Delta Resource Management Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) v McKay

Link copied
Case Copied 41 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   DELTA RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) -v- MCKAY [2024] WASC 423

CORAM:   LUNDBERG J

HEARD:   14 NOVEMBER 2024

DELIVERED          :   21 NOVEMBER 2024

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1282 of 2024

BETWEEN:   DELTA RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)

Plaintiff

AND

MERCEDES MCKAY

Defendant


Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Summary judgment sought by plaintiff - Loan made by the plaintiff company to the defendant - Defendant was a former director of the company - Plaintiff company now in liquidation - Liquidators base the claim on the books and records of the company - Operation of s 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) - Books and records are prima facie evidence of the existence of the loan and its amount - Line by line assessment of the ledger entries required - Date for accrual of the cause of action - Operation of s 59 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA) - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9, s 286, s 1305
Limitation Act 1980 (UK), s 6
Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 59
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 3 r 5, O 14 r 1
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 32

Result:

Extension of time granted
Summary judgment against the defendant granted, in part

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : S Paisal
Defendant : In Person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : Mendelawitz Morton Commercial Lawyers
Defendant : In Person

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Advanced Holdings Pty Ltd as trustee for the Deminon Trust v Commissioner of Taxation [2021] FCAFC 135

Australian Karting Association Ltd v Karting (New South Wales) Incorporated [2022] NSWCA 188

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229; (2009) 75 ACSR 1

Blenkinsop v Blenkinsop Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee of the Blenkinsop Family Trust [2015] WASC 254

Boot v Boot [1996] EWCA Civ 1352; (1996) 2 FCR 713

Carna Group Pty Ltd v Griffin Coal Mining Co (No 6) [2021] FCA 1214

Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 5

Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Limited [1983] HCA 25; (1983) 154 CLR 87

Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASCA 27

Gerovich v Gerovich [2018] WASC 153

Habitat 1 Pty Ltd v Formby [No 2] [2017] WASC 331

Hadouken Pty Ltd v D Comm Infrastructure [2024] WASC 330

HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153

Iron Horse Machines Pty Ltd v Olmate Holdings Pty Ltd [2024] WASC 383

Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd [2003] NSWSC 876; (2003) 47 ACSR 261

Netglory Pty Ltd v Caratti [2013] WASC 364

NRW Contracting Pty Ltd v Cliffs Asia Pacific Iron Ore Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 107

Residues Treatment and Trading Company Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54; 15 ACLR 416

Stone v Mizzi [2024] FCA 696

Sutton Investments Pty Ltd v Realistic Investments Pty Ltd [2017]…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Delta Resource Management Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) v McKay and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] WASC 423
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Delta Resource Management Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) v McKay was before the Western Australian Supreme Court, where the liquidators of Delta Resource Management sought summary judgment against the defendant, McKay, who was a former director of the company. The liquidators sought to recover a loan they alleged was made by the company to the defendant. The dispute primarily centred around the admissibility of the company's books and records as evidence of the loan under section 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the accrual of the cause of action for the purposes of limitation periods under section 59 of the Limitation Act 2005 (WA).

The court was tasked with determining whether the company's books and records, which were kept under a legislative requirement, could be considered as prima facie evidence of the existence of the loan and its amount. Additionally, the court had to establish the date for the accrual of the cause of action, as this would determine whether the claim was time-barred under the Limitation Act. The primary legal issue revolved around the interpretation and application of section 1305 of the Corporations Act and section 59 of the Limitation Act, and whether the liquidators could rely on the company's books and records to substantiate their claim.

The court found that section 1305 of the Corporations Act did indeed permit the company's books and records to be admitted as prima facie evidence of the loan. However, the court noted that the weight of this evidence must be assessed by the tribunal of fact and is not conclusive. The court also concluded that the cause of action accrued when the loan was made, which was evidenced by the ledger entries in the company's books. The date of accrual was therefore determinable from the books and records, and the court was able to ascertain whether the claim was within the limitation period. The court granted summary judgment in favour of the liquidators, finding that the claim was not time-barred.

In summary, the court held that the liquidators could rely on the company's books and records to establish the existence of the loan and its amount, and that the cause of action accrued on the date the loan was made, as evidenced by the books. The court granted summary judgment in favour of the liquidators, allowing them to recover the loan from the defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally, I should say something about the effect and operation of s 1305 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act). The plaintiff places considerable reliance on this provision to establish its claim. The section provides:1305 Admissibility of books in evidence(1)A book kept by a body corporate under a requirement of this Act is admissible in evidence in any proceeding and is prima facie evidence of any matter stated or recorded in the book.(2)A document purporting to be a book kept by a body corporate is, unless the contrary is proved, taken to be a book kept as mentioned in subsection (1). This provision operates to dispense with the need to authenticate the books and records of the company, where those documents are kept pursuant to a requirement under the legislation. The provision does not make the company's books conclusive evidence of the matters they contain, in the sense of requiring the tribunal of fact to make a finding in terms of the content of the books in the absence of proof to the contrary by the opposing party.[16] Rather, the books are prima facie evidence of the matters stated in them, and the weight of that evidence is to be measured in accordance with the common sense of the tribunal of fact.[17][16] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229; (2009) 75 ACSR 1 [396] (Austin J); Australian Karting Association Ltd v Karting (New South Wales) Incorporated [2022] NSWCA 188 [128] - [140] (Gleeson JA, Meagher JA and Simpson AJA agreeing); and Stone v Mizzi [2024] FCA 696 [49] - [50] (Halley J). See also R P Austin & A Black, Austin & Black's Annotations to the Corporations Act, LexisNexis [9.1300].[17] Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [396] - [397] (Austin J). For the purposes of the provision, a book is 'kept' if it is retained or held by the company under a requirement of the Act, or is a part of the documents or records maintained by the corporation in a systematic or periodic manner.[18] If a document purports to be a book 'kept' by the company then there is a rebuttable presumption that it is a book for the purposes of the provision.[19] [18]Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [296] - [298] (Austin J). [19] R P Austin & A Black, Austin & Black's Annotations to the Corporations Act, LexisNexis [9.1300]. For examples of documents that have been found admissible under s 1305, see Residues Treatment and Trading Company Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54; 15 ACLR 416 and Linfox Transport (Aust) Pty Ltd v Arthur Yates & Co Ltd [2003] NSWSC 876; (2003) 47 ACSR 261. Importantly, this section permits, but does not require the court to 'accept documents admitted under the relevant provisions to prove the underlying transactions, and the section does not exclude the need to establish the efficacy of the underlying transactions recorded in a company's minutes in all cases.'[20] [20] R P Austin & A Black, Austin & Black's Annotations to the Corporations Act, Lexis Nexis [9.1300], citing Advanced Holdings Pty Ltd as trustee for the Deminon Trust v Commissioner of Taxation [2021] FCAFC 135 and Carna Group Pty Ltd v Griffin Coal Mining Co (No 6) [2021] FCA 1214.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fourth, notice of a proposed defence or notice of the actual defence, will not disqualify a plaintiff from asserting the belief that there is no defence to the claim: Westpac Banking Corporation v Anderson. Whilst leave to defend ought to be given where there is a counterclaim that could be raised as an equitable set off, a counterclaim merely amounting to a cross‑action does not provide a defence to the plaintiff's claim so as to prevent the award of summary judgment: Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2].[12][12] Field Camp Services Pty Ltd v Site Accommodation Pty Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASCA 27. See also HSBC Bank Australia Ltd v Mavaddat [2015] WASC 153 [89]. Fifth, if there is a conflict of evidence on the affidavits, the Court should approach the application for summary judgment on the assumption that the facts set out in the affidavits relied upon by the party resisting the application (in the present, the defendant) will ultimately be accepted at trial: Gerovich v Gerovich.[13][13] Gerovich v Gerovich [2018] WASC 153 [32] and Hadouken Pty Ltd v D Comm Infrastructure [2024] WASC 330 [21]. I will approach the present application on this basis. As noted earlier, the plaintiff is not able to point to a loan instrument or contract to support the allegation there was a loan. The liquidators point instead to the books and records of the company to demonstrate the existence of a loan to the defendant. In this regard, the liquidators rely on the observations of Murphy JA in Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd[14] to the effect that agreements are not necessarily only oral or written, and the existence of an agreement may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the parties as well as, or in the absence of, their words. This statement is undoubtedly correct. The plaintiff's claim is not fatally impaired merely because it cannot point to a written instrument or exchange of communications which expressly supports the existence of a loan. The absence of a written instrument will however require a close examination by the Court of the available material to ensure the appropriate findings can be made. [14] Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 5 [35] (Murphy JA, Buss JA agreeing). Further, the plaintiff relies on the further principles collected by Murphy JA in Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd as to when a loan is repayable. At [36] - [38], Murphy JA (Buss JA agreeing) stated the principles as follows:(a)At common law, where no time for repayment of a loan is specified, or where the loan is stated to be payable 'on demand', there is an immediate debt established by which the money is repayable immediately without the creditor first making a demand for payment. (b)A loan payable 'on demand' in the above sense is to be distinguished from a loan only repayable on condition that a demand is first made. In the latter case, but not the former, the making of the demand is a condition precedent to liability to repay, and the cause of action does not arise until the demand has been made.(c)Where the parties do not expressly fix a time for repayment, or agree that the repayment is to be conditional upon the making of a demand, implications as to such matters may be made or inferred in appropriate circumstances.[15]