Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 382

Citation: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 382
Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v MSY TECHNOLOGY PTY LTD ACN 093 529 401, MSY TECHNOLOGY (NSW) PTY LTD 102 819 821, MSY TECHNOLOGY (QLD) PTY LTD ACN 112 112 437, MSY TECHNOLOGY (SA) PTY LTD ACN 123 607 198 and MSY TECHNOLOGY (WA) PTY LTD ACN 132 230 409
File number: NSD 1472 of 2010
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 15 April 2011
Catchwords:

JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – Declarations – declarations by consent – power of court to make declarations by consent – proper contradictor – whether party who consents is a “proper contradictor” – principles relating to making declarations on evidence questioned – statement of agreed facts under s 191 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

TRADE PRACTICES – Penalty – pecuniary penalty for contraventions – principles appropriate to order for pecuniary penalty

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Schedule 2 ss 232, 233

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 191

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)s 50

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 53, 68, 76, 76E, 80, 86C

Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth) Sch 5, Sch 7

Federal Court Rules  O 35A r 3(2)

Cases cited:

ACS v Anderson [1975] 1 NSWLR 212 cited
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 considered
Allgemeine Deutsche Credit Anstalt v Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society (1907) 15 SLT 427 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (2001) ATPR 41-815 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allergy Pathway Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 960 questioned
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Bridgestone Corporation (2010) 186 FCR 214 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Gourmet Goody’s Family Restaurant Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1216 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetplace Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 759 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 215 ALR 301 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd (2005) ATPR 42-070 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v McMahon Services Pty Ltd (2004) ATPR 42-031 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR 41-809 distinguished
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Skins Compression Garments Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 710 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v MSY Technology Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 204 cited
Baillie’s Trustees v Baillie (1910) 2 SLT 6 cited
Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East v Ship MV “Mawishi al Gasseem” (No 2) (2007) 240 ALR 120 cited

BMIv Federated Clerks Union of Australia (1983) 6 IR 416 questioned
Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376 cited
Cooper…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 382
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought an action against MSY Technology Pty Ltd in the Federal Court of Australia, seeking declarations and pecuniary penalties for breaches of consumer protection laws. The ACCC argued that MSY Technology had engaged in misleading conduct by making false representations about their product’s performance. The court was required to determine whether it should grant the declarations by consent and whether the penalty imposed was appropriate. One of the key legal issues was whether the court could make declarations based on agreed facts or if it required evidence. The court considered principles from cases such as Wallersteiner v Moir and Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd, which suggested declarations should be based on evidence rather than admissions or consent. However, the court concluded that these principles were not absolute and could be overridden by specific statutory provisions, such as section 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

The court reasoned that while there was a general reluctance to make declarations based solely on admissions, this did not preclude doing so in cases involving public rights, as in this instance where the ACCC sought to vindicate public rights and educate the public. The court also noted that the principle requiring a contradictor for declarations was not absolute and could be satisfied if all proper defendants were joined in the proceedings, regardless of whether they consented to the declarations. The court found that the ACCC, as a regulator, was a proper contradictor and that the consent of MSY Technology did not invalidate this status. Given the binding authority of BMI Group Australia Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd, the court concluded that it should not make the declarations sought by the ACCC. The court ordered the parties to bring in short minutes of order within seven days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties bring in short minutes of order within 7 days.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

These principles are related but not identical. It is useful to consider their status separately.(a) Declarations on admitted facts In Wallersteiner v Moir Buckley LJ said (at 1029):It has always been my experience and I believe it to be a practice of very long standing, that the court does not make declarations of right either on admissions or in default of pleading. A statement on this subject of respectable antiquity is to be found in Williams v Powell [1894] WN 141, where Kekewich J, whose views on the practice of the Chancery Division have always been regarded with much respect, said that a declaration by the court was a judicial act, and ought not to be made on admissions of the parties or on consent, but only if the court was satisfied by evidence. Scarman LJ put it this way (at 1030):When a defendant fails to plead, it is ordinarily in the interest of justice that the plaintiff should be able without more ado to obtain judgment for the money or property for which he is suing; the defendant is not without remedy after judgment in default, for, if he can show a bona fide defence, he can get it set aside before it is enforced. But, when what is sought is a declaration, there is the risk of irremediable injustice: the court has spoken and words cannot be recalled, even though later they be negatived; “nescit vox missa reverti”, Horace, Ars Poetica, line 390. The power of the court to give declaratory relief upon a default of pleading, of course, exists, but, for the reason crystallised by Horace in those four words of his, should be exercised only in cases in which to deny it would be to impose injustice upon the claimant. So far as I can see these statements suggest three reasons why declarations should not be made on agreed facts. These are:(a)Kekewich J said so in Williams v Powell [1894] WN 141;(b)the spoken words of a declaration cannot be recalled even if later reversed on appeal; and(c)Horace made the same point in Horace, Ars Poetica, line 390. Since Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376 at 390 per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ, the authority of the English Court of Appeal in this country is co-extensive, as in the case of other “great common law courts”, with its ability to persuade. In my opinion, this aspect of Wallersteiner v Moir is, with respect, distinctly unpersuasive. To begin with (a), Kekewich J said nothing so absolute as Buckley LJ suggests. Resort to the report of the decision shows why. It consists of a very short set of reasons probably delivered ex tempore. They are reported in the Weekly Notes for the week ending 21 July 1894. Williams v Powell was delivered on 14 July 1894 which was a Saturday, underscoring the ex tempore nature of the reasons. As was the style with the Weekly Notes the actual judgment is not reported but instead an account of it by a reporter “C.C.M.D”. His short report is as follows:KEKEWICH, J., said that a declaration by the Court was a judicial act, and ought not to be made on admissions of the parties or on consent, but only if the Court was satisfied by evidence. His Lordship had always so held, and intended so to hold until corrected; but in order to avoid expense, he would adopt a course which he had adopted on other occasions. Evidence that all parties were before the Court and of the title might be produced to the chief clerk, who, without making any certificate, would look into the matter and inform the Court whether he was satisfied with the title, and, if he was, the order might then go.(emphasis added)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In any event, this case involves public rights. The Commission is a regulator and it seeks vindication of the public’s right not to be misled. The principle reason the Commission desires, understandably, to have the declarations made is to serve that purpose and to educate. These are public matters. For that reason, I do not think that I can distinguish BMI. Conclusions in summary:(a)the suggested principles that declaration should only be made on evidence is dubious in origin, insubstantial in its persuasive content and is not required either by Forster or BMI;(b)to the extent that Allergy Pathway suggests that BMI propounds such a rule it is, with respect, plainly wrong because it overlooks the fact that the Court in BMI had evidence before it and did not decline the declarations on the basis suggested;(c)in any event, the rule, even if it exists, is overcome by s 191 of the Evidence Act in the present case;(d)this Court is bound by Forster not to make declarations without a contradictor;(e)as a matter of correct legal doctrine a contradictor will be present when all proper defendants have been joined and so are bound to the result. They will not cease to be contradictors merely because they consent to the proposed declarations;(f)BMI has, as its ratio decidendi, the contrary proposition which binds me. In those circumstances, I conclude that I should not make the declarations which are sought. There are three footnotes to that conclusion. The first is that this case is not concerned with the granting of relief where a respondent had defaulted in appearances which are governed by Order 35A rule 3(2) of the Federal Court Rules: cf. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 665 at 680-681 [54]-[59] per Kiefel J; Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East v Ship MV “Mawishi al Gasseem” (No 2) (2007) 240 ALR 120 at 122-123 [10]-[15] per Mansfield J. The second is that there are a large number of decisions of this Court in which consent declarations have been made including at least one of my own: Lang v ACN 078 899 591 Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 987. My present understanding of BMI is that this should not have occurred. The third footnote concerns declarations involving public rights of the kind referred to in BMI such as those declaring as invalid a statute. Such declarations are accepted as having an effect beyond the parties before the Court. In Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ said (at 69 [158]):…If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing, as a necessary step in making out his case for relief, that the Bonus Act is invalid, then the reasoning of the Court upon the issue of invalidity would be of binding force in the subsequent adjudications of other disputes. Hence the very great utility in granting declaratory relief in the plaintiff’s action. In this way the resolution pursuant to Ch III of the Constitution of the plaintiff’s particular controversy acquires a permanent, larger, and general dimension. The declaration would vindicate the rule of law under the Constitution. …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is convenient to deal first with the declarations.The making of declarations by consent There are two related principles which suggest that a Court should not make declarations in circumstances such as the present. They are:(a)a principle flowing from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wallersteiner v Moir [1974] 1 WLR 991 which suggests that declarations should not be made on submissions but only on evidence;(b)a principle flowing from the speech of Lord Dunedin in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd [1921] 2 AC 438 (“Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank”) which suggests that a declaration may not be made in the absence of a contradictor. These principles are related but not identical. It is useful to consider their status separately.(a) Declarations on admitted facts In Wallersteiner v Moir Buckley LJ said (at 1029):It has always been my experience and I believe it to be a practice of very long standing, that the court does not make declarations of right either on admissions or in default of pleading. A statement on this subject of respectable antiquity is to be found in Williams v Powell [1894] WN 141, where Kekewich J, whose views on the practice of the Chancery Division have always been regarded with much respect, said that a declaration by the court was a judicial act, and ought not to be made on admissions of the parties or on consent, but only if the court was satisfied by evidence. Scarman LJ put it this way (at 1030):When a defendant fails to plead, it is ordinarily in the interest of justice that the plaintiff should be able without more ado to obtain judgment for the money or property for which he is suing; the defendant is not without remedy after judgment in default, for, if he can show a bona fide defence, he can get it set aside before it is enforced. But, when what is sought is a declaration, there is the risk of irremediable injustice: the court has spoken and words cannot be recalled, even though later they be negatived; “nescit vox missa reverti”, Horace, Ars Poetica, line 390. The power of the court to give declaratory relief upon a default of pleading, of course, exists, but, for the reason crystallised by Horace in those four words of his, should be exercised only in cases in which to deny it would be to impose injustice upon the claimant. So far as I can see these statements suggest three reasons why declarations should not be made on agreed facts. These are:(a)Kekewich J said so in Williams v Powell [1894] WN 141;(b)the spoken words of a declaration cannot be recalled even if later reversed on appeal; and(c)Horace made the same point in Horace, Ars Poetica, line 390. Since Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376 at 390 per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ, the authority of the English Court of Appeal in this country is co-extensive, as in the case of other “great common law courts”, with its ability to persuade. In my opinion, this aspect of Wallersteiner v Moir is, with respect, distinctly unpersuasive. To begin with (a), Kekewich J said nothing so absolute as Buckley LJ suggests. Resort to the report of the decision shows why. It consists of a very short set of reasons probably delivered ex tempore. They are reported in the Weekly Notes for the week ending 21 July 1894. Williams v Powell was delivered on 14 July 1894 which was a Saturday, underscoring the ex tempore nature of the reasons.