Bluescope Steel Ltd v Maan Enterprises Pty Ltd

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by BLUESCOPE STEEL LIMITED to registration of trade mark application 1253955, 1253966 (classes 1, 19) - BLUE SKY WATER - filed in the name of MAAN ENTERPRISES PTY LTD.

Delegate: T. E. Williams
Representation: Opponent:  Fiona Brittain, Davies Collison Cave, patent attorneys
Applicant: David Williams of counsel, instructed by Andrew Nicholson, Mullins Lawyers, solicitors: written submissions on substantive matter, telephone submissions in relation to further evidence application
Decision: 2011 ATMO 26
S52 opposition: BLUE SKY WATER able to coexist with BLUESCOPE WATER. No ground of opposition established, registration to proceed. Statement of reasons for refusal of permission for applicant to rely on further evidence.

Background

  1. Maan Enterprises Pty Ltd (“the applicant”) has filed two applications to register the trade mark BLUE SKY WATER (“the trade mark”).  Those applications were filed on 29 July 2008 (“the priority date”) and have been numbered as 1253955 and 1253966.   I will not list the goods, in classes 6 and 19 specified in the applications but they can be summarized as “tanks and fittings therefor of metal” and “non-metallic tanks and fittings” respectively. 

  2. Registration of the trade mark is opposed by Bluescope Steel Ltd (“the opponent”), as provided for under s 52 of Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”).  The opposition process initially followed the course set out in the regulations.  The opponent filed evidence in support of its opposition, and served a copy of this on the applicant.  That evidence consists of declarations by Gavin Heitman, the Queensland Regional Business Manager of Bluescope Water Pty Ltd. (“Water”), Andrew Cropp, the General Manager of Water, and Robert Lynch, the Building Manager of Hallmark Homes Pty Ltd.

  3. From the evidence, Water is wholly owned by the opponent.  Mr Cropp gives evidence about how Water has used the trade mark BLUESCOPE WATER (“the opponent’s trade mark”) in respect of, primarily, steel water tanks, and gives details of revenue and advertising, both of which have been extensive since the opponent adopted its trade mark in 2004.  The tanks that Water supplies are quite large, domestic ones being of 1-10,000 litres, with rural and school water tanks being significantly bigger again.  Messrs Lynch and Heitman add detail and depth to this picture, with a particular focus on incidents or potential incidents of confusion between the trade mark and the opponent’s trade mark. 

  4. The applicant elected not to rely on evidence in answer to the opposition, and there the matter rested until August 2010 when the opponent requested to be heard and the opposition was listed for hearing on 7 December 2010.  I was assigned to conduct that hearing, which was to be in Melbourne since the applicant did not propose to attend and would rely on written submissions.  What follows is my decision of the opposition.  However, there are some procedural complexities which it is necessary to explain beforehand.

    Procedural matters

  5. On 9 November 2010, having been assigned to conduct the hearing…

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Details
Case
[2011] ATMO 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Bluescope Steel Ltd for registration of a trade mark, opposed by Maan Enterprises Pty Ltd. The dispute centred on whether the applicant's proposed trade mark was deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade mark, and whether the opponent had established grounds for opposition. The decision was made by T. E. Williams, Hearing Officer, at the Trade Marks Office on 29 March 2011.

The primary legal issue before the Hearing Officer was to determine if the applicant's trade mark was deceptively similar to the opponent's registered trade mark under section 44 of the relevant legislation, and consequently, if the grounds of opposition had been established. A secondary issue, addressed in an annexure, concerned the interpretation of "further evidence" and the circumstances under which a party might be permitted to rely on evidence not initially filed.

The Hearing Officer found that while the goods in question were similar, the applicant's trade mark was not deceptively similar to the opponent's registered mark. The reasoning applied the principles of deceptive similarity as defined in section 10 of the legislation, considering the likelihood of deception or confusion. The Hearing Officer rejected the opponent's analogy with invented words, distinguishing the present case where common English words were used. The Hearing Officer also addressed the applicant's attempt to rely on further evidence, rejecting a narrow interpretation of "further evidence" and indicating a preference for determining the merits of such evidence when the need arises, while noting the applicant's unexplained oversight in dealing with the opponent's evidence.

Ultimately, no grounds of opposition were established. The trade mark application was permitted to proceed to registration one month from the date of the decision, subject to any notice of appeal. Costs were awarded against the opponent, to be taxed in accordance with the principles in *James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhad*.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I award costs against the opponent, to be taxed as per James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhad (2001) 53 IPR 591.T. E. WilliamsHearing Officer29 March 2011Annexure 1: Reasons for refusing to grant permission for the applicant to rely on further evidence The further evidence on which the applicant sought to rely is “further” in the sense that the process for adducing such evidence is further to that of the earlier evidence stages set out in regulations. There have been one or two unpublished decisions made at the Trade Marks Office in earlier years, to the effect that a party that had elected not to rely on evidence at first instance cannot describe any evidence that it later seeks to tender as being further evidence, since it is not “further to that which it has already filed”. The effect of viewing the word “further” in those narrow terms is that such a party may bring its evidence into contention only by way of a late extension of time to file, in the present matter, evidence in answer. I reject such an interpretation on two bases. Firstly, as I have said above, the logical reading of the word “further”, where it occurs at reg 5.15 is as meaning further to the evidence stages that have been previously defined, by regs 5.7 to 5.9. Secondly, the very considerable extension of time fees that would apply to some cases - but not to others, depending on the history of the matter – makes a restricted reading of the word “further” undesirable. In Estate of Diana Princess of Wales v Masterson (2001) 52 IPR 264 I said that an applicant who had previously filed a notice under reg 5.11 had not forfeited her entitlement to bring in evidence. In that matter, as it happened, the evidence was presented by way of a late application for an extension of time, and I considered the application in those terms. In the present matter, the new evidence is described as further evidence. I believe that it is better to determine the merits of allowing such evidence in, when the need arises, without having a nagging apprehension that extension of time fees, sometimes covering a period of years, have had an arbitrary, but always restrictive, influence on the flow of information. In the present matter, a declaration by Andrew Nicholson, a partner in the applicant’s solicitor firm, sets out the broad nature of the further evidence and the circumstances which the applicant says would justify the grant of permission to rely on that evidence. Mr Nicholson, whose firm has only recently been engaged in this matter, declares that he has been informed - by whom, he does not say – that “the applicant” had “overlooked” some of the opponent’s evidence. Mr Nicholson does not explain how this came to be. He notes both that the declaration so “overlooked” is voluminous and fills two lever-arch files; and that it was received by the applicant. It appears to me that Mr Nicholson has tried to put a more acceptable face on unexplained actions that probably amount, in the lack of better explanation, to a disregard of the opposition process, in the sense of the applicant having “overlooked” the need to do anything, at the proper time, with or about the evidence in support of the opposition.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, there is no basis on which I could safely find that the s 59 ground has been established. Conclusion No ground of opposition has been established. The trade mark application may therefore proceed to registration one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar has been served with a notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration shall not occur unless the appeal has been discontinued or, otherwise, the court so orders. I award costs against the opponent, to be taxed as per James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd v Hume Industries (Malaysia) Berhad (2001) 53 IPR 591.T. E. WilliamsHearing Officer29 March 2011Annexure 1: Reasons for refusing to grant permission for the applicant to rely on further evidence The further evidence on which the applicant sought to rely is “further” in the sense that the process for adducing such evidence is further to that of the earlier evidence stages set out in regulations. There have been one or two unpublished decisions made at the Trade Marks Office in earlier years, to the effect that a party that had elected not to rely on evidence at first instance cannot describe any evidence that it later seeks to tender as being further evidence, since it is not “further to that which it has already filed”. The effect of viewing the word “further” in those narrow terms is that such a party may bring its evidence into contention only by way of a late extension of time to file, in the present matter, evidence in answer. I reject such an interpretation on two bases. Firstly, as I have said above, the logical reading of the word “further”, where it occurs at reg 5.15 is as meaning further to the evidence stages that have been previously defined, by regs 5.7 to 5.9. Secondly, the very considerable extension of time fees that would apply to some cases - but not to others, depending on the history of the matter – makes a restricted reading of the word “further” undesirable. In Estate of Diana Princess of Wales v Masterson (2001) 52 IPR 264 I said that an applicant who had previously filed a notice under reg 5.11 had not forfeited her entitlement to bring in evidence. In that matter, as it happened, the evidence was presented by way of a late application for an extension of time, and I considered the application in those terms. In the present matter, the new evidence is described as further evidence. I believe that it is better to determine the merits of allowing such evidence in, when the need arises, without having a nagging apprehension that extension of time fees, sometimes covering a period of years, have had an arbitrary, but always restrictive, influence on the flow of information. In the present matter, a declaration by Andrew Nicholson, a partner in the applicant’s solicitor firm, sets out the broad nature of the further evidence and the circumstances which the applicant says would justify the grant of permission to rely on that evidence. Mr Nicholson, whose firm has only recently been engaged in this matter, declares that he has been informed - by whom, he does not say – that “the applicant” had “overlooked” some of the opponent’s evidence. Mr Nicholson does not explain how this came to be. He notes both that the declaration so “overlooked” is voluminous and fills two lever-arch files; and that it was received by the applicant. It appears to me that Mr Nicholson has tried to put a more acceptable face on unexplained actions that probably amount, in the lack of better explanation, to a disregard of the opposition process, in the sense of the applicant having “overlooked” the need to do anything, at the proper time, with or about the evidence in support of the opposition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As Ms Brittain noted, the opponent bears the onus of establishing one or more of the grounds of opposition on the balance of probabilities[1]. [1] Following Gyles J in Pfizer Products Inc v Karam (2006) 70 IPR 599. See also Chocolaterie Guylian N.V. v Registrar of Trade Marks (2009) 82 IPR 13 at [22] to [26].S 44– Deceptively similar prior registration The most obviously relevant provision is sub-section (1), which reads:(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark ) in respect of goods ( applicant's goods ) must be rejected if: (a) the applicant's trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to: (i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or (ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and (b) the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services. Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10. Note 2: For similar goods see subsection 14(1). (Relevantly, goods are similar to other goods if they are the same as the other goods; or if they are of the same description as that of the other goods. )Note 3: For priority date see section 12. The opponent relies on trade mark registration 982984, for the opponent’s trade mark BLUESCOPE WATER. This is registered for, among other things, metal goods, pipes and valves and I am satisfied that the applicant’s goods in classes 6 and 19 are similar to goods in classes 6, 11 and 20 in the registration[2]. Consistent with the applicant’s written submissions, the only issue remaining to be decided under s 44 is that of deceptive similarity between the trade mark and the opponent’s trade mark. [2] Ms Brittain relied on Bobart v Ferry [2010] ATMO 43 to support her arguments on that issue, which I fully accept. Deceptive similarity is dealt with in s 10:For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. Ms Brittain pointed to the identical beginning and ending words, BLUE and WATER, within the respective trade marks. She went on to draw an analogy with findings of deceptive similarity in respect of the trade marks REBOVIR/REVOVIR on one hand, and RETROVIR[3]; and of LITL and LIDL[4]. This is something that the applicant addressed in its written submissions, arguing that, in the case before me, the ideas of the marks are very different, on the one hand, “blue sky” and on the other “blue scope”, two words that, together, have no apparent reference as they have no apparent connection. I agree that the opponent’s analogy with invented words is somewhat forced. Prima facie, it seems to me that the way in which an ordinary English expression like “blue sky” would be perceived or recollected, if adopted as part of a trade mark, is not likely to be similar to the process governing more complex single-word trade marks like those on which Ms Brittain relied. As the delegate in the REVOVIR matter noted: These identical beginnings and terminations are likely to contribute to the way the trade marks in questions are recognized, remembered and dealt with. With these particular trade marks an erroneous recognition may arise from the commonality of both the beginning and ending of the words – people tend to recognize words from the pattern or outline that they form.The idea of “recognition by pattern or outline” is something about which Ms Brittain had more to say in relation to s 60, to which I will come later in these reasons.[3] Glaxo Wellcome Australia Ltd v Bukwang Pharm Co Ltd [2008] ATMO 12[4] Lidl Stiftung & Co KG v Aquest LLC [2010] ATMO 21.