Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company

Link copied
Case Copied 76 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company [2018] FCA 993

Appeal from: The Coco-Cola Company v Frucor Beverages Limited [2016] ATMO 38; 121 IPR 52
File number: NSD 1112 of 2016
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 2 July 2018
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – appeal from decision of Registrar of Trade Marks in opposition proceedings –  colour mark – whether the mark applied for is capable of distinguishing the designated goods

TRADE MARKS – colour mark – disconformity between the colour of the representation of the mark and the description of the mark provided pursuant to reg 4.3(7) of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) – whether the trade mark application can be amended in reliance on s 65 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) to replace the representation of the mark – discussion of the powers of the Court to amend a trade mark application in an appeal in opposition proceedings

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave should be granted to the appellant to file a further amended notice of appeal seeking to amend the trade mark application in reliance on s 65A of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 192A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth)

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 60, 102, 104, 160

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 27, 30, 31, 33, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 65A, 67, 176, 177, 187, 197

Trade Marks Amendment Act 2006 (Cth)

Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) regs 4.1, 4.2, 4.3

Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Marks Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Aldi Foods Pty Ltd v Moroccanoil Israel Ltd [2018] FCAFC 93

Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [2014] FCA 1304; (2014) 227 FCR 511

Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] FCA 440; (1998) 83 FCR 50

Chocolaterie Guylian NV v Registrar of Trade Marks [2009] FCA 891; (2009) 180 FCR 60

Fraser-Kirk v David Jones Ltd [2010] FCA 1060; (2010) 190 FCR 325

Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company [2017] FCA 298

Garford Pty Ltd v Dywidag-Systems International Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1039

Genetics Institute Inc v Kirin-Amgen Inc [1996] FCA 540; (1996) 67 FCR 527

Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 816; (1999) 44 IPR 551

New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffman-La Roche AG [2004] FCAFC 213; (2004) 141 FCR 1

Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83

Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks [2002] FCA 1551; (2002) 126 FCR 525

Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (No 2) [2003] FCA 207; (2003) 57 IPR 526

Phone Directories Company Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited [2014] FCA 373; (2014) 106 IPR 281

Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 993
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company, the primary issue before the court was the validity and distinguishing capacity of a colour mark application by Frucor. Frucor sought to amend its trade mark application to reflect a specific colour Pantone 376C, which was described in the application but not accurately represented in the swatch provided. The Coca-Cola Company opposed the amendment, arguing that the court lacked the jurisdiction to permit such changes and that the amendment would be futile due to the late stage of the proceedings.

The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation and amendment of a colour mark application under the Trade Marks Act 1995 and the Trade Marks Regulations 1995. The court had to determine whether the colour mark could be amended to align the description and representation of the mark, and whether the court had the jurisdiction to permit such an amendment in the context of opposition proceedings. Additionally, the court considered whether leave should be granted to Frucor to file a further amended notice of appeal to amend the trade mark application.

The court found that the identity of the mark could not be resolved by construing the trade mark application to give primacy to the description over the representation of the mark. It emphasised that the representation of the mark must be accurate and reliable, and that any discrepancy between the description and the representation could not be resolved by merely relying on the description. The court held that the representation of the mark was a critical element of the application and could not be disregarded. Furthermore, the court determined that it did not have the jurisdiction to permit an amendment under section 65A of the Act in the context of these opposition proceedings. The court also considered the case management implications of allowing such an amendment at a late stage in the proceedings.

Consequently, the court dismissed Frucor's interlocutory application seeking leave to file a further amended notice of appeal and the main appeal. The court ordered that Frucor pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, including the costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application. This decision underscored the importance of accurate and reliable representations in trade mark applications and the limitations on the court's powers to amend such applications in opposition proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s interlocutory application filed on 24 February 2017 be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, including the costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 24 February 2017, Frucor filed an interlocutory application in which it seeks leave to file a further amended notice of appeal. The proposed further amended notice of appeal alleges that the representation of the mark attached to the application for registration can be amended pursuant to s 65A of the Act. Frucor seeks an order that the application be amended in this fashion. CCC opposes leave being granted. It submits that any amendment in reliance on s 65A would be futile because, amongst other things, the Court does not have jurisdiction to make orders based on s 65A. It also raises case management considerations as militating against the exercise of the discretion to permit a further amended notice of appeal to be filed at such a late stage in the proceeding, in light of certain procedural requirements that must be observed when reliance is placed on s 65A. At the commencement of the appeal hearing it was agreed that I should hear and determine the interlocutory application with the appeal itself.THE EVIDENCECCC’s witnesses CCC read two affidavits affirmed by Rodney Ian Lindsay Cruise on 20 September 2016 and 18 April 2017. Mr Cruise is a patent attorney. In his first affidavit, he produced the file history in relation to the trade mark application. In his second affidavit, he responded to certain paragraphs of Mr Fenwick’s affidavit, Mr Sayers’ affidavit and Ms Peacock’s affidavits (see below). He also gave evidence about the colour of Frucor’s core “V” energy drink. Frucor’s witnesses Frucor read the following affidavits: ·Peter John Lamb, affirmed 24 November 2016; ·Andrew Gregory Fenwick, sworn 9 December 2016;·Alistair David Sayers, sworn 8 December 2016 and 19 May 2017;·Susan Joan Peacock, sworn 10 November 2016; ·Anna Fae Henderson, sworn 9 December 2016;·Edward Joseph Nader, sworn 8 December 2016;·Lisa Salas, sworn 8 June 2017;·Garreth John Chandler, sworn 30 November 2016, 20 February 2017, and 19 May 2017; and·Timothy Bernard Webb, sworn 24 February 2017. Mr Lamb is a director and the Chief Financial Officer of Frucor. Mr Lamb gave evidence concerning the nature of Frucor’s business with reference to its “V” energy drink product and Frucor’s use of Pantone 376C in relation to the promotion and marketing of that product in Australia before the filing date. At the time he made his affidavit, Mr Fenwick was the Marketing Manager at Frucor. Mr Fenwick gave evidence concerning the marketing of energy drinks in Australia, including the segmentation of energy drinks as a distinct product category. He produced a number of “planograms”. These are documents created by retailers to show beverage manufacturers and distributors how their products will be displayed at the retail level. Mr Fenwick also produced a number of images of displays of “V” energy drinks at various store locations (convenience stores and supermarkets) in Australia before the filing date. Mr Sayers is the Packaging Manager at Frucor. He is responsible for overseeing the packaging of Frucor’s “V” energy drinks. Mr Sayers gave evidence about Frucor’s processes around its use of Pantone 376C on packaging, including how, typically, Frucor approves new packaging designs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In its form relevant to this appeal, s 67 provided that an appeal lies to the Court from a decision under Pt 6.The powers of the Court in an appeal from a decision or direction of the Registrar The jurisdiction of the Court in determining appeals against decisions, directions or orders of the Registrar is to be found in Pt 18 of the Act. The Court’s powers are found in s 197. In its form relevant to this appeal, s 197 provided:On hearing an appeal against a decision or direction of the Registrar, the Federal Court may do any one or more of the following: (a) admit evidence orally, or on affidavit or otherwise; (b)permit the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, including witnesses who gave evidence before the Registrar; (c) order an issue of fact to be tried as it directs; (d) affirm, reverse or vary the Registrar's decision or direction; (e)give any judgment, or make any order, that, in all the circumstances, it thinks fit; (f) order a party to pay costs to another party. WHAT IS THE MARK? This is the threshold question. It is relevant to each of the three main issues raised by the parties. Frucor submits that the ambiguity in the identity of the mark can be resolved as a matter of construction of the trade mark application. It submits that any interested trader inspecting the Register would regard the description under reg 4.3(7) as a more reliable identifier of the colour of the mark than the swatch, essentially because the swatch would be regarded as inherently unreliable in that a faithful rendering of the colour might be corrupted by processes such as scanning, printing and matters of that kind. Frucor submits that anyone looking at the Register would readily appreciate that Pantone 376C is the colour for which application has been made. Frucor accepts that s 41(6) of the Act cannot be applied in the present case without resolving the ambiguity. In opening, Frucor argued that if the ambiguity cannot be resolved as a matter of construction, or that, properly construed, the application is for the colour of the swatch (which is definitely not Pantone 376C), then the fate of the application depended on the representation of the mark being amended to show the colour Pantone 376C. I am not persuaded that the identity of the mark can be resolved as a matter of construction of the trade mark application. Although not cast in these terms, Frucor’s argument really proceeds from its subjective intention as to what it wanted to register. This is the reason why it gives primacy to the words “Pantone 376c” in the description under reg 4.3(7) over the representation of the mark itself, with the representation playing at best a subsidiary role, even to the point of being ignored or disregarded. This, it seems to me, subverts the scheme under Pt 4 of the Act and Pt 4 of the Regulations for making a trade mark application. A trade mark application must be in accordance with the Regulations and include a representation that is sufficient to identify the mark. Regulation 4.3 specifies the requirements for the representation. It is in the context of specifying the requirements for the representation that reg 4.3(7) provides, in the case of a colour mark (amongst certain other types of marks), that the application must include a concise and accurate description of the mark. This, of course, means a concise and accurate description of the mark as represented. It is not a description made without reference to the mark as represented. Still less is it a description made despite the representation of the mark. The importance of the representation is underscored by the requirement in reg 4.3(10) that it be of a kind and quality that ensures that the features of the mark will be preserved in the course of time and be suitable for reproduction.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.