Master Wealth Control Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Master Wealth Control Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2024] FCAFC 171

Appeal from:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Master Wealth Control Pty Ltd (Liability) [2024] FCA 344

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Master Wealth Control Pty Ltd (Penalty) [2024] FCA 795

File number: NSD 489 of 2024
Judgment of: SARAH C DERRINGTON, HALLEY AND SHARIFF JJ
Date of judgment: 20 December 2024
Catchwords:

CONSUMER LAW – misleading and deceptive conduct – where representations made in promotional materials and delivery of wealth creation course – whether representations conveyed the meaning found by the primary judge – whether statements were of opinion or fact – whether second appellant liable as accessory – whether primary judge erred as to applicable test for accessorial liability – whether primary judge improperly conflated first and second appellants

CONSUMER LAW – remedies – where non-party consumer redress order made refunding course fees – where appellants alleged refund order manifestly excessive – whether primary judge erred in assessing appropriateness of order made under s 239 of Australian Consumer Law –whether House v King error established

EVIDENCE – where primary judge drew inference adverse to second appellant in relation to her involvement in the representations – where second appellant did not give evidence – whether primary judge failed to properly consider and apply Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2) – whether adverse inference as to state of knowledge in a civil case can only be drawn where “only rational inference available” – whether primary judge erred in drawing Jones v Dunkel inference

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) ss 18, 29(1)(b), 29(1)(g), 29(1)(m), 34, 224(1), 232, 239, 240, 241, 248

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206G

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140(2)

Cases cited:

Adams v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2017] FCAFC 228; 258 FCR 257

Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Williams v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] NSWCA 131; 46 ACSR 504

Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes [2023] NSWCA 88; 111 NSWLR 304

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 330; 327 ALR 540

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dell Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 588

Australian Competition and Consumer CommissionvProductivity Partners Pty Ltd (trading as Captain Cook College) (No 3) [2021] FCA 737; 154 ACSR 472

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Geowash Pty Ltd (Subject to a Deed of Company Arrangement) (No 4) [2020] FCA 23; 376 ALR 701

Baron Vestey’s Settlement, In re; Lloyd’s Bank Ltd v O’Meara [1951] Ch 209

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Campomar Sociedad, Limitada v Nike International Ltd [2000] HCA 12; 202 CLR 45

Cassidy v Saatchi & Saatchi Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 34; 134 FCR 585

Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 171
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Master Wealth Control Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Federal Court of Australia addressed allegations of misleading and deceptive conduct by the appellants, Master Wealth Control Pty Ltd and Ms Grubisa, in relation to the delivery of a wealth creation course. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) sought penalties and declarations against the appellants, alleging that they made misleading representations in promotional materials and during the course delivery. The appellants contested the findings and the penalties imposed, arguing that the primary judge had erred in various respects, including in conflating the appellants, applying the correct test for accessorial liability, and determining the appropriateness of the consumer redress order. The court also examined whether the primary judge had properly considered the evidence and applied the correct legal standards in reaching his conclusions.

The legal issues before the court encompassed the interpretation of promotional materials and instructional content, the distinction between statements of opinion and fact, the liability of an accessory, and the appropriate application of statutory provisions for consumer redress and penalties. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the primary judge correctly identified the misleading nature of the representations and whether Ms Grubisa was liable as an accessory to the misleading conduct. Furthermore, the court assessed the appropriateness of the consumer redress order under the Australian Consumer Law and whether the primary judge had properly considered the evidence, particularly in light of Ms Grubisa's failure to give evidence.

The court found that the primary judge had not erred in his analysis. The representations made were indeed misleading and deceptive, and the primary judge correctly inferred Ms Grubisa's knowledge of their misleading nature based on her professional background and the clear meaning of the statements. The court also held that the primary judge had properly applied the law regarding accessorial liability and had not conflated the appellants. Regarding the consumer redress order, the court determined that the primary judge had correctly exercised his discretion under the statute and had not committed a House v King error. The court further found that the primary judge had appropriately considered the evidence, including the failure of Ms Grubisa to give evidence, in accordance with the civil standard of proof.

The court dismissed the appeals and cross-appeal, affirming the primary judge's findings and orders. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeals and the cross-appeal. This decision underscores the importance of clear and truthful promotional practices in consumer transactions and the rigorous application of consumer protection laws to ensure fair and honest commercial conduct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeals be dismissed.

2. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeals and the cross-appeal, to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By Ground 8, the appellants contended that the primary judge erred (LJ at [39]) in drawing an inference adverse to Ms Grubisa in relation to her involvement in the No Equity Representation on the basis that she did not give evidence, in circumstances where Ms Grubisa was the principal of DG Institute, a practising solicitor and barrister, and where a range of civil penalties were sought against both appellants. The appellants submitted that the primary judge failed to properly consider and apply s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the decision in Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 82 ALR 217. Proceedings for recovery of pecuniary penalties under the ACL are civil proceedings. Accordingly, s 140 of the Evidence Act requires the Court in such proceedings to apply the civil standard of proof on the balance of probabilities. In arriving at a conclusion of satisfaction that a case has been proved on the balance of probabilities, s 140(2) provides:(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:(a)the nature of the cause of action or defence; and(b)the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and(c)the gravity of the matters alleged. The mandatory considerations specified by s 140(2) reflect a legislative intention that a Court must be mindful of the forensic context in forming an opinion as to its satisfaction about matters in evidence. Ordinarily, the more serious the consequences of what is contested in the litigation, the more a Court will have regard to the strength and weakness of evidence before it in coming to a conclusion. In the present case, the primary judge found that he was “comfortably satisfied” that Ms Grubisa had actual knowledge that the No Equity Representations were in fact false and misleading (LJ at [41]). This was for the following reasons. First, because of Ms Grubisa’s legal qualifications and experience, “she knew that it was untrue as a general proposition and without qualification that a distressed homeowner would lose any remaining equity in their property if the property were sold by a mortgagee”. Secondly, the primary judge held that the statements made in the four videos that “banks don’t give change”, “there’s no equity left”, and “everything else would have got chewed up in fees and charges”, would be understood by members in the relevant class of consumers as bearing their ordinary meaning (LJ at [29]). That being so, coupled with the appellants’ submission below that the No Equity Representations were “absurd” and “nonsense”, the primary judge inferred that Ms Grubisa had a level of knowledge greater than that of the reasonable consumer in the class and so must have known the representations she was making were not true (LJ at [41]). The primary judge said that he drew the inferences as to Ms Grubisa’s actual knowledge that her conduct was misleading and deceptive, including with respect to the particular elements of ss 29(1)(m), 29(1)(g), and 34 of the ACL “with greater confidence in light of the fact that Ms Grubisa did not give evidence at the hearing” (LJ at [42]).

Decision

Reasons for decision

By further judgment delivered on 19 July 2024 (Penalty Judgment), the primary judge ordered, in summary, that:1.pursuant to s 224(1) of the ACL, DG Institute pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty of $5 million;2.pursuant to s 224(1) of the ACL, Ms Grubisa pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty of $1 million;3.pursuant to s 232 of the ACL, DG Institute be restrained for a period of 5 years from making any representations in the RER or MWC programs, or any substantially similar programs, that conveyed the No Equity Representations, the Vestey Trust Representations or the Authority Representations;4.pursuant to s 232 of the ACL, Ms Grubisa be restrained for a period of 5 years from the making of or being involved in the making of the representations referred to above;5.pursuant to s 248 of the ACL, subject to Order 6, Ms Grubisa be disqualified from managing corporations for a period of 5 years;6.pursuant to s 206G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), leave be granted to Ms Grubisa to manage DG Institute up to and including 91 days from the date of the order so as to allow DG Institute to carry into effect the orders; and7.pursuant to s 239 of the ACL, DG Institute offer redress to each student who enrolled in the MWC program in the relevant period in accordance with orders 8-10. It is unnecessary to set out the remaining orders. DG Institute and Ms Grubisa have appealed against the whole of both the Liability Judgment and the Penalty Judgment.WERE THE APPELLANTS IMPROPERLY CONFLATED? Ground 1 of the appellants’ Grounds of Appeal, pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed on 1 August 2024, contends that, in relation to the primary judge’s findings that Ms Grubisa made the “No Equity Representations”, the “Authority Representations”, and had actual knowledge that her conduct was misleading and deceptive, his Honour erroneously conflated Ms Grubisa with DG Institute. In particular, the appellants point to [41] of the Liability Judgment where the primary judge said he was “comfortably satisfied … that Ms Grubisa had actual knowledge that the No Equity Representations, which she knew had been made by her, were in fact false and misleading … and having personally delivered the relevant statements with knowledge of their audience … I have inferred that Ms Grubisa had actual knowledge that her conduct was misleading and deceptive …”. The appellants submitted that, it having never been contended by the ACCC that Ms Grubisa made any misleading statements on her own behalf, or engaged in any misleading or deceptive conduct, the learned primary judge had fallen foul of the distinction articulated in Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes [2023] NSWCA 88; 111 NSWLR 304 by conflating the first and second appellants. As was said by the Court in that case, at [356], “it does not follow that where a corporation engages in contravening conduct through an officer or employee, the conduct is necessarily to be attributed to the employee as well as to the corporation”. Nevertheless, as indicated by cases such as Cassidy v Saatchi & Saatchi Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 34; 134 FCR 585 at [26]-[27] and Gardam v George Wills & Co Ltd [1988] FCA 289; 82 ALR 415 at 417, “the question is whether the representee would reasonably regard the representation as being made by the director or employee as well as by the corporation”: Anchorage at [359].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Vesty Trust Representations arise from the MWC program which was promoted as teaching strategies which would enable participants to protect completely their assets from creditors. The strategies taught included setting up a structure described by DG Institute as an “impenetrable Vestey Trust” using what was described as “legally binding documentation” (LJ at [45]). The basic effect of the documentation, described as the Transaction Documents, was summarised by the primary judge at [83]:(a) a discretionary trust would be created and controlled by the client;(b)all future income of the client was intended to be assigned to the trustee and paid into the trustee’s bank account, although as a matter of law that was only valid to the extent of existing debts at the time the Notice of Assignment was given;(c)the client would then withdraw money from time to time from the trustee’s bank account to meet personal expenses of the client, thereby borrowing money from the trustee free of interests and with no obligation of repayment for at least 50 years; and(d)the loan would be secured by the Equitable Mortgage, and would also be the subject of a caveat on the title of any real property and could be the subject of PPSR registration in respect of personal property.Does Declaration 2 go beyond the concession? Ground 11 challenges Declaration 2 made by the primary judge, which was in the following terms:DG Institute, in trade or commerce and in connection with the supply or possible supply of services in Australia, in the period April 2017 to November 2022:(a)engaged in conduct that was misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive in contravention of s 18 of the ACL;(b)made false or misleading representations that the Master Wealth Control (MWC) program had a benefit which it did not have, being the benefit of equipping consumers with a strategy that was effective to protect all of their assets in a way that would provide complete protection from creditors, in contravention of s 29(1)(g) of the ACL; and(c)engaged in conduct that was liable to mislead the public as to the nature, characteristics or suitability for purpose of services, being that the strategy taught would enable consumers to protect all of their assets in a way which would provide complete protection from creditors, when it would not, in contravention of s 34 of the ACL;by:(d)making statements in Promotional Materials for the MWC program and in the instructional material for the MWC program set out in Annexure B to the Concise Statement (Program Materials), that represented that the asset protection strategies called the “Vestey Trust” structure taught in the MWC program would enable consumers to protect all of their assets by setting up a specific trust called the Vestey Trust transaction documents provided by DG Institute, which would provide complete protection from creditors (Vestey Trust Representations) when that protection was not provided by the adoption of those strategies.