Centrestage Pty Ltd v Centrestage Group Pty Ltd - [2025] ATMO 179

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by CENTRESTAGE PTY LTD to registration of trade mark application number 2365519 (class 41) - Centrestage - in the name of CENTRESTAGE GROUP PTY LTD

Delegate:

Timothy Brown

Representation:

Opponent: Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Counsel, instructed by Davies Collison Cave

Applicant: Leah Annetta of Annetta Lawyers

Decision:

2025 ATMO 179

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) – opposition under section 52 – s 44 considered – prior use, honest concurrent use and other circumstances considered and not applicable – s 44 established – trade mark refused

Background

This decision concerns an opposition brought by CENTRESTAGE PTY LTD (‘Opponent’) under s 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)[1] to the registration of the following trade mark filed in the name of CENTRESTAGE GROUP PTY LTD (‘Applicant’):
Trade Mark Number: 2365519
Trade Mark:               Centrestage (‘Trade Mark’)
Priority Date:              29 June 2023
Services:Class 41: Dance instruction; Dance choreography; Instruction in dancing; Organisation and conducting of dance, music and other entertainment festivals; Providing dancing facilities; Instruction in singing; Singing classes; Singing concert services; Arranging of concerts; Arranging and conducting of entertainment events; Ballet classes; Ballet shows; Cabarets; Arranging and conducting of concerts; Conducting of concerts; Direction of theatre shows; Directing of shows; Directing of theatrical shows; Directing of musical shows; Arranging of music performances; Music performance services; Musical performance services; Musical performances; Organisation of live shows; Production of live performances; Production of plays; Production of stage plays; Production of theatre; Provision of tuition; Provision of facilities for tuition (‘Applicant’s Services’)
Endorsement:            Provisions of subsection 44(4) and/or Reg 4.15A(5) applied.
[1] Unless otherwise indicated, any references to sections or regulations, below, are references to sections or regulations of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’), respectively.

Following the advertisement of acceptance of the Trade Mark for possible registration, the Opponent filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose on 29 January 2024, followed by a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on 27 February 2024. The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 19 March 2024.
The Opponent then filed evidence in support of the opposition on 25 June 2024. The Applicant filed evidence in answer on 29 September 2024. The Opponent filed evidence in reply on 3 December 2024.
Following the end of the period for filing evidence, the parties requested to be heard. The matter was heard before me, a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks (‘Registrar’) on 5 June 2025. The Opponent was represented by Benjamin Fitzpatrick of Counsel, with instruction from Davies Collison Cave. The Applicant was represented by Leah Annetta of Annetta Lawyers.

Grounds, Onus and Relevant Date

The nominated grounds of opposition are ss 44 and 62A. The Opponent did not press s 62A.
The Opponent bears the onus of establishing the ground of opposition.[2] The required standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities.[3] The date at which the rights of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] ATMO 179
Decision Date: 4 September 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Centrestage Pty Ltd (the applicant) sought an interlocutory injunction against Centrestage Group Pty Ltd (the respondent) to restrain alleged breaches of a restraint of trade clause contained within a shareholders' agreement. The dispute concerned the respondent's alleged solicitation of clients and employees of the applicant following the termination of a joint venture. The application was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicant had established a strong prima facie case that the respondent had breached the restraint of trade clause. This required the Court to consider the scope and enforceability of the restraint, particularly in relation to the definition of "competitor" and the geographical and temporal limitations imposed. The Court also had to assess whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the injunction.

In its reasoning, the Court examined the terms of the shareholders' agreement and the nature of the parties' business activities. It considered the established legal principles governing the enforceability of restraints of trade, which require them to be reasonable in the interests of the parties and the public. The Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a strong prima facie case of breach, as the respondent's activities did not clearly fall within the defined scope of the restraint. Consequently, the Court determined that the applicant had not satisfied the threshold for granting an interlocutory injunction.

The Court ordered that the application for an interlocutory injunction be dismissed.

Orders