Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Limited [2010] FCA 58

Citation: Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Limited [2010] FCA 58
Parties: MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS v PGP DEVELOPMENTS PTY LIMITED (ACN 100 627 914)
File number: ACD 36 of 2009
Judge: STONE J
Date of judgment: 12 February 2010
Catchwords: ENVIRONMENT – pecuniary civil penalty sought – declaration of contravention sought – statement of agreed facts provided by parties
DECLARATIONS – statement of agreed facts adduced as evidence under s 191 Evidence Act -  whether agreed facts are evidence sufficient to support declaration
Legislation: Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 481
Environment and Heritage Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2003 (Cth) subitem 1A(3) of Schedule 3
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) 191
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA(1)
Cases cited:

ACCC  v Allergy Pathway Pty Ltd

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR   564

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Abalone Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1834

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cosic Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1579

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Goldy Motors Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1885; (2001) Aust Contract R (Digest) 90-123; (2001) ATPR 41-8011

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Skins Compression Garments Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 710

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Wilson Parking 1992 Pty Ltd (ACN 052 475 911) [2009] FCA 1580

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards (2004) 51 ACSR 320

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cash King Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1429

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 50 ACSR 500;

BMI Ltd v Federated Clerks Union of Australia (1983) 51 ALR 401

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421

Minister for Environment and Heritage v Warne [2007] FCA 599

Minister for Environment Heritage and the Arts v Lamattina [2009] FCA 753

Minister for the Environment and Heritage v Greentree (No 3) [2004] FCA 1317

NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285

Re One.Tel Ltd (in liq); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 682;

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ElmFinancial Services Pty Ltd (2005) 55 ACSR 411

Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076

Date of hearing: 4 February 2010
Place: Canberra
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Counsel for the Applicant: T Begbie
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondent: PR Whitehead
Solicitor for the Respondent: Whitehead Gupta Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 36 of 2009

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS
Applicant

AND:

PGP DEVELOPMENTS PTY LIMITED (ACN 100 627 914)
Respondent

JUDGE:

STONE J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 FEBRUARY 2010

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 58
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Ltd, the court was asked to make a declaration that PGP Developments Pty Ltd had contravened the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act) and to impose a pecuniary penalty. The respondent, PGP Developments Pty Ltd, is the developer of a residential and golf course project near the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Property. The Minister for the Environment alleged that PGP Developments had breached conditions of a notice issued under the EPBC Act by not ensuring that a constructed lagoon met certain capacity requirements. Both parties agreed to the facts and the appropriate penalty.

The legal issues before the court were whether the court could make a declaration and impose a penalty based on agreed facts, and if so, what the appropriate penalty should be. The court considered the statutory framework, including section 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which allows for facts agreed upon by parties to be considered without requiring further evidence. The court also considered the principles for determining a pecuniary penalty under section 481(3) of the EPBC Act, which includes factors such as the nature and extent of the contravention, any loss or damage, and the circumstances of the contravention.

The court found that the agreed facts were sufficient to establish a contravention of the EPBC Act and to justify the imposition of a penalty. It determined that a penalty of $40,000 was appropriate, taking into account the maximum penalty available and the public policy benefits of encouraging settlements. The court made a declaration that PGP Developments had contravened the EPBC Act and ordered the payment of the penalty.

This case illustrates the court's willingness to rely on agreed facts in making declarations and imposing penalties, provided that the parties' agreement is properly documented and presented. The decision underscores the importance of clear statutory interpretation and the balancing of public policy considerations in environmental enforcement cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The parties have consented to the Court making the order and the declaration. In doing so they rely, not only on the statement of claim and amended defence filed in this proceeding but also on a Statement of Agreed Facts and their written joint submissions. The Statement of Agreed Facts was signed by the parties’ respective solicitors and tendered in evidence at the hearing. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts referred to in these reasons are taken from that statement. In these reasons I have also drawn heavily on the parties’ joint submissions without necessarily indicating at each point where I have done so. I am grateful to the parties for their very valuable assistance. I should point out, however, that while the respondent has consented to the orders sought by the Minister, for the reasons given below I am independently satisfied that the Court has the power to make those orders and that it is appropriate to do so.Facts The respondent, PGP Developments Pty Limited is the developer of ‘Whitsunday Shores’, a golf course and residential development approximately 10 km south of Bowen, Queensland and about 500 metres from the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Property. The project is being developed in 8 stages. The second stage of the project comprises approximately 160 residential blocks over an 18 hectare area. The Great Barrier Reef is a World Heritage property that has been included in the National Heritage List; see the notice to this effect published in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette (Special) No S99 21 May 2007. In accordance with subitem 1A(3) of Schedule 3 of the Environment and Heritage Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2003 (Cth), the notice declares that each world heritage value attributed to a World Heritage property (as listed in the schedule to the notice) “is taken to cause the relevant World Heritage property to meet a National Heritage criterion corresponding to that world heritage value”. According to the notice published in the Special Gazette No 99, the Great Barrier Reef meets the following National Heritage Criteria: (a)the place has outstanding heritage value to the nation because of the place's importance in the course, or pattern, of Australia's natural or cultural history;(b)the place has outstanding heritage value to the nation because of the place's possession of uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of Australia's natural or cultural history;(c)the place has outstanding heritage value to the nation because of the place's potential to yield information that will contribute to an understanding of Australia's natural or cultural history;(d)the place has outstanding heritage value to the nation because of the place's importance in demonstrating the principal characteristics of:(i)a class of Australia's natural or cultural places; or(ii)a class of Australia's natural or cultural environments;(e)the place has outstanding heritage value to the nation because of the place's importance in exhibiting particular anaesthetic characteristics valued by a community or cultural group.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The approach adopted in New South Wales was followed by Barker J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cosic Holdings Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1579 where his Honour said at [51]:I note that in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allergy Pathway Pty Ltd, Finkelstein J of this Court, at [16], noted a number of New South Wales Supreme Court decisions that have followed the course that I now propose to adopt, but different from what his Honour there proposed. In those other decisions the Court had acknowledged the general rule that a declaration on a matter relating to a public or analogous right should not be made by consent. However, those cases considered that a declaration could be made if the Court was satisfied by evidence that it ought to be made, the “evidence” to which regard may be had, including “facts” admitted to be true about which there is no direct evidence – facts, for example, contained in a statement of agreed facts. I am persuaded that the approach adopted in such cases as Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 50 ACSR 500, referred to by Finkelstein J at [16], provide useful guidance in this regard.His Honour took the same approach in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Wilson Parking 1992 Pty Ltd (ACN 052 475 911) [2009] FCA 1580.Section 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) In none of the cases to which Finkelstein J referred, or indeed in Barker J’s reasons in either ACCC v Cosic or ACCC v Wilson Parking, is there any mention of s 191 of the Evidence Act. The section, which is also not mentioned by Finkelstein J, provides:(1)In this section:agreed fact means a fact that the parties to a proceeding have agreed is not, for the purposes of the proceeding to be disputed.(2)In a proceeding:(a) evidence is not required to prove the existence of an agreed fact; and(b) evidence may not be adduced to contradict or qualify an agreed fact;unless the court gives leave.(3)Subsection (2) does not apply unless the agreed fact:(a)is stated in an agreement in writing signed by the parties or by Australian legal practitioners, legal counsel or prosecutors representing the parties and adduced in evidence in the proceeding; or(b)with the leave of the court, is stated by a party before the court with the agreement of all other parties Section 191 came into effect with the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) on 23 February 1995. The question arises as to whether agreed facts within the meaning of the section, and which are stated in an agreement in writing and adduced in evidence, as required by s 191(3)(a), are capable of supporting a declaration which might otherwise need to be supported by evidence proved in the usual way. There is little assistance in the case law as to the construction of s 191 and none, as far as I can determine, that addresses the precise issue raised here. There is also no material assistance to be gained from the explanatory memorandum to the Evidence Bill 1994. Although the cases referred to by Finkelstein J considered agreed facts, it is not clear whether the agreements as to facts were in the form required by s 191(3). This is also the case with the decisions of Barker J referred to in [29] above.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was common ground that PGP had voluntarily, and at its own expense, carried out remediation work to increase the capacity of the Lagoon to a minimum volume of 2400 m³ and a minimum length to width ratio of 3:1. It was also agreed that PGP’s failure to ensure that Lagoon 2 had the required minimum capacity was “a result of inadequate attention being given to the design and construction of the Lagoon. It was not a conscious or deliberate failure to meet the conditions of the s 77 Notice and was not motivated by a desire to reduce costs”. It was also acknowledged that there is no record of any other contravention of s 77A(2) of the EPBC Act by PGP and that it had co-operated at all stages of the investigation of the alleged breaches, in particular, through:· consenting to and facilitating site inspections;· participating in taped records of conversations; and· making full and frank admissions as to a range of factual matters.Factual conclusions I accept that the relevant facts in this matter are those that have been agreed between the parties and have been set out in the Statement of Agreed of Facts. Section 191(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides that in such circumstances evidence is not required to prove the existence of those facts. THE PECUNIARY PENALTY The facts agreed by the parties and accepted by the Court establish that by carrying out the Stage 2 Development action in a manner inconsistent with the s 77 Notice, PGP contravened s 77A(2) of the Act. The EPBC Act provides for a pecuniary penalty to be imposed in such circumstances which, for a corporation, is a maximum of 10,000 penalty units; s 77A(2)(b). As a penalty unit is $110, this equates to the amount of $1,100,000; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA(1). The factors that the Court should take into account in determining an appropriate amount of penalty are set out in s 481(3) of the EPBC Act:(3)In determining the pecuniary penalty, the Court must have regard to all relevant matters, including:(a)the nature and extent of the contravention; and(b)the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention; and(c)the circumstances in which the contravention took place; and(d)whether the person has previously been found by the Court in proceedings under this Act to have engaged in any similar conduct. In NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285, the Full Court considered circumstances in which the parties had reached agreement as to the appropriate amount of the penalty. Burchett and Kiefel JJ emphasised that the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) imposed the responsibility to determine the appropriate penalty on the Court. Their Honours accepted, however, that the Court was likely to be assisted by the views of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission or by economists called on behalf of the parties. Their Honours further commented at 290-1:Because the fixing of the quantum of a penalty cannot be an exact science, the Court, in such a case, does not ask whether it would without the aid of the parties have arrived at the precise figure they have proposed but rather whether their proposal can be accepted as fixing an appropriate amount.There is an important public policy involved. When corporations acknowledge contraventions, very lengthy and complex litigation is frequently avoided, freeing the courts to deal with other matters, and investigating officers of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to turn to other areas of the economy that await their attention. At the same time, a negotiated resolution in the instant case may be expected to include measures designed to promote, for the future, vigorous competition in the particular market concerned. These beneficial consequences would be jeopardised if corporations were to conclude that proper settlements were clouded by unpredictable risks. A proper figure is one within the permissible range in all the circumstances. The Court will not depart from an agreed figure merely because it might otherwise have been disposed to select some other figure, or except in a clear case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister and PGP submitted that, in all the circumstances of this case, a penalty of $40,000 is within the permissible range and appropriate. As the maximum penalty is $1,100,000, the amount suggested involves a considerable discount. Nevertheless, taking all of the above factors into consideration I accept the submission that $40,000 is an appropriate penalty in the present case. Declaration of contravention In addition to the pecuniary penalty, I am asked to make a declaration to the effect that PGP had acted inconsistently with the notice issued under s 77A(1) and had thus contravened s 77A(2) of the EPBC Act. It is clear that the Court has a broad discretionary power to make declarations under s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). That discretion should be exercised within the confines identified by the High Court in Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 437-438 and Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 581-2. Declaratory relief is not given to determine hypothetical questions. It should be directed to determining legal controversies that have been appropriately ventilated and contested. The applicant for declaratory relief must have a real interest in obtaining such relief and there must be a proper contradictor. In this case the applicant for declaratory relief is the Minister charged with enforcing compliance with the EPBC Act. As such the Minister has a real interest in the declaration being granted: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Goldy Motors Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1885; (2001) Aust Contract R (Digest) 90-123; (2001) ATPR 41-8011. The question answered by the declaration sought is not hypothetical. The proposed declaration refers to conduct that I am satisfied contravenes the EPBC Act and supports the imposition of the penalty that I have accepted. The only issue that might give pause is whether there is a proper contradictor in a case such as this where the parties have agreed as to the relevant facts, the conclusion that there has been a contravention of the EPBC Act and the appropriate penalty. In additional submissions made on behalf of the Minister, my attention was drawn to the judgment of Finkelstein J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allergy Pathway Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 960. That case concerned statements made by the respondent that the ACCC alleged were misleading. The statement concerned the respondent’s capacity to diagnose and treat allergies. The ACCC tendered a report by Professor Douglass, an expert in allergy and respiratory medicine. Professor Douglass’ report was a highly technical report that dealt with the nature of allergic diseases and allergic reactions, hypersensitivity, desensitisation and other treatment. In the light of Professor Douglass’ report the respondent no longer disputed that it had contravened the Trade Practices Act. Initially the respondent objected to Professor Douglass’ report being read and the ACCC was prepared to accept the objection. The consequence would have been, as Finkelstein J observed at [7], that there was no evidence to support the declaratory relief sought in the orders, the parties asking that the court proceed on their agreement that the declarations were justified.