Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty Ltd (in liq)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty. Ltd. (in liq)
[2012] FCA 976

Citation: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v EDirect Pty. Ltd. (in liq) [2012] FCA 976
Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v EDIRECT PTY. LTD. ACN 1008 532 083 (IN LIQUIDATION)
File number: NTD 3 of 2011
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 6 September 2012
Corrigendum: 14 February 2013
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judgments and orders – default judgment – operation of O 35A r 3(2)(c) Federal Court Rules (now Rule 5.23(2)(c) Federal Court Rules 2011) in relation to declaratory orders – default by respondent – consideration of whether declaratory orders may be made on deemed admissions – Court not bound by decision in BMI – considerations in exercising discretion to make declaratory orders under s 21 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – form of declaratory order – orders must clearly state the basis upon which they are made

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judgments and orders – declarations – consideration of discretionary power to make declarations under s 21 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – issue addressed by declaration must not be hypothetical – consideration of whether sufficient consequences flow from the making of declaratory orders –public interest in declarations in consumer protection litigation – declarations should clearly describe the conduct underlying the imposition of a pecuniary penalty

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judgment and orders – proper contradictor – consideration of decision of Full Court in MSY Technology – a party with an interest in opposing proceedings is a proper contradictor – a decision by a proper contradictor not to contest proceedings does not alter their status as a proper contradictor

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – default judgment under O 35A r 3(2)(c) Federal Court Rules – principle that Court may not receive evidence in support of application for default judgment is based upon a practice of dubious origins, not a rule of law – evidence must not alter the case pleaded – Court empowered to make default judgments in the absence of evidence – matters not taken into account because not pleaded or not pleaded with sufficient particularity

TRADE PRACTICES – penalty – pecuniary penalty for contraventions – consideration of whether it is appropriate to impose a penalty on a company in liquidation – consideration of principles of general deterrence for companies or traders in a discrete industry

TRADE PRACTICES – penalty – application of pecuniary penalty under s 76E Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – factors prescribed by s 76E(2) Trade Practices Act 1976 (Cth) are not exhaustive – consideration of factors relevant to fixing pecuniary penalty – penalties fixed should involve an element of general deterrence such that contraventions amount to “commercial suicide” – guidance on imposition of pecuniary penalty derived from recent, comparable cases – consideration of context, seriousness and frequency of contraventions – concurrent contraventions taken into account – relevance of prior conduct by respondent

Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Crimes…
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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 976
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) brought proceedings against EDirect Pty Ltd, a company in liquidation, for alleged breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The ACCC claimed that EDirect supplied mobile telephone services to numerous customers in areas where it could not provide mobile telephone coverage, thereby contravening sections 53 and 58 of the Trade Practices Act. The case reached the Federal Court, where the ACCC sought a default judgment under rule 5.23(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, as the company had not defended the proceedings. The court considered whether it could grant declaratory relief based on the deemed admissions from EDirect's default, the appropriate form of the declaration, and the quantum of any pecuniary penalty to be imposed. In addressing these issues, the court found that the ACCC could rely on the deemed admissions to support the declaration sought, provided it was not hypothetical and had real consequences. The court also considered the public interest in making such a declaration, the need for general deterrence, and the company's financial situation. Ultimately, the court made a declaration in the terms sought by the ACCC and imposed a pecuniary penalty of $2,500,000 on EDirect, reflecting the seriousness of its conduct and the need for general deterrence in the mobile telephone industry.

The court found EDirect in default and granted the ACCC's application for a declaration that EDirect had contravened sections 53(c) and 58 of the Trade Practices Act in relation to 219 customers. The court also ordered EDirect to pay a pecuniary penalty of $2,500,000 for these contraventions. The court emphasised the importance of proper supervision and control of telemarketers to ensure compliance with consumer protection laws, highlighting the need for general deterrence in the mobile telephone industry. The penalty imposed was intended to act as a strong deterrent for other companies engaging in similar conduct, reflecting the seriousness of EDirect's actions and the significant number of affected customers.

Orders

Orders of the court

3. Pursuant to s 76E of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), EDirect Pty. Ltd. pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty in the amount of $2,500,000 for the contraventions of ss 53(c) and 58 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) described in paragraphs 1(b) and 2 above in so far as the contraventions relate to the 219 identified customers from whom it received payments on or after 15 April 2010 and before 10 September 2010.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The ACCC claims that EDirect’s breaches of these provisions of the TPA arose out of its supply of mobile telephone services in Australia. It claims that EDirect supplied those services to a large number of customers in areas where it was aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, that it could not provide mobile telephone coverage. The details of these breaches and some relevant procedural history of these proceedings are set out immediately below.FACTUAL BACKGROUND According to the ACCC’s statement of claim in these proceedings, from at least 21 July 2006 to 10 September 2010, EDirect, trading as VIPtel, carried on business in Australia supplying mobile telephone services and related equipment to its customers. The mobile telephone services were supplied to its customers exclusively via the Optus General Service Mobile telecommunications network (Optus GSM Network). The related equipment comprised a VIPtel subscriber identity module (SIM) card either with or without a mobile telephone. During the period in question, EDirect used direct telemarketing to promote and sell its services to its potential customers. In that process, the telemarketers would: request and obtain an address from each potential customer; inform each potential customer that any agreement to supply him or her with mobile network services would be conditional upon their nominated address being verified by EDirect to be an address which was located in an area covered by the Optus GSM Network; subject to coverage being established, enter into a contract with each customer to supply the mobile network services for a 24 month period using a VIPtel SIM card either with or without a mobile telephone requiring him or her to pay a minimum monthly access fee; and enter into a direct debit service agreement with each customer that authorised EDirect to deduct the minimum monthly access fee, plus any additional charges payable under the contract, from his or her bank account. The ACCC has identified 350 customers of EDirect who it claims went through the telemarketing process outlined above and commenced making payments to EDirect, or one of its related entities, without having any mobile telephone coverage for the VIPtel SIM card, or mobile telephone EDirect provided to them. Unsurprisingly, all of these customers were located in regional and remote areas of Australia, mainly across northern Australia.PROCEDURAL HISTORY These proceedings were issued in late March 2011. The originating application was accompanied by a statement of claim setting out the details of EDirect’s alleged contraventions of the TPA and the relief sought against it. Those documents were served on EDirect in early April 2011. A day after the documents were served, Receivers and Managers were appointed to EDirect. About a month later, the Receivers and Managers stated in a letter to the ACCC’s lawyers that they did not propose to defend the proceedings. The ACCC then sought judgment by default against EDirect under O 35A r 3(2)(c) of the former Federal Court Rules (Rules) (now Rule 5.23(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011). Because the ACCC’s application pre-dated the commencement of the new Rules on 1 August 2011, the former Rules continue to apply: see Rule 1.04 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Returning to the particular question under consideration here (that set out at [13](a) above), since it has duly served its statement of claim on EDirect and, subsequently, a copy of the Confidential Schedule A, and since the Receivers and Managers of EDirect have specifically stated that they do not intend to defend these proceedings, the decisions to which I have referred above (with the exceptions of Allergy Pathway and possibly Bridgestone) mean that the ACCC may rely upon the facts pleaded in its statement of claim which are deemed to be admitted under O 35A r 3(2)(c) to seek the declaratory relief described in its originating application. Whether or not those deemed admitted facts are sufficient to support that relief is something I will come to later in these reasons.(b) What, if any, evidence can the ACCC adduce in support of its application? While evidence is not permitted to supplement, support or alter the facts pleaded in the statement of claim (see at [20](c) above), it is permitted on matters relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant relief: see Dataline at [49]–[50], Bank of Kuwait at [14], Yellow Page Marketing at [62] and Speedo at [25]–[26]. Some such matters were identified by Kiefel J in Dataline (at [51]) as:Evidence as to costs, an order for fixed sum being sought, can be relied upon. Evidence of company searches and of communications with the liquidators of Dataline and Australis, of the existence of the district court proceedings referred to in the statement of claim may be seen as necessary in relation to the utility of the orders sought … In this matter, I consider this principle extends to the evidence of Mr Sutherland (set out at [10]–[11] above) and Ms Eckermann (set out at [12] above) because that evidence goes to matters that are pertinent to EDirect’s default and to the relief sought, particularly fixing the amount of any pecuniary penalty to be imposed. However, I do not consider the ACCC is entitled to rely upon matters contained in Ms Eckermann’s affidavit that go beyond the facts as pleaded in the statement of claim. That includes those parts of that affidavit that were relied upon to make the following submissions:…4.Until 2 August 2010, EDirect directed its staff that they could use a proxy for actually checking whether the customer’s address was shown by the Optus coverage checker to have coverage – that is, they could ask the customer whether their existing mobile phone service was on the Optus network. If the customer said it was, EDirect relied on that as a basis to believe the customer was in a coverage area. That procedure left open two avenues – the applicant submits, obvious avenues – for mistake or abuse: one, that the customer mistakenly believed their existing service was on the Optus network; and two, that the telemarketer proceeded with a sale as if the customer had said they were on the Optus network, when in fact they had said they were not or that they did not know. EDirect subsequently identified at least 33 cases where its staff had deliberately exploited this procedural flaw to make a sale to a customer with no coverage. There is no evidence provided to the applicant or before the Court that any of the remaining 317 pleaded cases were not similarly deliberate acts of dishonesty by EDirect’s telemarketers.…31.The worst conduct notified to the applicant (involving 33 customers in Aurukun, Qld) was admitted to have been deliberately engaged in by a small (at best) number of ‘rogue’ telemarketing staff, who easily bypassed procedures that were obviously inadequate and that were tightened only as a result of government intervention. All of [the] contraventions occurred too easily and too frequently to be regarded as mere slips.(Emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

Applying these principles to the present case, the matters I propose to take into account in fixing the pecuniary penalty to be imposed on EDirect include the following:1.Since s 76E of the TPA only applies to conduct that occurred after 15 April 2010 and the statement of claim is confined to the period up to 10 September 2010, that is the period which I will take into account in assessing the pecuniary penalty. In the circumstances, I consider this (approximately) five month period to be relatively long. Clearly there were numerous repetitive contraventions of the apposite sections of the TPA in this period.2.Further, since s 76E of the TPA only applies to contraventions of ss 53 and 58 and not to contraventions of s 52, I must and will limit any pecuniary penalty to the conduct which involves contraventions of those sections.3.Based on the evidence of Ms Eckermann (at [12] above), I find that 219 of the 350 customers listed in Confidential Schedule A to the statement of claim were the subject of the contraventions by EDirect of both ss 53 and 58 of the TPA.4.The breaches of ss 53 and 58 of the TPA are described in the statement of claim as follows:In relation to s 5316.By representing to the affected customers that the verification condition had been satisfied and that the affected customer’s nominated address was located within the covered areas, when in fact none of the affected customers' nominated addresses was located within the covered areas, EDirect has, in the case of each of the affected customers, in trade or commerce:…16.2.in connexion with the supply or possible supply of services, made a false or misleading representation as to the performance characteristics, uses or benefits of its mobile network services, in contravention of section 53(c) of the TPA …In relation to s 5819.By engaging in the conduct pleaded at paragraph 14 above, by reason of the matters pleaded at paragraph 18 above, EDirect has, in trade or commerce, in the case of each of the persons identified at Table A.2 in Confidential Schedule A hereto, accepted payment for services where, at the time of acceptance:19.1.there were reasonable grounds, of which EDirect was aware or ought reasonably to have been aware, for believing that EDirect would not be able to supply the services within a reasonable time;and …19.2.EDirect intended to supply services, namely mobile network services that were not accessible at the nominated address, that were materially different from the goods or services in respect of which payment was accepted, namely mobile network services accessible at the nominated address;in contravention of section 58 of the TPA …Paragraph 1414.EDirect accepted payment for its mobile network services from each of the persons listed in Table A.2 in Confidential Schedule A hereto on, respectively, each of the direct debit dates listed therein.Paragraph 1818.… EDirect was aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware that, at the time it accepted payment from each of the persons listed in Table A.2 at Confidential Schedule A, it could not supply mobile network services to the said persons at the nominated address each person had provided to EDirect.5.The conduct described above was, in my view, particularly serious. It essentially involved receiving money for the supply of mobile telephone services that were, for practical purposes, non-existent. That occurred in circumstances where EDirect knew, or ought to have known, that the services did not exist. That is so because, quite apart from the regional and remote locations of the addresses provided by the 219 customers, if it had any doubt, EDirect had at its disposal a relatively simple method of checking whether a particular customer was in an Optus coverage area by using the Optus Open Network Coverage Locator on the Optus website, www2.optus.com.au. Further, EDirect’s deception of its customers was compounded by the fact that, in each case, EDirect’s telemarketers assured the customer concerned that a check would be made to verify whether their addresses were in a coverage area before the contract came into effect. Obviously no such check was made in relation to any of the 219 customers concerned. Put in simple terms, EDirect took a relatively large amount of money from these 219 customers when they knew, or ought to have known, that they were not entitled to that money.6.The particular context in which this conduct occurred is also significant. In EDirect 2008 (at [14]), I adopted the following submission of counsel:Vulnerable consumers have an increased risk of being victims of unscrupulous conduct when it occurs over the telephone. Telemarketing is frequently used in the telecommunications industry to contract new customers by way of voice contracts.I consider this quotation apt to describe the circumstances of this case as well. The vulnerability mentioned arises from the fact that the whole of each of the telemarketing interactions in this case was oral. It follows that, among other things, there was no written record of the telemarketer’s promise to each customer to undertake the coverage check before the oral contract with each customer came into effect. Because of the relatively large number of customers who ended up committed to contracts without having any mobile telephone coverage, it is not difficult to infer that EDirect did not have any system in place to ensure the promised coverage check was undertaken by its telemarketers. While I consider I am constrained by the way the ACCC has pleaded its case (see at [45]–[46] above) from concluding this outcome was the result of deliberate or dishonest conduct on the part of EDirect’s telemarketers, I do not consider this prevents me from concluding it was unscrupulous. It this context I take the word “unscrupulous” to mean that EDirect did not “hav[e] or [show] a strict regard for what is right” (Macquarie Dictionary, 4th Ed). If EDirect had such a strict regard for what was right, this outcome could not have occurred. I should add that I consider the deemed admissions of the facts pleaded above obviates the necessity for me to examine whether the state of mind of EDirect’s telemarketers could be treated as being identified with the state of mind of the company: see the discussion in Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Radio Rentals Limited [2005] FCA 1133 at [177]–[183] per Finn J.The deception of EDirect’s affected customers in this case exemplifies the kind of unscrupulous telemarketing to which this quotation refers. It reinforces the need for companies that use telemarketers to ensure that they are properly supervised and controlled so that they comply with Australia’s consumer laws. It is a notorious fact that each individual telemarketer is usually paid according to the number of sales he or she makes and this sometimes presents a temptation to them to “cut corners” to achieve a sale. The corners that are often cut involve matters going to the protection of the customer concerned. That was obviously present in this case where the telemarketers concerned clearly did not undertake the check that they assured the customers they would do to verify whether their addresses were in a mobile coverage area. In my view, all these factors compound the seriousness of EDirect’s contravention of the TPA.7.The evidence does not disclose precisely how much money was wrongly deducted from the bank accounts of the 219 customers concerned, but a measure of the total amount involved can be gained from the evidence of Ms Eckermann (see at [12] above) that up until 22 December 2010 EDirect had refunded a total of $88,725.84 to affected customers and, up until 29 November 2010, EDirect had received a total of $121,193.64 from customers whose nominated addresses were not in an Optus mobile coverage area.8.While specific deterrence is not a factor given EDirect’s insolvency, general deterrence remains a significant factor. Thus I consider the amount of the total pecuniary penalty to be imposed on EDirect should be at such a level as to make it, to use the descriptor adopted by Logan J, commercial suicide, for any other operators in the mobile telephone industry, or elsewhere, to even contemplate taking the risk of engaging in similar conduct. In this instance, I consider the need for this level of general deterrence is reinforced by the size of the mobile telephone industry in Australia and the obvious difficulties associated with regulating such a large and complex market. In this regard, I take account, under s 144 of the Evidence Act, of the fact that at the end of December 2011 there were 11 million mobile handset subscribers in Australia: see Australian Bureau of Statistics, Internet Activity, Australia, Dec 2011 (cat no 8153.0, ABS, 2012). In addition, I consider the penalty should act as a general deterrent to companies who use telemarketers in the way that occurred in this case. If such companies, whether mobile telephone companies or others, do not properly supervise and control their telemarketers to ensure that they comply with Australia’s consumer protection laws, they can expect to be dealt with severely.9.By way of general guidance only, I take into account the range of other pecuniary penalties recently imposed for similar consumer protection contraventions as being between $203,500 and $2.7 million.10.The maximum penalty for each contravention of each of the sections involved is $1.1 million (10,000 penalty units x $110). Since I have found that 219 of the customers in Confidential Schedule A to the statement of claim were each the subject of a contravention of each of the sections involved, I find that at least 438 such contraventions have occurred. As noted in [74](1) above, these contraventions occurred over a period of (approximately) five months. However, I consider all of these contraventions were part and parcel of the one course of conduct and, in relation to each customer, the breach of each section (ss 53 and 58) occurred almost concurrently. That is, the false or misleading representations under s 53(c) and the acceptance of payments for the non-existent services under s 58, occurred at about the same time and during the same five months period. For these reasons, I consider I should impose one aggregate penalty for the whole course of conduct and all the contraventions of both sections. This does not, of course, mean that the aggregate penalty for all the contraventions in this one course of conduct is limited to the maximum penalty that could be imposed for one contravention, viz $1.1 million.11.As I have already mentioned earlier in these reasons, I also propose to take into account the fact that in the recent past, EDirect was the subject of a series of orders in this Court (EDirect 2008) that were based on contraventions of the TPA in circumstances that included items of conduct that were very similar to the contravening conduct involved in this case, viz using telemarketers to supply mobile telephone services to customers whose addresses were located in areas that had no mobile telephone coverage. This prior history further underscores the need for a significant deterrent penalty in this case.12.Turning to EDirect itself, the evidence of Mr Sutherland (at [10]–[11] above) shows that, as at about the time it was placed in liquidation, it had assets of about $10 million and creditors of about $14 million. Further, Ms Eckermann’s evidence (at [12] above) shows that, as at 7 October 2010, it had 43,360 current customers and in April 2011 it transferred 62,418 active customers to its creditor. Apart from this evidence, I know little about the turnover of the company, or its size except to observe that, with a customer base of more than 62,000, its turnover is likely to have been at least $150,000 a month. I also know very little about its management structure and practices, or its corporate culture. However, in relation to the latter, insofar as it reflects upon its compliance with the consumer protection laws of this country, the fact that, as noted above, EDirect has now been before this Court twice in a relatively short period of time, suggests that its corporate culture relating to consumer protection was particularly poor. Finally, it is stating the obvious to say that EDirect’s financial position is now dismal. It is currently in liquidation and the evidence of Mr Sutherland (at [10] above), particularly the statement of Mr Algeri, one of the Receivers and Managers, indicates that there are unlikely to be any funds available at the completion of the liquidation for distribution among the company’s unsecured creditors. This obviously includes any pecuniary penalty that is imposed on it. EDirect’s liquidation also means the money it wrongly received from its customers will be swallowed up in its winding up process and none of the affected customers will ever be compensated for their losses.CONCLUSION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There is no evidence in this case that any pecuniary penalty imposed might be met in whole, or in part, by a third party, or from funds available at the completion of the winding up. Indeed, the evidence contained in Mr Sutherland’s affidavits is to the contrary: see at [10]–[11] above. Nonetheless, I consider this is very much a case where a deterrent penalty of the kind described by the Court in Dataline FC (at [20] see [53] above) falls for consideration. I will turn to consider that issue in a short while, but first I will consider the other substantive issue: should a declaration be made in the terms sought by the ACCC?(e) If a declaration can be made, should it be made in the terms sought by the ACCC? Before answering this specific question, it is appropriate to reiterate some of the general principles that apply to the issue of declaratory relief. They were summarised in my decision in Grove & Edgar. They are as follows (at [17]–[20]):17.… there is little doubt that the Court has a wide discretionary power to make declarations of right under s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): see Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 (‘Forster’) at 437–438; Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 (‘Ainsworth’) at 581–582 and Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd v Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc (No.2) (1993) 41 FCR 89 (‘Tobacco Institute’) at 99.18.When the Court is asked to make declarations of right by consent it is required to scrutinise the orders sought to satisfy itself that it has the power to make those orders and to ensure, after due consideration, that they are appropriate: see ACCC v Real Estate Institute Industry of Western Australia Inc [1999] FCA 18; (1999) 161 ALR 79 at [1] and [17], ACCC v Virgin Mobile Australia Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2002] FCA 1548 at [1] and BMW Australia Limited v ACCC (2004) FCAFC 167, (2004) 207 ALR 452, (2004) ATPR 42-012 (‘BMW’) at [35]. On this aspect it should be noted that there is a long held view that a declaration, being a judicial act, should only be made on evidence and not simply on admissions or deemed admissions: see Bank of Kuwait and the Middle East v Ship MV Mawashi Al Gasseem (No.2) (2007) FCA 815 at [10] per Mansfield J and the cases referred to therein, particularly the observations of Kiefel J in ACCC vDataline.Net.Au Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1427, (2006) 236 ALR 665.19.The strictures mentioned above mean, among other things, that the Court has to ensure that the declaration sought is directed to determining a legal controversy and not to answering abstract or hypothetical questions: see Ainsworth at 582. Further the Court is required to ensure that the party seeking the declaration has a real interest in seeking that relief: see Forster at 437 and Ainsworth at 582. And, finally, the Court has to ensure that there are sufficient consequences flowing from the making of the declaration that it is appropriate for it to exercise its discretion to do so. 20.This latter aspect may include the public interest in having such a declaration made to indicate the Court’s disapproval of particular conduct, assist in clarifying the law on a particular matter, or assist to inform consumers about a particular matter of concern: see Medical Benefits Fund of Australia Limited v Cassidy [2003] FCAFC 289, (2003) 135 FCR 1, (2003) ALR 402 (‘MBF’) at [50]–[52]; ACCC v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2006] FCA 1534 at [8], ACCC v Goldy Motors Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1885 at [30] and [34]; Tobacco Institute at 99-100, ACCC v Midland Brick Co Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 693; (2004) 207 ALR 392 at [21] and ACCC v Pacific Dunlop [2001] FCA 740 at [59]–[69].