Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] FCA 1436

Citation: Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] FCA 1436
Parties: ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED v ACPA PTY LIMITED and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC; ACPA PTY LIMITED and ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC v ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED
File number: NSD 149 of 2014
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 17 December 2015
Catchwords:

TRADE MARKS – whether power to remove trade marks from register under s 88 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) discretionary – who bears the onus of proof under s 88 – manner of the exercise of the power to remove under s 88(1) – consideration of factors relevant to the exercise of the power to remove under s 88(1)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – suppression orders – whether orders necessary under s 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AF, 37AG
Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) ss 22, 23
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 88, 89(1)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 2.32
Cases cited:

Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45 cited
Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 1 cited
Deckers Outdoor Corp v Farley (No 2) (2009) 176 FCR 33 cited
Health World Ltd v Shin-Sun Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 240 CLR 590 cited
Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 cited
Jonathan Ross Sceats v Jonathan Sceats Design Pty Ltd (1990) 17 IPR 28 cited
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 cited
Re Carl Zeiss Pty Ltd’s Application (1969) 122 CLR 1 cited
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 cited

Davison M, Berger T, Freeman A, Shanahan’s Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (4th ed, Lawbook Co, 2008)

Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Date of last submissions: 23 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Mr A Leopold SC, Ms ST Chrysanthou and Ms SL Ross
Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross-Respondent: Watson Mangioni
Counsel for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: Mr AJL Bannon SC, Mr C Dimitriadis SC and Mr R Clark
Solicitor for the Respondents/ Cross-Claimants: Herbert Smith Freehills

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 149 of 2014

BETWEEN:

ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED
Applicant

AND:

ACPA PTY LIMITED
First Respondent

ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC
Second Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

ACPA PTY LIMITED
First Cross-Claimant

ANCHORAGE CAPITAL GROUP LLC
Second Cross-Claimant

AND: ANCHORAGE CAPITAL PARTNERS PTY LIMITED
Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The register of trade marks be rectified so that the registrations of trade marks 1425924 and 1425929 be cancelled.

2.Direct that the exhibits be returned to the parties…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1436
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 3), the dispute centred on the registration of certain trade marks, specifically trade marks 1425924 and 1425929. The applicant, Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Ltd, sought the removal of these trade marks from the register, arguing that the respondent, ACPA Pty Ltd, was not the rightful owner. This case was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, which was required to determine several legal issues concerning the exercise of the court's discretion under s 88 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) and the appropriateness of non-publication orders.

The central legal issue was whether the court's power to remove trade marks from the register under s 88 of the Act is discretionary or mandatory, and if discretionary, what factors should guide the exercise of this power. The court examined whether the term 'may' in s 88(1) of the Act implies a mandatory requirement or if it allows for judicial discretion. The court also considered the onus of proof under s 88 and the circumstances under which the power should be exercised. Additionally, the court evaluated the necessity and appropriateness of non-publication orders regarding certain evidence presented during the trial.

In its reasoning, the court concluded that the power to remove trade marks from the register is indeed discretionary. It rejected the argument that 'may' should be interpreted as 'must', thereby establishing that the court has the authority to decide whether to exercise the power based on the specific circumstances of each case. The court also found that the onus of proof lies with the applicant to demonstrate sufficient reason for the cancellation of the trade mark registration. Regarding the exercise of the discretion, the court held that while the power is rarely exercised by not cancelling a registration, it is not limited to exceptional circumstances. Instead, the court should consider various factors, including the reasons for the registration and the potential consequences of its removal. The court further determined that non-publication orders were necessary to protect sensitive information contained in some of the trial evidence.

The final orders of the court included the cancellation of the registrations of trade marks 1425924 and 1425929 from the register, directives for the return of exhibits, restrictions on third-party access to certain exhibits, and specific instructions regarding the handling of sensitive submissions. The court also made no order as to costs concerning the issue of non-publication.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The register of trade marks be rectified so that the registrations of trade marks 1425924 and 1425929 be cancelled.

2. Direct that the exhibits be returned to the parties 29 days after the final disposition of the proceedings, including any appeals and applications for leave or special leave to appeal.

3. Direct that no access be granted to any third party under r 2.32(4) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) to any of the exhibits without the leave of a judge of the Court.

4. Direct that the respondents’ closing submissions dated 2 February 2015, including annexure A thereto, be placed in a sealed envelope on the front of which is written ‘Not to be accessed without the leave of a judge of the Court: see Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Limited (No 3) [2015] FCA 1436 at [48]’.

5. No order as to costs with respect to the issue of non-publication.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 21 August 2015 I concluded that the applicant’s trade mark infringement proceedings should be dismissed: Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 882 (‘the primary judgment’). At trial the respondents had pursued a cross-claim seeking removal of the applicant’s trade marks from the register on the basis, amongst others, that the applicant was not their owner. This latter contention I upheld: see [32]-[43] of the primary judgment. I concluded that the Court’s power to remove the marks under s 88(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Act’) was enlivened. The parties sought, however, to make further submissions on the question of how the discretion should be exercised in light of the facts found in the balance of the primary judgment. These reasons deal, first, with that issue. They then deal with the respondents’ application for non-publication orders with respect to some of the evidence led at trial. These reasons assume a familiarity with the primary judgment.A. Should the registration of the trade marks be cancelled? The power to cancel the registration of a trade mark is conferred by s 88 of the Act which provides:‘88 Amendment or cancellation—other specified grounds(1)Subject to subsection (2) and section 89, a prescribed court may, on the application of an aggrieved person or the Registrar, order that the Register be rectified by:(a) cancelling the registration of a trade mark; or(b) removing or amending an entry wrongly made or remaining on the Register; or(c) entering any condition or limitation affecting the registration of a trade mark that ought to be entered.(2)An application may be made on any of the following grounds, and on no other grounds:(a)any of the grounds on which the registration of the trade mark could have been opposed under this Act;(b)an amendment of the application for the registration of the trade mark was obtained as a result of fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation;(c)because of the circumstances applying at the time when the application for rectification is filed, the use of the trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion;(e)if the application is in respect of an entry in the Register—the entry was made, or has been previously amended, as a result of fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation.’(Notes omitted) Three initial issues arise between the parties about the meaning of s 88(1). The first of these is whether ‘may’ means ‘must’, so that there is, in truth, no discretion at all. I resolved this adversely to the respondents in the primary judgment at [48]. The second concerns who bears the onus of proof under the provision. The third is whether it is true that once the power under s 88(1) is enlivened only rarely or in exceptional circumstances is it to be exercised by not cancelling the registration of a mark. So far as the question of onus is concerned it is established in relation to the predecessor provisions to s 88(1), viz ss 22(1) and 23(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), that once the preconditions to the Court’s power have been established the mark should be expunged ‘unless sufficient reason appears for leaving it there’: Re Carl Zeiss Pty Ltd’s Application (1969) 122 CLR 1 at 11 per Kitto J (s 23); Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 221 per McLelland J (ss 22 and 23).