. For trade mark number 2224287, I award reduced costs against the Applicant in the same manner as Hume Industries (Malayasia) Berhad v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd.[36]
[36] [2001] ATMO 78 (Delegate Williams).
Timothy Brown
Hearing Officer
Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks
4 October 2024
Annexure A – Specifications of the Opponent’s Registrations
Trade Mark Registration 1289894
Class 5: Supplements, namely, dietary food supplements, dietary supplements, food supplements, herbal supplements, meal replacement and dietary supplement drink mixes, mineral nutritional supplements, mineral supplements, nutritional supplements, nutritional supplement drink mix, vitamin and mineral supplements, vitamin supplements, meal replacement bars
Class 25: Clothing, namely, hats, caps, bottoms, tops, shorts, pants, shirts, sweat shirts, sweat pants, sweat shorts, sweat jackets
Trade Mark Registration 1289895
Class 5: Dietary food supplements; a nutritional supplement comprised of but not limited to vitamins, minerals and training nutrients
Trade Mark Registration 1417132
Class 5: Powdered nutritional supplement drink mix for human consumption; dietary supplement drink mixes in powdered form for human consumption
Trade Mark Registration 1452544
Class 5: Human dietary, health, body building and fitness supplements, including without limitation dietary food supplements, herbal supplements, meal replacement and dietary supplement drink mixes, mineral nutritional supplements, mineral supplements, nutritional supplements, nutritional supplement drink mixes, vitamin and mineral supplements, vitamin supplements, meal replacement bars, protein supplement
Trade Mark Registration 1617653
Class 25: Apparel (clothing, footwear, headgear); Headgear for wear; Footwear; Clothing
Trade Mark Registration 1695425
Class 5: Nutritional Supplements for human consumption
Trade Mark Registration 1695426
Class 5: Nutritional supplements for human consumption
Trade Mark Registration 1726508
Class 5: Nutritional Supplements
Trade Mark Registration 1766864
Class 5: Nutritional supplements; powdered nutritional supplement drink
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Intellectual Property
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Commercial Law
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