Jockey International Inc v Darren Wilkinson

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by JOCKEY INTERNATIONAL, INC. to registration of trade mark application 1127359 (25) – THROTTLE JOCKEY - filed in the name of DARREN WILKINSON

Delegate: John Spence
Representation: Opponent: Simon Williams, Solicitor, of Spruson & Ferguson, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys
Applicant: Pipers, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys. No appearance at the hearing and no written submissions provided.
Decision: 2010 ATMO 22
Section 52 Opposition – Sections 42(b), 44, 60 and 62A pressed – effect of Amendment Act on Section 60 considered - registration refused under amended Section 60 – the effect of international reputation considered – grounds under Sections 42(b), 44 and 62A rejected - costs awarded in favour of the Opponent.

Background

  1. The company Jockey International, Inc. (“the Opponent”) is recorded as the registered owner or applicant in Australia of a multiplicity of trade marks in Class 25 of the International Classification of Goods and Services which feature the word “JOCKEY” as a component, including Nos. 72033 “JOCKEY”, 78636 “JOCKEY MIDWAYS”, 215425 “JOCKEY ELANCE”, 500212 “JOCKEY SCANTS”, 904687 “JOCKEY Y-GEN”, 916242 “JOCKEY Y-GENERATION”, 1028523 “JOCKEY ALMOST NOTHING”, 1239460 “JOCKEY”AND DEVICE and 1246090 “JOCKEY” AND DEVICE. The earliest of those registrations, being No. 72033, dates from 8 March 1931. Since at least 1947 the “JOCKEY” trade mark has been continuously used in Australia either by the Opponent itself, by its predecessors in title, or by licensees, distributors and authorised users who are permitted or appointed by the Opponent for that purpose.

  2. Overseas, the “JOCKEY” trade mark was first adopted and used in the U.S.A. in 1929 and by a predecessor in title of the Opponent. The company, formerly known as S.T. Cooper and Sons and later as Coopers Underwear Company, was reincorporated on 1 May 1972 and since then it has operated under the new (and still current) trading style Jockey International, Inc. .

  3. On 2 August 2006 an application for registration of the trade mark “THROTTLE JOCKEY” (as a word mark) was filed under No. 1127359 in Class 25 and in respect of “T-shirts, caps, beanies, head bands, sweat bands” in the name of Darren James Wilkinson (“the Applicant”). Upon examination this application was accepted for possible registration on 31 October 2006 and the advertisement of acceptance in respect of same took place in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks dated 7 December 2006.

  4. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”), on 7 March 2007 the Opponent filed a notice of opposition to the granting of registration in respect of the Applicant’s trade mark “THROTTLE JOCKEY”.

  5. The Opponent duly filed and served its evidence in support of the opposition proceedings on 7 September 2007. That evidence in support comprises the Statutory Declaration of Mark Steven Jaegar made on 20 August 2007 (“the first Jaegar Declaration”) together with the supplementary Declaration of Mr. Jaegar made on 27 August 2007 (“the second Jaegar Declaration”). After…

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Details
Case
[2010] ATMO 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This decision concerns an opposition by Jockey International Inc. (the Opponent) to the registration of the trade mark application No. 1127359, "THROTTLE JOCKEY," filed by Darren Wilkinson (the Applicant). The matter was heard by John Spence, a Hearing Officer for Trade Marks and Designs Hearings & Oppositions.

The Opponent raised two grounds for opposition: bad faith under Section 62A of the relevant legislation and a ground under Section 60. The court was required to determine whether the Applicant had acted in bad faith in adopting the "THROTTLE JOCKEY" mark and whether the Section 60 ground of opposition was established.

The Hearing Officer found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Applicant had sought to copy the "JOCKEY" trade mark or had acted deliberately in doing so. Consequently, the Opponent had not satisfied the onus of establishing bad faith under Section 62A. However, the Hearing Officer found that the Opponent had established its opposition on the ground under Section 60.

Accordingly, the opposition succeeded, and the registration of the trade mark application "THROTTLE JOCKEY" was refused. The Applicant was ordered to pay the Opponent's costs in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Jockey International Inc v Darren Wilkinson involves an opposition to the registration of a trade mark application for "THROTTLE JOCKEY" by Jockey International Inc. Jockey International Inc, the opponent, holds the "JOCKEY" trade mark and opposed the registration of the Applicant's trade mark application on the grounds of similarity and bad faith. Jockey International Inc argues that the use of "JOCKEY" in "THROTTLE JOCKEY" is likely to cause confusion among consumers and that the Applicant has acted in bad faith by adopting the expression "THROTTLE JOCKEY."

The Applicant, Darren Wilkinson, applied for registration of the trade mark "THROTTLE JOCKEY" in relation to goods in classes 18, 25, and 28. Wilkinson intended to use the trade mark in relation to various products, including leather goods, luggage, sporting goods, and jewellery. Jockey International Inc raised concerns that the use of "JOCKEY" in the Applicant's trade mark would cause confusion among consumers, as it is a well-established trade mark owned by Jockey International Inc. The opponent also alleged that the Applicant had acted in bad faith by adopting the expression "THROTTLE JOCKEY."

The hearing officer found that while the trade marks were similar, the Applicant had not acted in bad faith by adopting the expression "THROTTLE JOCKEY." The officer noted that the Applicant had not sought to copy the opponent's "JOCKEY" trade mark or acted deliberately in so doing. The officer also found that there was nothing before the court that would justify a finding of bad faith on the part of the Applicant. However, the officer found that the opponent had established its opposition on the ground of similarity, and therefore, the opposition succeeded, and registration of the trade mark application was refused.

In conclusion, the case of Jockey International Inc v Darren Wilkinson involves an opposition to the registration of the trade mark application "THROTTLE JOCKEY" by Jockey International Inc, the owner of the "JOCKEY" trade mark. The opponent raised concerns about similarity and bad faith, but the hearing officer found that the Applicant had not acted in bad faith, and the opposition was successful on the ground of similarity. As a result, registration of the trade mark application was refused.

The matter of Jockey International Inc v Darren Wilkinson originated when Jockey International Inc opposed the application by Darren Wilkinson to register the trade mark "THROTTLE JOCKEY." This opposition was lodged on the grounds of likelihood of confusion with Jockey International Inc’s registered trade mark "JOCKEY" and bad faith pursuant to Section 62A of the Trade Marks Act 1995. The opposition was heard by the Trade Marks and Designs Hearings & Oppositions division, with John Spence acting as the Hearing Officer. During the proceedings, Jockey International Inc argued that the use of the term "THROTTLE" in conjunction with "JOCKEY" was intended to capitalise on the reputation of the "JOCKEY" trade mark and that this was done in bad faith. Wilkinson contended that there was no intention to imitate or confuse consumers and that the term "THROTTLE JOCKEY" was a unique expression with no deliberate attempt to trade off the established reputation of the "JOCKEY" trade mark. The opposition hearing included submissions from both parties and considered relevant case law and prior decisions related to trade mark infringement and bad faith. The court reviewed evidence regarding the distinctiveness of the "JOCKEY" trade mark and the potential for consumer confusion as well as the Applicant’s intentions in adopting the "THROTTLE JOCKEY" expression. The Hearing Officer, John Spence, concluded that while there was a likelihood of confusion with the existing trade mark, there was insufficient evidence to establish bad faith on the part of Wilkinson. Consequently, the opposition was successful on the ground of likelihood of confusion, leading to the refusal of the registration of the trade mark application No. 1127359 “THROTTLE JOCKEY.” Jockey International Inc requested costs, which were awarded in their favour as they were the successful party in the opposition proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In relation to the matter presently before me there is nothing to establish that the Applicant, in adopting the expression “THROTTLE JOCKEY”, has sought to copy the “JOCKEY” trade mark of the Opponent or has acted deliberately in so doing. Moreover, even if I were to accept the submission of the Opponent in this regard, it does not necessarily follow that in so doing the Applicant has acted in bad faith. In determining this matter, there is nothing before me which would justify a finding of “bad faith” on the part of the Applicant or which would warrant the exercise of this Section in favour of the Opponent. The onus of establishing the assertion of “bad faith” has not been satisfactorily met or overcome by the Opponent in this instance. Accordingly, I find that the ground of opposition relating to bad faith pursuant to Section 62A which has been raised by the Opponent is not established.Decision On the reasoning which has earlier been set out, I find that the Opponent has established its opposition so far as the Section 60 ground is concerned. In the circumstances, the Opposition succeeds and I refuse registration of the trade mark application No. 1127359 “THROTTLE JOCKEY”. Costs The Opponent has requested an award of costs in its favour in this matter. I see no reason as to why the general rule should not apply and why costs should not follow the cause. The Opponent having been successful, I award costs against the Applicant in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations. John Spence Hearing OfficerTrade Marks and Designs Hearings & Oppositions17 March 2010

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court commenced by examining the assertion that the Applicant intentionally copied the “JOCKEY” trade mark of the Opponent by using the expression “THROTTLE JOCKEY.” The court determined that there was no evidence to suggest that the Applicant intended to mimic the Opponent’s trade mark. The court reasoned that the mere use of the word “JOCKEY” in a compound expression does not inherently constitute an attempt to replicate the Opponent’s mark. In making this determination, the court did not find any direct or indirect evidence to substantiate the claim that the Applicant deliberately sought to imitate the Opponent’s trade mark.

Moving to the issue of bad faith, the court examined whether the Applicant acted in bad faith by adopting the expression “THROTTLE JOCKEY.” The court noted that the presence of bad faith is not automatically inferred from the use of a similar term. The Opponent bore the burden of proving bad faith, which includes demonstrating that the Applicant had an intent to trade on the reputation of the Opponent’s trade mark or to cause confusion in the marketplace. However, the evidence presented did not sufficiently support a finding of bad faith. The court found no clear indication that the Applicant had any intention to deceive consumers or take unfair advantage of the Opponent’s established trade mark.

Further, the court evaluated whether the Opponent had successfully established that the Applicant acted in bad faith, thereby warranting the exercise of Section 62A in its favour. The court reiterated that the onus of proving bad faith rested with the Opponent. Despite the Opponent’s arguments, the court found that the evidence did not convincingly demonstrate bad faith on the part of the Applicant. Therefore, the court concluded that the ground of opposition based on bad faith was not substantiated, and the exercise of Section 62A was unwarranted.

In considering the Section 60 opposition ground, the court found that the Opponent had successfully established its opposition. The court held that the Applicant’s trade mark application No. 1127359 “THROTTLE JOCKEY” posed a likelihood of confusion with the Opponent’s “JOCKEY” trade mark. The court reasoned that the use of the term “JOCKEY” in conjunction with “THROTTLE” could lead consumers to associate the Applicant’s mark with the Opponent’s established trade mark, thereby causing confusion in the marketplace.

Given the findings on the Section 60 opposition ground, the court refused registration of the trade mark application No. 1127359 “THROTTLE JOCKEY.” The court determined that the likelihood of confusion outweighed any potential distinctiveness or originality the Applicant might claim for the trade mark. The refusal of registration was based on the protection of the Opponent’s trade mark rights and the need to prevent consumer confusion.

Lastly, the court addressed the issue of costs. The Opponent requested an award of costs in its favour. The court ruled that the general rule of costs following the cause should apply, meaning that the successful party in the opposition proceeding should be awarded costs. Since the Opponent was successful in its opposition, the court awarded costs against the Applicant in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Trade Mark Regulations. This decision aligns with the principle that costs should reflect the outcome of the proceedings.