FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Philmac Pty Limited v The Registrar of Trade Marks
[2002] FCA 1551
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – application for registration of a trade mark – colour mark – capability of colour applied to the designated goods of the applicant to distinguish those goods from the goods of other persons – whether mark inherently adapted to distinguish – whether by reason of the extent of the applicant’s use of the mark the mark in fact distinguished the applicant’s goods.
JURISDICTION – appeal from decision of Registrar of Trade Marks under s 35(b) Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – nature of appeal – appeal in nature of hearing de novo.
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), ss 6, 17, 19, 27, 33(3), 35, 41, 63, 65, 120, 197.
Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), s 6Blount v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50 – discussed
Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 411 – referred toJafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 – referred to
Rowntree PLC v Rollbits Pty Ltd (1988) 90 FLR 398 – referred to
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (1999) 44 IPR 551; [1999] FCA 816 – referred to
Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2000] FCA 177 – referred to
Clark Equipment Co v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 – applied
Kenman Kandy Australia Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCAFC 273 – discussed
‘Weldmesh’ Trade Mark [1966] RPC 220 – discussed
Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417 – discussed
FH Faulding & Co Ltd v Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and New Zealand Ltd (1965) 112 CLR 537 – discussed
Blue Paraffin Trade Mark [1977] RPC 473 – cited
Nor-Am Chem. Co. v OM Scott & Sons Co, 44 USPQ 2d (BNA) 1316 – discussed
Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products (1997) 40 IPR 279 – referred to British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281 – referred to
TGI Fridays Australia Pty Ltd v TGI Friday’s Inc (2000) 100 FCR 358 – cited
Re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation 774 F 2d 1116 (1985) – consideredCampbell Soup Co v Amrour & Co 138 F 2d 4 (7th Cir 1950) – discussed
Genetics Institute Inc. v Kirin-Amgen Inc. (No.3) (1998) 41 IPR 325 – referred to
Merck & Co. Inc. v Sankyo Co. Ltd (1992) 23 IPR 415 – referred toPHILMAC PTY LIMITED (ACN 007 873 047) v THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
S 8 of 2001
MANSFIELD J
13 DECEMBER 2002
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 8 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
PHILMAC PTY LIMITED (ACN 007 873 047)
APPLICANTAND:
THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MANSFIELD J
DATE:
13 DECEMBER 2002
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Philmac Pty Ltd (Philmac), appeals under s 35 of the Trade Marks Act 1995
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- [2002] FCA 1551
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the trade mark was indeed capable of distinguishing Philmac's goods from those of other manufacturers. The analysis involved examining whether the trade mark was inherently adaptable to distinguishing the goods and whether it achieved this distinction in practice. The court considered the extent of Philmac's use of the mark and other relevant circumstances. The legislative framework provided that the test for registration is less demanding than under the previous legislation, allowing for a broader interpretation of what constitutes a distinguishing mark. The court concluded that the trade mark was not only inherently adapted to distinguish the goods but also did so in practice, thereby satisfying the criteria for registration.
In light of this finding, the court decided to adjourn the application to allow the parties to consider these reasons and determine what further actions, if any, were necessary. The court also noted that it could permit the application to proceed if Philmac amended its application to more precisely describe the colour of the mark, in line with previous case law. The final orders would be determined based on the parties' submissions following the adjournment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
The Act imposes a less demanding test for the registration of a trade mark than that previously imposed by the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) in at least two respects. Firstly, unlike s 26 of the former legislation, s 41(2) of the Act now has the capacity to distinguish the applicant’s goods or services from those of other persons as the qualifying criterion for registration. Secondly, s 41(6) now permits that qualifying criterion to be met to the satisfaction of the Registrar or of the Court if, by reason of the past use of the applicant’s mark up to the time of the application for registration, the mark does in fact distinguish the applicant’s goods or services from those of other persons. Section 41(3) preserves the “inherent adaptability” test as a means by which s 41(2) may be met. But it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant’s goods or services from those of other persons, as well as that it does in fact do so: cp Burger King Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417 per Gibbs CJ at 426. See the discussion of those matters by Branson J in Blount at 55-60; followed by Wilcox J in Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2000] FCA 177 at [17]; [2000] 47 IPR 579 at 585. Hence, whilst previously it was the case that certain marks could never be registered even though they were in fact distinctive of the applicant’s goods or services (e.g. Clark Equipment Co. v Registrar of Trade Marks (1964) 111 CLR 511 (Clark Equipment) per Kitto J at 515-516), that is no longer the case.CONSIDERATION Philmac contended that the mark applied for is not only inherently adapted to distinguish but does in fact serve to distinguish Philmac’s goods from goods of other manufacturers in the same class. It was contended, therefore, that the mark should not be rejected pursuant to s 41(2) because it was either capable (by reason of s 41(3)) or should be taken to be capable (by reason of either s 41(5) or 41(6)) of distinguishing Philmac’s goods. Given the legislative process described above, it is therefore necessary to firstly consider whether, in accordance with s 27(1), Philmac is using or intends to use the Philmac mark as a trade mark in respect of the goods identified in the Philmac application, and if that question is answered affirmatively then to consider the extent to which the Philmac mark is inherently adapted to distinguish its goods: s 41(3), and then if necessary to address the questions identified by s 41(5) and s 41(6).Philmac’s use of the Philmac mark as a trade mark Philmac was formed in 1929. It manufactures and supplies pipe system products to a range of industry sectors, including water and gas utilities, plumbing and hardware, mining, construction, industrial processing and agricultural irrigation, stock and cropping. It exports approximately 30% of its production. The remainder is sold throughout Australia via a national dealer network.