Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Apple Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [2014] FCA 1304

Citation: Apple Inc. v Registrar of Trade Marks [2014] FCA 1304
Appeal from: Apple Inc. [2013] ATMO 13
Parties: APPLE INC. v REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
File number(s): NSD 428 of 2013
Judge(s): YATES J
Date of judgment: 3 December 2014
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – application to register APP STORE as a trade mark – whether the mark is capable of distinguishing the applicant’s designated services from the services of other persons within the meaning of s 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – consideration of the notion of inherent adaptation to distinguish

TRADE MARKS – Convention application – whether the test under s 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) is to be considered at the priority date for registration of the mark or the filing date of the application for the mark

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –  trade marks – appeal from decision of a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks rejecting a trade mark application – consideration of the role of the Registrar of Trade Marks in the appeal proceeding

Legislation: Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 12, 20, 29, 31, 33, 35, 38, 41, 44, 60, 72
Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) reg 3
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1905 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 34
Cases cited:

Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50
Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511
Modena Trading Pty Ltd v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd (2013) 215 FCR 16
Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (2002) 122 FCR 494
Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 93 FCR 365
Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115
Rowntree PLC v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1988) 90 FLR 398 Eclipse Sleep Products Incorporated v The Registrar of Trade Marks (1957) 99 CLR 300 at 308
Registrar of Trade Marks v Muller (1980) 144 CLR 37 at 41
Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1957) 99 CLR 453 at 457
Chocolaterie Guylian NV v Registrar of Trade Marks (2009) 180 FCR 60
Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1953) 91 CLR 592
Austereo Pty Ltd v DMG Radio (Australia) Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 93
Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (2000) 47 IPR 579
Howard Auto-Cultivators Limited v Webb Industries Proprietary Limited (1946) 72 CLR 175
Eastman Photographic Materials Company, Limited v The Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks [1898] AC 571
Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 275 ALR 526
Societe Des Produits Nestle SA v Unilever plc [2003] RPC 35
Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 97
Merck & Co Inc v Sankyo Co Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 415

Date of hearing: 18, 19 November and 5 December 2013
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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1304
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks concerned an application by Apple to register "APP STORE" as a trade mark for various services, which was rejected by the Registrar of Trade Marks. The primary legal issue was whether the term "APP STORE" was capable of distinguishing Apple's services from those of other traders, under section 41 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). The court also needed to determine whether the test for registrability under section 41 should be assessed at the priority date for registration or the filing date of the application. The court considered the role of the Registrar in the appeal process and the linguistic evidence provided by Professor Harris, who opined that "APP STORE" had a non-compositional meaning and was inherently adapted to distinguish Apple's services.

The court found that the correct date for assessing registrability under section 41 was the filing date of the application, not the priority date, distinguishing this case from previous decisions. The court also rejected the Registrar's view that the term "APP STORE" was purely descriptive. Instead, the court accepted Professor Harris's expert linguistic evidence that "APP STORE" had a unique and non-compositional meaning, which distinguished Apple's services from those of other traders. The court found that the term "APP STORE" was not inherently descriptive and had the requisite capacity to distinguish Apple's services. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and Apple was ordered to pay the Registrar's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The above quotation is taken from the transcript of the commercial in the form in which it was tendered, using “the App Store”: Exhibit A3. However, on viewing the commercial, what one hears is simply the words “the app store”, without the significance that one might perceive those words to have on reading them with the capitalisation provided in the transcript.THE EXPERT LINGUISTIC EVIDENCEProfessor Harris Professor Harris carried out a linguistic analysis of APP STORE. He made two affidavits. His first affidavit annexed a declaration he had prepared for Apple’s Community Trade Mark Application No. 009852691 for the registration of APP STORE as a trade mark. In his affidavit, Professor Harris drew attention to the fact that, when making the declaration, he had in mind English as spoken in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. For the purpose of this proceeding, he reconsidered the declaration having regard to the fact that it would be used in an Australian context. He said that the fact that the declaration would be relied on for use in an Australian context did not cause him to change the opinions expressed in it. His second affidavit annexed a report he prepared to address a number of matters raised in an affidavit made by Dr Neil James, which was filed and read by the Registrar. Professor Harris expressed the opinion that the expression “app store” cannot be fully‑understood by simply combining the meanings of its component parts “app” and “store”. In other words, the combination “app store” does not have a “compositional” meaning. According to him, “the compound APP STORE can only be fully‑understood non‑compositionally”. This is because, in Professor Harris’ view, the compound expression “entrenched a narrower meaning” of “app” than was generally current before the commencement of Apple’s App Store, and “ushered in a novel meaning” of “store”. In his declaration, Professor Harris developed the notion that “store”, as used by Apple, had a novel meaning by referring to the fact that the App Store service does not involve a store with a physical presence and operates in a way that the customer “pays not for the software itself but rather for a licence that allows the software to run on Apple devices”. Professor Harris said that the use of the word “store” was unique to Apple’s products and services. He developed this notion further in his report where he said that there were four “noteworthy aspects” to the meaning to be attached to Apple’s use of the word “store” in the expression “app store”, namely: ·the non-physicality of the outlet;·the intangibility of the goods on offer;·the downloading of software licences onto a hardware device, and·the showcasing of different sellers’ goods in one location. Professor Harris said: 13.… None of these aspects was in and of itself new in 2008 when Apple introduced the App Store. Indeed the term store could already be used to refer to outlets that combined two of these aspects. For example, there were virtual stores that sold tangible goods (such as mail-order stores and online stores such as Amazon) and physical stores that sold physical software products along with licenses (such as CD-ROMs available in high-street stores). What was novel was Apple’s extension of store’s meaning to encompass all four of these aspects simultaneously.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It does not seem that the correct date for assessing registrability under s 41 of the Act was in dispute or was even raised as a question in either Austereo or Chocolaterie Guylian. Certainly no argument on that matter is recorded in the respective reasons for judgment. The question has been raised in the present appeal. It is a question which, therefore, falls for resolution. That being the case, I do not, with utmost respect, consider that Austereo and ChocolaterieGuylian correctly state the date at which registrability under s 41 is to be assessed. To that extent, I do not propose to follow those cases. In my view, registrability under s 41 of the Act must be assessed at the filing date of the application.THE DECISION BELOW As I have noted, the delegate rejected the application in its entirety. The delegate relied on dictionary meanings for the words “app” (“An application, esp. an application program”) and “store” (“A place where merchandise is kept for sale …”) and reasoned that: 19.… by applying the general meanings which may be attributed to the separate words “APP and “STORE” the applicant’s trade mark, APP STORE, can therefore be defined as a store (or retail outlet) that sells or provides computer application programs. Given the applicant’s claimed services in Class 35, the applicant’s trade mark clearly indicates that it operates a retail store which sells software application programs. I believe that the expression APP STORE is a term which is relatively straight forward, easily defined and well understood by modern digital-savvy consumers who are likely to be the customers seeking out and using the applicant’s services. The delegate found that the mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish Apple’s designated services in Class 35. The delegate found that the mark is “purely”, “directly” or “inherently” descriptive. The delegate extended this conclusion to Apple’s designated services in Classes 38 and 42 for which Apple had also sought registration in the same application. In this connection, the delegate found: 22.In respect of the services listed in classes 38 and 42, I note the following. The applicant’s services in classes 38 and 42 include electronic transmission of computer software via the Internet and other computer and electronic communication networks and the maintenance, repair and updating of computer software and of handheld mobile digital electronic devices and other consumer electronics. With an APP STORE (like a “computer store”) a number of other services are likely to fall within the purview of the store and this is likely to be understood and assumed by consumers. It is likely that a place a customer has ‘purchased’ a good or service from will be available to deal with faults or issues that the customer encounters regarding those goods or services. Apple had submitted that the lack of use of the expression “app store” by other traders indicated that the mark was, at least to some extent, inherently adapted to distinguish Apple’s services from those of other traders. The delegate rejected that submission, stating: 23.… [the] submissions about the use and/or lack of use of the expression APP STORE by other traders makes an unwarranted assumption that customers and other traders will tend to disregard the general and descriptive meaning of the expression APP STORE in favour of using other descriptive expressions such as SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS SHOP. However, the use of the acronym APP in place of Application and the supposedly interchangeable use of words such as SHOP with STORE does not confer the requisite capacity to distinguish on the applicant’s trade mark. Nor do I believe that a customer looking for application programs is going to be ignorant of or ignore the inherently descriptive meaning of APP STORE particularly when it is presented in plain text.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established