QS Holdings Sarl v Paul's Retail Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QS Holdings Sarl v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 853

Citation: QS Holdings Sarl v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 853
Parties: QS HOLDINGS SARL, GSM (TRADEMARKS) PTY LTD ACN 085 955 291, GSM (OPERATIONS) PTY LTD ACN 085 950 803, DC SHOES INC, UG MANUFACTURING CO PTY LTD ACN 005 047 941, PINEAPPLE TRADEMARKS PTY LTD ACN 107 248 680 and QUIKSILVER INC v PAUL'S RETAIL PTY LTD ACN 114 419 242 and PAUL ANDREW DWYER
File number: VID 652 of 2010
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 2 August 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment – trade mark infringement – breach of copyright – summary judgment ordered – application for leave to amend amended defence – proposed implied licence defence unlikely to succeed – proposed section 44C(2) defence unlikely to succeed – leave to amend refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth)
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)
Copyright (International Protection) Regulations 1969 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372
The Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd 109 CLR 407
Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 641
Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592
Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd (1999) 45 IPR 411
Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (2010) 86 IPR 437
Aristoc Ltd Rysta Ltd (1945) AC 68
Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Communications Pty Ltd (2004) 209 ALR 1
de Cordova v Vick Chemical Co (1951) 68 RPC 103
Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115
Sports Café Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks (1999) 42 IPR 552
Saville Perfumery Ltd v June Perfect Ltd (1939) 58 RPC 147
IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 458
Krueger Transport Equipment Pyt Ltd v Glen Cameron Storage & Distribution Pty Ltd (2008) 78 IPR 262
Avel Pty Ltd v Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 88
Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Roland Corporation (1992) 23 IPR 376
Interstate Parcel Express Co Pty Ltd v Time-Life International (Nederlands) BV (1977) 1B IPR 253
Broderbund Software Inc v Computermate Products (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR 215
Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) (“Raben”) 75 FCR 88
Star Micronics Pty Ltd v Five Star Computers Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 225
Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 30 IPR 209
Enzed Holdings Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd (1984) 3 IPR 619
Edsonic Pty Ltd v Cassidy (2010) 272 ALR 589
Antocks Lairn Ltd v I Bloohn Ltd [1972] RPC 219
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401
JF Keir Pty Limited v…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 853
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of QS Holdings Sarl v Paul's Retail Pty Ltd involved an application for summary judgment by the applicant, QS Holdings Sarl, against the respondent, Paul's Retail Pty Ltd. The dispute centred around allegations of trademark infringement and breach of copyright. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether summary judgment should be granted to the applicant based on the respondent's lack of a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding. Additionally, the court considered the respondent's application for leave to amend its defence to include additional arguments regarding an implied licence and section 44C(2) of the relevant legislation.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the respondent had a reasonable prospect of successfully defending the claims of trademark infringement and copyright breach, and whether the respondent should be granted leave to amend its defence to include the proposed defences of an implied licence and section 44C(2). The court examined the relevant statutory provisions, including section 31A of the Federal Court Act, which governs the granting of summary judgment, and assessed the merits of the proposed defences.

The court found that the respondent had no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding, given the strength of the applicant's claims and the lack of any viable defences presented by the respondent. The court also determined that the proposed amendments to the defence were unlikely to succeed. The court held that the proposed implied licence defence was implausible because it was based on a misunderstanding of the scope of the applicant's claims. Furthermore, the court found that the proposed section 44C(2) defence was also unlikely to succeed as it did not adequately address the specific allegations of trademark infringement and copyright breach. Consequently, the court refused the respondent's application for leave to amend its defence.

The court ordered that the applicant file and serve submissions regarding the appropriate orders to be made by 5 August 2011, with the respondent to file and serve responsive submissions by 9 August 2011. A directions hearing was scheduled for 12 August 2011 to consider the final orders. The court's decision emphasised the importance of understanding the scope of claims and the need for defendants to present viable defences in a timely manner.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. On or before 4 pm on 5 August 2011, the applicants file and serve submissions as to the appropriate orders to be made, having regard to the reasons for judgment delivered today, together with a draft minute of proposed orders.

2. On or before 4 pm on 9 August 2011, the respondents file and serve responsive submissions and, if appropriate, an alternative draft minute of proposed orders.

3. There be a directions hearing at 2:15 pm on 12 August 2011.

Note: Entry of Orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In these reasons, I discuss, first, the applicants’ motion and, secondly, the respondents’ amendment application, to the extent that it was opposed. LAW REGARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER SECTION 31A Section 31A of the Federal Court Act relevantly provides:(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if: (a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. (2) …(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be: (a) hopeless; or (b) bound to fail; for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. (4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)… The High Court considered s 31A in Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118 (“Spencer”), where Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ said (at 139 [52]-141 [60]):It is important to begin by recognising that the combined effect of sub-ss (2) and (3) is that the inquiry required in this case is whether there is a “reasonable” prospect of prosecuting the proceeding, not an inquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail. In this respect, s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered. Those earlier provisions were understood as requiring formation of a certain and concluded determination that a proceeding would necessarily fail. That this was the basis of earlier decisions may be illustrated by reference to two decisions of this Court often cited in connection with questions of summary judgment: Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners [(1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91] and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [(1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129]. …Because s 31A(3) provides that certainty of failure (“hopeless” or “bound to fail”) need not be demonstrated in order to show that a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting an action, it is evident that s 31A is to be understood as requiring a different inquiry from that which had to be made under earlier procedural regimes. It follows, of course, that it is dangerous to seek to elucidate the meaning of the statutory expression “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding” by reference to what is said in those earlier cases.…How then should the expression “no reasonable prospect” be understood? No paraphrase of the expression can be adopted as a sufficient explanation of its operation, let alone definition of its content. …Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. But the elucidation of what amounts to “no reasonable prospect” can best proceed in the same way as content has been given, through a succession of the decided cases, to other generally expressed statutory phrases, such as the phrase “just and equitable” when it is used to identify a ground for winding up a company. …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There remains some doubt as to whether the word “may” in s 31A of the Federal Court Act confers a discretion on the court as to whether to grant summary judgment, notwithstanding the court is otherwise satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding. Compare Jefferson Ford 167 FCR 372 at 407 [128], where Gordon J held that the word “may” in s 31A(1) and (2) was used in an empowering (not a discretionary) sense, and Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 401 at 408 [28] where Spender, Graham and Gilmour JJ stated that in their view “a discretion is reposed in the judge hearing the relevant application to grant summary judgment”. See also JF Keir Pty Limited v Sparks [2008] FCA 611 at [12] (Graham J), Luck v University of Southern Queensland (2009) 176 FCR 268 at 295 [110] (Rares J). It is, however, unnecessary to discuss this question further because, in the circumstances of this case, for the reasons already stated, no question of exercising discretion in favour of the first respondent arises. CONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS’ PROPOSED COPYRIGHT DEFENCES As already stated, the respondents sought leave to amend their amended defence, in part to introduce some positive defences. In written submissions, the respondents explained that they had not originally “apprehended the generality of paragraphs 32, 33 and 36” of the Statement of Claim, because they had understood these paragraphs to concern only “complaints relating to the reproduction of the applicants’ logos on Paul’s Warehouse brochures … specifically advertising the Infringing Board Shorts and the Infringing t-shirts”. The respondents went on to say:The realisation that paragraphs 32, 33 and 36 of the SOC were directed at the Respondents’ advertising generally came during preparation for this application and was also prompted by the service on the Respondents’ solicitors, of a Notice to Admit, on 17 January 2011, which attached copies of the brochures particularised in paragraphs 32, 33 and 36 of the SOC.The Respondents’ position, now expressed by paragraphs 31, 32, 33 and 36 of the SAD, is that where genuine goods are promoted by reference to the Applicants’ logos, such use is not an infringement because there is an implied licence and/or because of the operation of section 44C(2). … Pursuant to O 13 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (see now Rule 16.53 of the Federal Court Rules 2011), the Court has a wide discretion to permit amendments to pleadings in appropriate cases. I accept that, as the respondents contended, the circumstances in this case are different from those considered in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175: compare Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 273 ALR 147. Leave will not be given, however, if the proposed pleading is likely to be struck out (see O 11 r 16; and now Rule 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011) or if the issue sought to be raised is unlikely to succeed: see Research in Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 255 ALR 508 at 512 [21]-[22]. The applicants argued that such was in fact the position with respect to the proposed positive defences.