Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

MILAN VISNIC  PLAINTIFF

AND

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS

COMMISSION  DEFENDANT

Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2007] HCA 24
24 May 2007
S389/2006

ORDER

The action is dismissed.

Representation

A W Street SC with G D Wendler and J S Emmett for the plaintiff (instructed by Van Houten Law)

Submitting appearance for the defendant

Intervener

H C Burmester QC with G M Aitken intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ. Section 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Corporations Act") is found in Pt 2D.6 (ss 206A‑206HA) of that statute. Part 2D.6 is headed "Disqualification from managing corporations". This may be brought about in three ways.

  2. First, s 206B provides for what is identified as "[a]utomatic disqualification". This occurs by force of that section if a person is convicted of an offence of a certain description. Secondly, ss 206C, 206D and 206E confer powers of disqualification upon "the Court", which is defined[1] so as to include the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of a State or a Territory. The powers of the Court under these provisions for disqualification are exercised upon application by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC"). Section 206C is engaged by curial declaration under s 1317E of contravention of a civil penalty provision, s 206D by responsibility for mismanagement of failed corporations, and s 206E by repeated contraventions of the Corporations Act.

    [1]s 58AA.

  3. Thirdly, s 206F confers the power of disqualification not upon one of the designated courts but upon ASIC itself. Section 206F provides that ASIC may disqualify a person from managing corporations for up to five years if the conditions spelled out in s 206F(1) are satisfied. In determining whether disqualification is justified, ASIC is directed to the matters set out in s 206F(2). The text of these provisions is set out later in these reasons. A decision by ASIC under s 206F may be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (s 1317B).

  4. A person who becomes disqualified from managing corporations by the operation of any of these provisions of Pt 2D.6 ceases to be a director, alternate director or a secretary of a company (s 206A(2)). It is an offence for a disqualified person to manage a corporation (s 206A(1)).

  5. The litigation in this Court arises in the following manner.  On 24 January 2006, a delegate of ASIC served upon the plaintiff a notice stating that he had been disqualified from the time of service of the notice for a period of five years from managing corporations without the leave of ASIC.  On the same day, ASIC published a statement of facts, findings and reasons for decision.

  6. The plaintiff had been a director of 14…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCA 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission*, the plaintiff, Mr Milan Visnic, challenged the constitutional validity of section 206F of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth). This provision empowers the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to disqualify individuals from managing corporations. Mr Visnic argued that this power, when exercised by ASIC, an executive body, constituted an invalid conferral of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, thereby infringing Chapter III of the Constitution.

The High Court was required to determine whether the disqualification power vested in ASIC by section 206F of the *Corporations Act* was an exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth. This involved considering whether the functions performed by ASIC under this section, such as determining the "public interest" and maintaining professional standards, were inherently judicial in nature. The Court also had to assess the relevance of the existence of concurrent judicial powers of disqualification held by Chapter III courts and whether the conferral of such a power on an administrative body like ASIC represented an impermissible circumvention of Chapter III.

The Court applied a "functional analysis" approach to determine whether the power exercised by ASIC was judicial. It reasoned that while some aspects of corporate officer disqualification could be vested in Chapter III courts, the functions conferred by section 206F were not exclusively judicial. The Court concluded that the federal regulation of corporations and their officers, as embodied in section 206F, was a constitutionally valid feature of public administration. The Court affirmed that, under the prevailing functional analysis, legislation of this nature would not be declared invalid.

The High Court dismissed the plaintiff's action.

Orders

Orders of the court

The action is dismissed (all members of the Court).

Background

Background to the litigation

These proceedings, removed into this Court from the Federal Court of Australia, were heard at the same time as the Albarran and Gould appeals from that Court[8]. Like those appeals, the proceedings concern s 71 of the Constitution. That is the provision that requires "the judicial power of the Commonwealth" to be vested in a Ch III court and not exercised by a legislative or executive officer, body or tribunal.[8]Albarran v Members of the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board [2007] HCA 23.The facts and legislation The facts: The basic facts are set out in the reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ ("the joint reasons")[9]. Before action was taken to disqualify him, Mr Milan Visnic ("the plaintiff") was an officer (director) of fourteen companies that had been wound up. Pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("the Corporations Act")[10], a liquidator reported that the corporations, of which the plaintiff was an officer, might have been unable to pay their unsecured creditors more than $0.50 in the dollar. [9]Joint reasons at [5]-[6].[10]s 533(1)(c), (d). In the result, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC")[11], by service of a notice in November 2005, afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard as to why he should not be disqualified from managing corporations for a period of up to five years. The notice was issued pursuant to s 206F(1)(b)(i) of the Corporations Act. The plaintiff responded by challenging the constitutional validity of s 206F.[11]See Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) ("the ASIC Act"), s 261. ASIC was formerly known as the Australian Securities Commission: see Australian Securities Commission Act 1989 (Cth), s 7. These proceedings have afforded the plaintiff the opportunity to argue his challenge. Some, but not all, of the plaintiff's arguments overlapped those advanced by the appellants in Albarran and Gould. The legislation: The joint reasons set out the terms of sub‑ss (1) and (2) of s 206F[12]. It is unnecessary for me to repeat them. As the joint reasons explain[13], the scheme of the Corporations Act envisages that officers of corporations may be disqualified from holding such office in three ways: (1) by automatic disqualification upon conviction of certain offences[14]; (2) by order of "the Court" (including the Federal Court or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory)[15]; or (3) by order of ASIC itself under s 206F.[12]Joint reasons at [7].[13]Joint reasons at [1]-[2].[14]Corporations Act, s 206B.[15]Corporations Act, ss 206C, 206D, 206E. The expression "the Court" is defined in s 58AA. ASIC proceeded against the plaintiff not by making application to "the Court" but under its own power expressed in s 206F. This is described in the heading to that section as "ASIC's power of disqualification". It is this asserted "power" which the plaintiff argues constitutes an invasion by ASIC – a body within the executive government of the Commonwealth – of the federal judicial power reserved by the Constitution to Ch III courts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ KIRBY J
The federal regulation of corporations and their officers evident in s 206F is therefore a constitutionally valid feature of contemporary public administration. Whilst some aspects of that regulation may properly be conferred on Ch III courts (as ss 206C, 206D and 206E illustrate), it cannot be said that the functions conferred by s 206F are of such a kind that they must be vested in the courts. So long as a "functional analysis"[39] continues to be endorsed by this Court and applied in its present form, legislation such as this will not be declared invalid. And in Mr Visnic's proceedings the "functional" approach was not challenged[40], but accepted.[39]See Albarran [2007] HCA 23 at [36], [42], [76]; H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v Queensland (1998) 195 CLR 547 at 562 [15].[40]Leave to reopen the correctness of Farbenfabriken and Quinn was sought but refused in Pasini (2002) 209 CLR 246 at 248, 254 [13] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ.Conclusion and order I therefore agree in the order proposed in the joint reasons. The action should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ, KIRBY J