Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Philmac Pty Limited v The Registrar of Trade Marks

[2002] FCA 1551

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – application for registration of a trade mark – colour mark – capability of colour applied to the designated goods of the applicant to distinguish those goods from the goods of other persons – whether mark inherently adapted to distinguish – whether by reason of the extent of the applicant’s use of the mark the mark in fact distinguished the applicant’s goods.

JURISDICTION – appeal from decision of Registrar of Trade Marks under s 35(b) Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – nature of appeal – appeal in nature of hearing de novo.

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 6, 17, 19, 27, 33(3), 35, 41, 63, 65, 120, 197.
Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), s 6

Blount v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50 – discussed
Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 411 – referred to

Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 – referred to
Rowntree PLC v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1988) 90 FLR 398 – referred to
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 44 IPR 551; [1999] FCA 816 – referred to
Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2000] FCA 177 – referred to
Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 – applied
Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCAFC 273 – discussed
‘Weldmesh’ Trade Mark [1966] RPC 220 – discussed
Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417 – discussed
FH Faulding & Co Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand Ltd (1965) 112 CLR 537 – discussed
Blue Paraffin Trade Mark [1977] RPC 473 – cited
Nor-Am Chem. Co. v OM Scott & Sons Co, 44 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1316 – discussed
Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products (1997) 40 IPR 279 – referred to British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 – referred to
TGI Fridays Australia Pty Ltd v TGI Friday’s Inc (2000) 100 FCR 358 – cited
Re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation 774 F 2d 1116 (1985) – considered

Campbell Soup Co v Amrour & Co 138 F 2d 4 (7th Cir 1950) – discussed

Genetics Institute Inc. v Kirin-Amgen Inc. (No.3) (1998) 41 IPR 325 – referred to
Merck & Co. Inc. v Sankyo Co. Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 415 – referred to

PHILMAC PTY LIMITED (ACN 007 873 047) v THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS

S 8 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
13 DECEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 8 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

PHILMAC PTY LIMITED (ACN 007 873 047)
APPLICANT

AND:

THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

13 DECEMBER 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant, Philmac Pty Ltd (Philmac), appeals under s 35 of the Trade Marks Act 1995

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1551
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Philmac Pty Ltd filed an appeal against the Registrar of Trade Marks in relation to the registration of a trade mark for a specific type of irrigation pipe fitting. The primary issue before the court was whether the proposed trade mark was capable of distinguishing Philmac’s goods from those of other manufacturers. The court was required to determine if the trade mark met the criteria for registration under the relevant legislation, particularly whether it was inherently adapted to distinguish the goods and whether it distinguished the goods in practice.

The court found that the trade mark was indeed capable of distinguishing Philmac's goods from those of other manufacturers. The analysis involved examining whether the trade mark was inherently adaptable to distinguishing the goods and whether it achieved this distinction in practice. The court considered the extent of Philmac's use of the mark and other relevant circumstances. The legislative framework provided that the test for registration is less demanding than under the previous legislation, allowing for a broader interpretation of what constitutes a distinguishing mark. The court concluded that the trade mark was not only inherently adapted to distinguish the goods but also did so in practice, thereby satisfying the criteria for registration.

In light of this finding, the court decided to adjourn the application to allow the parties to consider these reasons and determine what further actions, if any, were necessary. The court also noted that it could permit the application to proceed if Philmac amended its application to more precisely describe the colour of the mark, in line with previous case law. The final orders would be determined based on the parties' submissions following the adjournment.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

I am satisfied that the proposed amendment does not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark or extend the rights Philmac would have under the registration if it were granted. The proposed amendment restricts the goods to which the trade mark will apply to a particular type of irrigation pipe fitting. Accordingly, I would give leave to Philmac to amend the Philmac application in the terms sought. I proceed to consider the application by way of appeal on that basis. I will hereafter refer to the Philmac application as proposed to be amended as “the Philmac application” unless it is necessary to distinguish between the original application and the proposed amended application. I will also call the mark in respect of which Philmac now seeks registration “the Philmac mark”. For reasons which are obvious in the light of my conclusion in [79] hereof, I do not propose formally to make the amendment to the Philmac application until the parties have had an opportunity to consider these reasons for judgment.LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND An application for the registration of a trade mark in respect of goods is made pursuant to s 27 of the Act. Subsection (1) provides that a person may apply for the registration of a mark if:“(a) the person claims to be the owner of the trade mark; and(b) one of the following applies:(i)the person is using or intends to use the trade mark in relation to the goods and/or services;(ii)the person has authorised or intends to authorise another person to use the trade mark in relation to the goods and/or services;(iii)the person intends to assign the trade mark to a body corporate that is about to be constituted with a view to the use by the body corporate of the trade mark in relation to the goods and/or services.”Section 31 of the Act imposes on the Registrar a duty to examine and report on whether the application has been made in accordance with the Act and whether there are grounds under Div 2 of the Act for rejecting it. After the examination, the Registrar must accept the application unless satisfied that either the application has not been made in accordance with the Act or that there are grounds for rejecting it: s 33. Division 2 of the Act sets out the grounds on which an application for registration of a trade mark may be rejected. Section 41 provides that an application may be rejected on the grounds that the mark applied for does not distinguish the applicant’s goods and services. As this appeal turns on the application of that section, it is desirable to set it out in full: “41(1) For the purposes of this section, the use of a trade mark by a predecessor in title of an application for the registration of a trade mark is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the applicant.(2) An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (“designated goods or services”) from the goods or services of other persons.(3) In deciding the question whether or not a trade mark is capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons, the Registrar must first take into account the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.(4) Then, if the Registrar is still unable to decide the question, the following provisions apply.(5) If the Registrar finds that the trade mark is to some extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons but is unable to decide, on that basis alone, that the trade mark is capable of so distinguishing the designated goods or services:(a)the Registrar is to consider whether, because of the combined effect of the following:i)the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services;ii)the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;iii)any other circumstances;the trade mark does or will distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant; and(b) if the Registrar is then satisfied that the trade mark does or will so distinguish the designated goods or services – the trade mark is taken to be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and(c)if the Registrar is not satisfied that the trade mark does or will so distinguish the designated goods or services – the trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.(6) if the Registrar finds that the trade mark is not inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons, the following provisions apply:(a)if the applicant establishes that, because of the extent to which the applicant has used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application, it does distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant – the trade mark is taken to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;(b)in any other case – the trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
It is apparent from the findings I have made that I have generally accepted the evidence of Philmac’s witnesses, including of course that which emerged in cross-examination. I have also accepted the evidence of the witnesses called by the Registrar. In only one respect was there a direct contradiction of one witness with another, at least so far as I discerned, and that was not on an immediately relevant matter. Indeed, neither counsel made any submission that the evidence or any material part of the evidence of any particular witness should not be accepted. The submissions on matters of fact really concerned the conclusions which should be drawn from the evidence. The conclusions I have drawn are set out above.conclusion Counsel for the Registrar contended, as I understood his submission, that if the Court were minded to register the colour mark, the Philmac application should be further amended to describe more precisely the colour to be registered. Counsel for Philmac indicated a preparedness on the part of his client to do so. The capacity to permit such a refinement in an application clearly exists: see Genetics Institute Inc. v Kirin-Amgen Inc. (No.3) (1998) 41 IPR 325; Merck & Co. Inc. v Sankyo Co. Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 415. In the light of my conclusions, putting aside that issue, I do not propose to accede to Philmac’s application as amended. However, rather than reject the Philmac application as presently proposed to be amended, I propose to adjourn the application to give the parties the opportunity to consider these reasons. It may be that the Philmac application might proceed to registration to the extent that it is registrable, pursuant to ss 63 and 65(5) of the Act, by Philmac if it so chooses varying the terms of its proposed amended application by confining the mark applied for to the colour terracotta applied to the connecting inserts of plastic compression fittings for B class/ rural imperial sized polyethylene pipe. That will also give the parties the opportunity to consider what action is necessary, if any, on the part of Philmac to identify precisely the colour which is to constitute the mark.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

The Act imposes a less demanding test for the registration of a trade mark than that previously imposed by the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) in at least two respects. Firstly, unlike s 26 of the former legislation, s 41(2) of the Act now has the capacity to distinguish the applicant’s goods or services from those of other persons as the qualifying criterion for registration. Secondly, s 41(6) now permits that qualifying criterion to be met to the satisfaction of the Registrar or of the Court if, by reason of the past use of the applicant’s mark up to the time of the application for registration, the mark does in fact distinguish the applicant’s goods or services from those of other persons. Section 41(3) preserves the “inherent adaptability” test as a means by which s 41(2) may be met. But it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant’s goods or services from those of other persons, as well as that it does in fact do so: cp Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417 per Gibbs CJ at 426. See the discussion of those matters by Branson J in Blount at 55-60; followed by Wilcox J in Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2000] FCA 177 at [17]; [2000] 47 IPR 579 at 585. Hence, whilst previously it was the case that certain marks could never be registered even though they were in fact distinctive of the applicant’s goods or services (e.g. Clark Equipment Co. v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 (Clark Equipment) per Kitto J at 515-516), that is no longer the case.CONSIDERATION Philmac contended that the mark applied for is not only inherently adapted to distinguish but does in fact serve to distinguish Philmac’s goods from goods of other manufacturers in the same class. It was contended, therefore, that the mark should not be rejected pursuant to s 41(2) because it was either capable (by reason of s 41(3)) or should be taken to be capable (by reason of either s 41(5) or 41(6)) of distinguishing Philmac’s goods. Given the legislative process described above, it is therefore necessary to firstly consider whether, in accordance with s 27(1), Philmac is using or intends to use the Philmac mark as a trade mark in respect of the goods identified in the Philmac application, and if that question is answered affirmatively then to consider the extent to which the Philmac mark is inherently adapted to distinguish its goods: s 41(3), and then if necessary to address the questions identified by s 41(5) and s 41(6).Philmac’s use of the Philmac mark as a trade mark Philmac was formed in 1929. It manufactures and supplies pipe system products to a range of industry sectors, including water and gas utilities, plumbing and hardware, mining, construction, industrial processing and agricultural irrigation, stock and cropping. It exports approximately 30% of its production. The remainder is sold throughout Australia via a national dealer network.