HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ.
REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS v. MULLER
9 September 1980
Trade Mark
Trade Mark—Word mark—"Less"—Registration sought in respect of pharmaceutical products—Whether direct reference to character or quality of goods—Parts A and B of Register—Whether distinctiveness of mark essential for registration in Part A—Distinctiveness—Adapted to distinguish—Entitlement to registration—Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), ss. 24 (1) (d), 26 (1).
Decision
September 9.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment: -
This is an appeal pursuant to a grant by this Court of special leave from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Fullagar J.) allowing an appeal from the refusal of the Registrar of Trade Marks to register as a trade mark the word "LESS" in respect of "pharmaceutical products". (at p39)
2. Registration was sought in Pt A of the register upon the ground that the word "LESS" fell within s. 24 (1) (d) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, as amended ("the Act"). (at p39)
3. Section 24 (1) (d) is in the following terms:
"A trade mark is registrable in Part A of the Register if it contains or consists of - . . .(d) a word not having direct reference to the character or quality of the goods in respect of which registration is sought and not being, according to its ordinary meaning, a geographical name or a surname." (at p40)
4. The Registrar rejected the application. First, he was of the opinion that "in respect of some preparations the mark LESS would indicate to possible purchasers that the product contains less of some particular ingredient or that less of that material is required to achieve an effective result for the purpose required. We think that more likely to be the impression if the preparation is known to contain ingredients which in excess can be harmful or if the preparation in normal dosage has undesirable side effects". (at p40)
5. On the other hand, Fullagar J. felt that the word "LESS" carried no clear meaning at all and thus could not refer directly to the character or quality of any substance. (at p40)
6. The question whether words have a direct reference to the character or quality of goods is in our opinion to be answered by applying the test posed by Dixon C.J. in Mark Foy's Ltd. v. Davies Coop. &Co. Ltd. ("the Tub Happy Case") (1956) 95 CLR 190, at p 195 . The Chief Justice said: "The test must lie in the probability of ordinary persons understanding the words, in their application to the goods, as describing or indicating or calling to mind either their nature or some attribute they possess." Kitto J., though dissenting, applied a similar test when he said (1956) 95 CLR, at p 207 : "One has to look at the words as they would present themselves to the persons who are to look at them and form an opinion as to what…
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- Case
- [1980] HCA 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the word "MULLEROID" was inherently adapted to distinguish the goods of Mr. Muller from the goods of other persons, as required by section 26(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth). This involved considering whether the word was descriptive of the goods themselves or their origin, or whether it was capable of functioning as a trade mark to indicate a trade source. The court also had to consider the Registrar's argument that the word was likely to become a common name for the goods.
The court reasoned that the word "MULLEROID" was not inherently descriptive of plastic materials in sheets, rods, tubes, or profiles. While the suffix "-oid" might suggest a resemblance to something, it did not, in combination with "MULLER," describe the essential characteristics or nature of the goods. The court found that the word was capable of distinguishing the goods and that there was no evidence to suggest it was already a common descriptive term or was likely to become one. The principles applied centred on the interpretation of "inherently adapted to distinguish" and the assessment of whether a mark was descriptive or capable of indicating trade origin.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Federal Court and remitting the matter to the Registrar with a direction to proceed with the registration of the trade mark.
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