FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hirama v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 648
File number: VID 331 of 2020 Judgment of: MORTIMER J Date of judgment: 15 June 2021 Catchwords: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Constitution s 51(xix) – application of tripartite test in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1; where applicant is a non-citizen who identifies as an Aboriginal Australian
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where parties sought a particular form of declaratory relief – principles applying to grant of declaratory relief – declaratory relief granted in form other than that sought by the parties
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
Cases cited: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; 175 CLR 564
Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; 158 CLR 1
Love v Commonwealth; Thoms v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3; 375 ALR 597
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1
Mellifont v Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] HCA 53; 173 CLR 289
Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Limited [2010] FCA 58; 183 FCR 10
Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; 29 CLR 257
Samson on behalf of the Ngarluma People v Western Australia [2015] FCA 1438
Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v Western Australia [2020] FCA 1416
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 62 Date of last submission/s: 20 October 2020 Date of hearing: 16 February 2021 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A J Hartnett Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S Lloyd SC with Mr A Yuile Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 331 of 2020 BETWEEN: JONATHON KINGI HIRAMA
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MORTIMER J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 JUNE 2021
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The applicant is not an alien within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MORTIMER J:
INTRODUCTION
This proceeding is part of a cohort of matters relating to people affected by the decision in Love v Commonwealth; Thoms v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3; 375 ALR 597 (Love/Thoms). That is, it is a matter relating to an individual who is a non-citizen affected by an exercise of power under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), but who claims to not be an alien and therefore outside the…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 648
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the applicant, as a non-citizen identifying as an Aboriginal Australian, could be classified as an ‘alien’ under section 51(xix) of the Constitution. This issue required the court to interpret the decision in Love/Thoms, where the High Court had determined that non-citizens who are Aboriginal Australians are not aliens for the purposes of the Migration Act. The court had to apply this principle to the specific circumstances of the applicant and decide if the tripartite test from Mabo (No 2) was sufficient to establish Aboriginal Australian identity, or if additional criteria were necessary.
The Federal Court found that the applicant, by agreeing to apply the native title approach as outlined by Nettle J in Love/Thoms, met the criteria for being considered an Aboriginal Australian. This approach, which the Minister had previously contested, was deemed appropriate in this case as it aligned with the Minister’s concession regarding the applicant’s circumstances. The court granted the declaration that the applicant was not an ‘alien’ under section 51(xix) of the Constitution, thereby exempting them from certain powers under the Migration Act. The court also noted that while the applicant could not be removed from Australia or detained under specific sections of the Act, other aspects of the Act might still apply, pending further clarification.
The court’s final order was a declaration that the applicant is not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of section 51(xix) of the Constitution, thereby exempting them from certain powers under the Migration Act. This outcome aligns with the High Court’s decision in Love/Thoms, which established that non-citizens identifying as Aboriginal Australians are not aliens for the purposes of the Act. The court emphasized that while the applicant could not be removed or detained under certain sections, other aspects of the Act might still apply, and further clarification was needed in this regard.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister agreed that it is unnecessary to consider whether a “less stringent test might be sufficient” while maintaining his position (taken in Helmbright) that the minimum content of the tripartite test must accord with what the Minister submits is Nettle J’s understanding of the third limb of the tripartite test in Mabo (No 2).The effect of the declaration It is agreed between the parties, and has been borne out in the actions of the Minister releasing the applicant from immigration detention, that the effect of the declaration sought is that the applicant cannot be removed from Australia under s 198 of the Migration Act, and cannot be detained under s 189 of the Migration Act, although, as extracted below, the Minister included a qualification to this concession that “theoretically” the applicant could be detained under s 189 where an officer held a “reasonable suspicion” that the applicant was an alien. However, there remains a disagreement between the parties as to the continuing application of other aspects of the Migration Act to the applicant. The applicant submitted (citing Love/Thoms at [285]):The consequence of the Applicant’s not being an alien is best expressed by Nettle J in Love. His Honour wrote that:since the Migration Act imposes the liabilities of an alien on unlawful non-citizens, it is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament under s 51(xix) of the Constitution to treat a member of such an Aboriginal society as an unlawful non-citizen, and that s 14(1) of the Migration Act must be read down accordingly under s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).Because the Applicant is an Aboriginal Australian and is also a non-citizen, the relevant provisions of the Migration Act that purport to visit consequences on him because he is an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ are necessarily read down so as not to include him.(Footnotes omitted.) Section 14(1) of the Migration Act provides a definition of the phrase “unlawful non-citizen” for the purposes of the Act. Curiously, given his otherwise complete embracing of the reasoning adopted by Nettle J, the Minister did not accept that the paragraph of Nettle J’s reasons extracted by the applicant above is a correct statement of the law concerning to the status of non-citizens who are found to be Aboriginal Australians. Also curiously, the Minister’s asserted basis for this position is that the statement at [285] was not endorsed by other members of the Court. Of course, neither were any of the passages from his Honour’s judgment about the native title approach which the Minister contends flows from Nettle J’s reasons. Nevertheless, the Minister pressed on and submitted that in this caseit is sufficient to say that as an Aboriginal Australian and non-alien, the applicant:a)is beyond the reach of the power in s 198 of the Migration Act to remove him from Australia; andb)will generally not be liable to detention pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act. (The word “generally” is used because it is theoretically possible that the applicant could still be lawfully detained under s 189 because that section turns on the reasonable suspicion of an officer. Understood in accordance with Love; Thoms, that proposition would now effectively be limited to a reasonable suspicion that the person is an unlawful non-citizen who is an alien. If evidence could be adduced of such a suspicion in a particular case, the detention would remain lawful until facts came to light undermining the suspicion. That is a limited and theoretical possibility, but it should be mentioned for completeness.)No additional questions, for example in respect of overseas travel or visas, are raised by the applicant in this case. No additional questions of reading down fall for determination in this case.(Footnotes omitted.)