FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company [2017] FCA 298
Appeal from: The Coca-Cola Company v Frucor Beverages Limited [2016] ATMO 38 File number: NSD 1112 of 2016 Judge: YATES J Date of judgment: 24 March 2017 Catchwords: TRADE MARKS – application for advance rulings on the admissibility of evidence under s 192A(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 192A(a), s 55(1), s 56, s 57(1), s 135
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 41(6)(a)
Cases cited: Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (2014) 227 FCR 511; [2014] FCA 1304
Blount Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50; [1998] FCA 440
Chocolaterie Guylian NV v Registrar of Trade Marks (2009) 180 FCR 60; [2009] FCA 891
Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 275 ALR 526; [2010] FCA 1380
Societe Des Produits Nestle SA v Unilever plc [2003] RPC 35
Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 97; [2006] FCAFC 132
Date of hearing: 2 March 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Trade Marks Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 33 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Darke SC with Ms C Bembrick Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Respondent: Ms C Amato Solicitor for the Respondent: Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 1112 of 2016 BETWEEN: FRUCOR BEVERAGES LIMITED
Appellant
AND: THE COCA-COLA COMPANY
Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent’s interlocutory application dated 22 February 2017 (the interlocutory application) be dismissed.
2.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
YATES J:
INTRODUCTION
The respondent, The Coca-Cola Company Limited (CCC), seeks advance rulings, pursuant to s 192A(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act), on the admissibility of two affidavits that will be read by the appellant, Frucor Beverages Limited (Frucor), in an appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Trade Marks (the Registrar) in opposition proceedings concerning Trade Mark Application No. 1496541 (the opposed application). The Registrar upheld CCC’s opposition and refused to register the opposed mark.
The opposed mark is a colour mark that is sought to be registered for energy drinks in Class 32 (the designated goods). The opposed application contains the following endorsement:
The mark consists of the colour green (Pantone 376C), as shown in the representation attached to the application, applied as the predominant colour to the goods, their packaging or labels.
One issue in this appeal is whether the Registrar erred in finding that Frucor had not established the requirement of s 41(6)(a) of the
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 298
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
CCC argued that the affidavits were not relevant because the surveys were conducted after the relevant date and did not accurately reflect the state of the market at that time. Additionally, CCC contended that there was a disconnect between the stimulus used in the surveys (a single block of colour) and the description of the opposed mark in the application (Pantone 376C applied as the predominant colour to the goods, their packaging, or labels). However, the court found that the affidavits were relevant as they tied the survey results to the relevant time for the reasons given by Mr Chandler. The court also noted that the evidence had not been rejected in similar cases like Optical 88 and Apple, despite being conducted post the relevant date. The court further held that the intended evidence from Frucor concerning its use of Pantone 376C provided a factual foundation for Mr Chandler’s assumptions.
The court dismissed CCC’s interlocutory application seeking to exclude the affidavits and ordered CCC to pay Frucor’s costs of and incidental to the application. This decision was made on the basis that the affidavits were relevant and could be understood as relevant to the filing dates of the trade mark applications in issue. The court also considered the statutory requirement that evidence should be accepted as true when assessing its relevance.
In conclusion, the court ruled that the affidavits were admissible and relevant to the appeal, dismissing CCC’s application and ordering CCC to pay Frucor’s costs. This decision was made in accordance with the Federal Court Rules 2011, specifically Rule 39.32, which governs the entry of orders in interlocutory applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent’s interlocutory application dated 22 February 2017 (the interlocutory application) be dismissed.
2. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
CCC also relies on what it identifies as a disconnect between the stimulus used in the surveys – a single block of colour – and the opposed mark, described in the opposed application as Pantone 376C “applied as the predominant colour to the goods, their packaging or labels”. Put shortly, CCC says that the surveys were not directed to the correct question and should, for that reason, be rejected. CONSIDERATION AND CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE I am not persuaded that Mr Chandler’s affidavits should be rejected on the ground of relevance. As a preliminary matter, I should record that, although the focus of CCC’s submissions was the two surveys discussed in those affidavits, Mr Chandler’s first affidavit, in fact, deals with broader subject matter, including the nature of brands and the use of colours in retail marketing. In this part of his first affidavit, Mr Chandler discusses the associative theory of memory, which he uses as part of the reasoning for the opinions he expresses in the second affidavit. It was not suggested by CCC that this broader subject matter was not relevant or that Mr Chandler did not have the expertise to give such evidence. Thus, I would not make the blanket ruling that CCC seeks in any event. With specific reference to those parts of Mr Chandler’s affidavits dealing with the results of the two surveys, and the conclusions that can be drawn from them, it should be noted that in both Optical 88 and Apple, the evidence of the surveys had not been rejected, even though their probative value was criticised because the surveys were conducted after the relevant date. For the purpose of ruling on relevance, I do not think that Mr Chandler’s first affidavit can be considered in isolation from his second affidavit, which seeks to tie the results of the surveys to the relevant time (15 June 2012) for the reasons given by Mr Chandler. This feature was not present in the evidence referred to in Optical 88 or in Apple. With respect to Woolworths, CCC pointed to some passages in the Full Court’s reasons which, it said, indicated that the Full Court considered that the survey evidence in that case should have been rejected. I am not persuaded that that is the purport of the passages relied on. In Woolworths, the Full Court found that the primary judge had erred in the way he had used the survey evidence, not that the evidence was inadmissible. At [110], the Full Court noted that there had been a challenge to admissibility. However, in the course of argument on the appeal, the appellant (Woolworths), who had made that challenge, conceded that, whatever probative force the survey had, it could be understood as relevant to the filing dates of the trade mark applications in issue in that case. Another matter of significance is that fact that, in assessing relevance, s 55(1) of the Evidence Act requires the Court to proceed on the footing that the evidence is to be accepted. On that footing, and reading Mr Chandler’s first affidavit with his second, I am unable to see why the results of the two surveys, and Mr Chandler’s opinions as to the conclusions to be drawn from them, are not relevant, in terms of s 55, or at least provisionally relevant under s 57 of the Evidence Act. It is true that, in expressing the opinions in his second affidavit, Mr Chandler has proceeded on the basis of a number of assumptions concerning Frucor’s use of Pantone 376C in the 13 year period from 1999 to June 2012, including assumptions about Frucor’s advertising spend and the number of units of its energy drink that were sold. But the present ruling is sought against the background that other affidavit evidence has been filed, and will be read, by Frucor concerning its use of Pantone 376C in that period, and the manner and extent to which Frucor has marketed and sold its energy drink apparently using that colour. This intended evidence is said to provide the factual foundation for the assumptions Mr Chandler has been asked to make.