FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hills Industries Limited v Bitek Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 94
Citation: Hills Industries Limited v Bitek Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 94 Parties: HILLS INDUSTRIES LIMITED (ACN 007 573 417) v BITEK PTY LTD (ACN 084 308 207)
HILLS INDUSTRIES LIMITED (ACN 007 573 417) v BITEK PTY LTD (ACN 084 308 207)
BITEK PTY LTD (ACN 084 308 207) v HILLS INDUSTRIES LIMITED (ACN 007 573 417)
File numbers: SAD 14 of 2008
SAD 39 of 2009
SAD 40 of 2009Judge: LANDER J Date of judgment: 15 February 2011 Corrigendum: 4 May 2011 Catchwords: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – registration – application for registration of mark “DIGITEK” – opposition to registration under s 44(1) – whether mark deceptively similar to opponent’s registered trade mark “DGTEC” – whether the applicant’s TV installation accessories and goods the subject of opponent’s trade mark (digital and electronic products including televisions, video players, DVD players, CD players, decoders and cameras) are “goods of the same description” within meaning of s 14(1) of Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – appeal from Registrar of Trade Marks – standard of proof to be applied in determining grounds of opposition – whether opponent required to satisfy the Court that trade marks should clearly not be registered.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – registration – whether honest concurrent use of trade marks established for purposes of s 44(3)(a) – whether evidence of use after the date the application for registration is made may be taken into account under s 44(3) – whether, because of “other circumstances” it is proper to allow registration of the mark under s 44(3)(b).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – opposition – whether opponent’s marks had acquired a reputation in Australia for purposes of s 60 – nature of evidence required to show reputation considered – whether s 60 subject to s 44(3) – whether applicant’s registration would be contrary to law under s 42(b) because its use would constitute misleading and deceptive conduct under s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – application for removal of trade mark from Register for non-use – application seeking to remove all goods in respect of which the mark is registered – evidence of use of some, but not all of the goods – whether grounds for removal under s 92(4) established – whether s 101(2) affords discretion to remove certain goods from registration notwithstanding that the application seeks removal of all of the goods – whether permissible for the Court to amend a registration to ensure that it accords with the scope of established use – exercise of discretion under s 101(3) – scope of s 101(4) – whether the opponent has established use of “similar goods” under s 101(4) - whether order for removal from the Register operates retrospectively to provide a defence to infringement.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – Trade marks – infringement – whether infringement under ss 120(1), (2) and (3)…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 94
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court carefully examined the nature of the goods involved, distinguishing between television installation accessories and digital and electronic products. It concluded that although these goods are interdependent in their functionality, they are not similar or of the same description. The court held that television installation accessories such as antennas and cabling are not akin to televisions, video players, DVD players, or cameras. This distinction was crucial in finding that the proposed registration of “DIGITEK” should not be opposed based on deceptive similarity. The court further considered the standard of proof in opposition cases and concluded that the opponent must show a clear likelihood of deception, which was not sufficiently demonstrated in this instance. Additionally, the court assessed whether the marks had acquired a reputation or if the applicant’s registration would constitute misleading and deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ultimately finding these grounds for opposition were not met.
In conclusion, the Federal Court dismissed Hills Industries Ltd’s appeal against the registration of “DIGITEK” by Bitek Pty Ltd. The court found that the goods associated with the two trade marks were not similar or of the same description, thereby invalidating the primary ground of opposition. Consequently, the registration of “DIGITEK” was upheld, and no grounds for removal of the “DGTEC” mark from the Register were established. The decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between goods in similar industries to prevent unwarranted opposition to trade mark registrations.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties bring in short minutes of order to reflect these reasons.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the non-use application, Gummow J noted at 43:It is clear that during the relevant period (24 February 1988—6 June 1988) there was use by the first respondent of the MOO trade mark in relation to packaged cheese. But it was hotly disputed whether there had been use in the technical sense required for s 23(1)(b) upon flavoured milk, the principal subject of contention between the applicant and first respondent. User in relation to cheese does not necessarily preserve the registration in its entirety. The trade mark may be removed in respect of those goods for which it was registered other than cheese: Hunter Douglas (Australia) Pty Ltd v Perma Blinds (1970) 122 CLR 49; Unilever plc v Johnson Wax Ltd [1989] FSR 145 at 160.(Emphasis added.) Murray Goulburn appealed Gummow J’s findings under s 22 and sought that the registration be allowed to remain as “dairy products”. The Full Court of the Federal Court allowed an appeal in respect of s 22 but ordered rectification of the Register by limiting the goods in respect of which the trade mark MOO was registered to cheese and flavoured milk. In Unilever plc v Johnson Wax Ltd [1989] FSR 145, the “LIFEBUOY” mark was registered in respect of “all goods included in class 3”. The only evidence of use of the mark was in respect of “soap”. Justice Whitford amended the specification of goods for the LIFEBUOY registration, limiting it to “soaps and other washing liquids, powders and preparations”. In Hunter Douglas (Australia) Pty Ltd v Perma Blinds (1970) 122 CLR 49, Kitto J had made orders expunging certain goods from the opponent’s registration on the grounds of non-use. On appeal Barwick CJ noted that the effect of his Honour’s orders was to:… in substance to limit the registration of the mark to the residue of the goods in respect of which it is registered, ie after elimination of “venetian blinds” and “awnings and blinds”. This course is in conformity with the provisions of the Act. The power to excise goods from a statement of goods is consistent with the underlying policy of Part 9 of the Act which is to facilitate the removal of an unused trade mark. Removal of trade marks in respect of goods for which there is no evidence of use is warranted to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the Register: New South Wales Dairy Corporation v Murray Goulburn Co-op Corporation 14 IPR 75. It is also consistent with s 101(2) which gives the Court a discretion “to remove the trade mark from the Register in respect of any or all of the goods and/or services to which the application relates”. Section 101(2) assumes that the Registrar or Court may be left in circumstances where some of the grounds have been established in relation to some of the goods and/or services but not all and the subsection empowers the Registrar or Court in the exercise of its discretion to remove the trade mark from the Register in respect of any or all of the goods to which the application relates.