Hirama v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hirama v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 648

File number: VID 331 of 2020
Judgment of: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 15 June 2021
Catchwords:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Constitution s 51(xix) – application of tripartite test in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1; where applicant is a non-citizen who identifies as an Aboriginal Australian

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – where parties sought a particular form of declaratory relief – principles applying to grant of declaratory relief – declaratory relief granted in form other than that sought by the parties

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; 175 CLR 564

Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; 158 CLR 1

Helmbright v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 647

Love v Commonwealth; Thoms v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3; 375 ALR 597

Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1

Manado (on behalf of the Bindunbur Native Title Claim Group) v State of Western Australia [2018] FCA 854

Mellifont v Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] HCA 53; 173 CLR 289

Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts v PGP Developments Pty Limited [2010] FCA 58; 183 FCR 10

Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts [1921] HCA 20; 29 CLR 257

Samson on behalf of the Ngarluma People v Western Australia [2015] FCA 1438

Warrie (formerly TJ) (on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People) v Western Australia (No 2) [2017] FCA 1299

Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v Western Australia [2020] FCA 1416

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 62
Date of last submission/s: 20 October 2020
Date of hearing: 16 February 2021
Counsel for the Applicant:  Mr A J Hartnett
Solicitor for the Applicant:  Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the Respondent:  Mr S Lloyd SC with Mr A Yuile
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 331 of 2020
BETWEEN:

JONATHON KINGI HIRAMA

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 JUNE 2021

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.The applicant is not an alien within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This proceeding is part of a cohort of matters relating to people affected by the decision in Love v Commonwealth; Thoms v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3; 375 ALR 597 (Love/Thoms). That is, it is a matter relating to an individual who is a non-citizen affected by an exercise of power under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), but who claims to not be an alien and therefore outside the…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 648
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hirama v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, a non-citizen who identifies as an Aboriginal Australian, sought a declaration that they were not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of section 51(xix) of the Australian Constitution. The applicant argued that this classification would exempt them from certain powers under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), including visa cancellation and removal powers. The Minister for Home Affairs opposed the application, contending that the applicant was indeed an alien and thus subject to these powers. The case was before the Federal Court of Australia, which had to determine the legal status of the applicant concerning the tripartite test for identifying Aboriginal Australians as outlined in Mabo v Queensland (No 2).

The central legal issue was whether the applicant, as a non-citizen identifying as an Aboriginal Australian, could be classified as an ‘alien’ under section 51(xix) of the Constitution. This issue required the court to interpret the decision in Love/Thoms, where the High Court had determined that non-citizens who are Aboriginal Australians are not aliens for the purposes of the Migration Act. The court had to apply this principle to the specific circumstances of the applicant and decide if the tripartite test from Mabo (No 2) was sufficient to establish Aboriginal Australian identity, or if additional criteria were necessary.

The Federal Court found that the applicant, by agreeing to apply the native title approach as outlined by Nettle J in Love/Thoms, met the criteria for being considered an Aboriginal Australian. This approach, which the Minister had previously contested, was deemed appropriate in this case as it aligned with the Minister’s concession regarding the applicant’s circumstances. The court granted the declaration that the applicant was not an ‘alien’ under section 51(xix) of the Constitution, thereby exempting them from certain powers under the Migration Act. The court also noted that while the applicant could not be removed from Australia or detained under specific sections of the Act, other aspects of the Act might still apply, pending further clarification.

The court’s final order was a declaration that the applicant is not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of section 51(xix) of the Constitution, thereby exempting them from certain powers under the Migration Act. This outcome aligns with the High Court’s decision in Love/Thoms, which established that non-citizens identifying as Aboriginal Australians are not aliens for the purposes of the Act. The court emphasized that while the applicant could not be removed or detained under certain sections, other aspects of the Act might still apply, and further clarification was needed in this regard.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

These reasons should be read with my reasons for judgment in Helmbright v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 647.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This matter was commenced by application filed in the High Court of Australia on 2 October 2019. The application was accompanied by an affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 1 October 2019 in support of the request for extension of time to make the application, which was contained within the application itself. The Minister filed submissions in response to the application, opposing the making of the orders sought and identifying the matter as one that would be potentially affected by the matter of Love/Thoms. The Minister sought that the proceeding to be adjourned pending the decision in Love/Thoms. In this proceeding, after Love/Thoms was handed down, on 15 May 2020 and with the consent of the parties, Nettle J relevantly made orders granting the extension of time sought, and remitting the matter to be heard in this Court. The Minister submitted that the delay between the handing down of Love and the remittal orders made in this proceeding reflecteda period where the applicant’s matter was held in abeyance in the High Court while the parties explored whether the applicant was an Aboriginal Australian to whom the judgment applied. An amended originating application was filed in this Court on 17 June 2020. A further amended application was filed on 22 September 2020, seeking only a declaration that the applicant is not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution, and costs.THE DECISION IN LOVE/THOMS The decision of the High Court in Love/Thoms was published on 11 February 2020. I have set out my understanding of the reasons in detail in Helmbright at [104]-[111]; [150]-[214]. In short summary, a majority of the Court found that those non-citizens who fall within the term “Aboriginal Australians” are not “aliens” within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The majority employed the term “Aboriginal Australians” by reference to the description given by Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 at 70. Therefore, Aboriginal Australians as so described are not vulnerable to exercises of power such as the visa cancellation and removal powers contained in the Migration Act, because those parts of the Migration Act are supported by s 51(xix). The parties have sought that the proceeding be resolved in favour of the applicant on the basis of the approach set out by Brennan J in Mabo (No 2) at 70. As I explain in Helmbright, and as that proceeding itself illustrates, the Mabo (No 2) approach may not be the only approach contended to be available to determine if a non-citizen is an Aboriginal Australian, and therefore on the majority view in Love/Thoms not an alien. In Helmbright I held that, sitting as a single judge at trial level, I was bound to adopt the approach in Mabo (No 2) as it formed part of the ratio of the decision in Love/Thoms.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

An amended originating application was filed in this Court on 17 June 2020. A further amended application was filed on 22 September 2020, seeking only a declaration that the applicant is not an ‘alien’ within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution, and costs.THE DECISION IN LOVE/THOMS The decision of the High Court in Love/Thoms was published on 11 February 2020. I have set out my understanding of the reasons in detail in Helmbright at [104]-[111]; [150]-[214]. In short summary, a majority of the Court found that those non-citizens who fall within the term “Aboriginal Australians” are not “aliens” within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. The majority employed the term “Aboriginal Australians” by reference to the description given by Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23; 175 CLR 1 at 70. Therefore, Aboriginal Australians as so described are not vulnerable to exercises of power such as the visa cancellation and removal powers contained in the Migration Act, because those parts of the Migration Act are supported by s 51(xix). The parties have sought that the proceeding be resolved in favour of the applicant on the basis of the approach set out by Brennan J in Mabo (No 2) at 70. As I explain in Helmbright, and as that proceeding itself illustrates, the Mabo (No 2) approach may not be the only approach contended to be available to determine if a non-citizen is an Aboriginal Australian, and therefore on the majority view in Love/Thoms not an alien. In Helmbright I held that, sitting as a single judge at trial level, I was bound to adopt the approach in Mabo (No 2) as it formed part of the ratio of the decision in Love/Thoms. In this proceeding there was no dispute between the parties about whether the Mabo (No 2) approach should be adopted. In addition, Mr Hirama was prepared to agree to the application of additional criteria which the Minister contends arise from Nettle J’s reasons in Love/Thoms at [271] and [278] (the native title approach). The word “additional” is my description. In Helmbright I rejected the native title approach, which was also advanced by the Minister in that proceeding, and contested by the other parties. I found that the native title approach did not arise from Nettle J’s reasoning, as I understood it. Instead, I took an approach which I considered reflected the correct understanding of Brennan J’s reasons in Mabo (No 2), and I found that there was no modification or alteration made to Brennan J’s approach by any of the majority reasoning in Love/Thoms, albeit that approach was being applied to the question of alienage, rather than to the determination of who is a member of a community said to hold native title. However, here Mr Hirama has agreed to the Court adopting a native title approach in making its findings of fact in this proceeding. I find that is because the applicant is aware that the Minister concedes Mr Hirama’s circumstances, as disclosed on the evidence, satisfy the additional criteria which feature in such an approach. It is therefore understandable that the applicant does not press upon the Court any other or different approach, such as the one pressed in Helmbright.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister agreed that it is unnecessary to consider whether a “less stringent test might be sufficient” while maintaining his position (taken in Helmbright) that the minimum content of the tripartite test must accord with what the Minister submits is Nettle J’s understanding of the third limb of the tripartite test in Mabo (No 2).The effect of the declaration It is agreed between the parties, and has been borne out in the actions of the Minister releasing the applicant from immigration detention, that the effect of the declaration sought is that the applicant cannot be removed from Australia under s 198 of the Migration Act, and cannot be detained under s 189 of the Migration Act, although, as extracted below, the Minister included a qualification to this concession that “theoretically” the applicant could be detained under s 189 where an officer held a “reasonable suspicion” that the applicant was an alien. However, there remains a disagreement between the parties as to the continuing application of other aspects of the Migration Act to the applicant. The applicant submitted (citing Love/Thoms at [285]):The consequence of the Applicant’s not being an alien is best expressed by Nettle J in Love. His Honour wrote that:since the Migration Act imposes the liabilities of an alien on unlawful non-citizens, it is beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament under s 51(xix) of the Constitution to treat a member of such an Aboriginal society as an unlawful non-citizen, and that s 14(1) of the Migration Act must be read down accordingly under s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth).Because the Applicant is an Aboriginal Australian and is also a non-citizen, the relevant provisions of the Migration Act that purport to visit consequences on him because he is an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ are necessarily read down so as not to include him.(Footnotes omitted.) Section 14(1) of the Migration Act provides a definition of the phrase “unlawful non-citizen” for the purposes of the Act. Curiously, given his otherwise complete embracing of the reasoning adopted by Nettle J, the Minister did not accept that the paragraph of Nettle J’s reasons extracted by the applicant above is a correct statement of the law concerning to the status of non-citizens who are found to be Aboriginal Australians. Also curiously, the Minister’s asserted basis for this position is that the statement at [285] was not endorsed by other members of the Court. Of course, neither were any of the passages from his Honour’s judgment about the native title approach which the Minister contends flows from Nettle J’s reasons. Nevertheless, the Minister pressed on and submitted that in this caseit is sufficient to say that as an Aboriginal Australian and non-alien, the applicant:a)is beyond the reach of the power in s 198 of the Migration Act to remove him from Australia; andb)will generally not be liable to detention pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act. (The word “generally” is used because it is theoretically possible that the applicant could still be lawfully detained under s 189 because that section turns on the reasonable suspicion of an officer. Understood in accordance with Love; Thoms, that proposition would now effectively be limited to a reasonable suspicion that the person is an unlawful non-citizen who is an alien. If evidence could be adduced of such a suspicion in a particular case, the detention would remain lawful until facts came to light undermining the suspicion. That is a limited and theoretical possibility, but it should be mentioned for completeness.)No additional questions, for example in respect of overseas travel or visas, are raised by the applicant in this case. No additional questions of reading down fall for determination in this case.(Footnotes omitted.)