FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Culley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2010] FCAFC 43
Citation: Culley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2010] FCAFC 43 Appeal from: Culley v Australian Securities and Investments Commissioner [2008] FCA 1208 Parties: BRIAN MALCOLM CULLEY v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION File number(s): VID 924 of 2009 Judges: RYAN, MANSFIELD AND MCKERRACHER JJ Date of judgment: 19 May 2010 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act – requirements of s 44
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act – ground raised for first time in the Federal Court – whether Court ought entertain such a ground.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act – discretionary relief – whether declaratory and consequential relief “appropriate”.
CORPORATIONS LAW – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 206F – requirement of timeliness – whether free-standing requirement imposed by law – discretionary factors going to exercise of power.Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 206F
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 5Cases cited: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321
Culley v ASIC [2009] FCA 120
Culley v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2008] AATA 58
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Raptis (1989) 19 ALD 726
Ferriday v Repatriation Commission (1996) 69 FCR 521 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Glennan (1999) 90 FCR 53Halliday v Commissioner of Corporate Affairs (14 May 1990, Supreme Court of Victoria, O’Bryan J, unreported)
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Hussain v Minister for Foreign Affairs (2008) 169 FCR 241
Kardas v Australian Securities Commission (1998) 29 ACSR 304
Kuswardana v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 334
MacDonald v Secretary, Department of Family, Health, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2009) 180 FCR 378
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Gungor (1982) 63 FLR 441
Murdaca v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2009) 178 FCR 119
Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 8
Repatriation Commission v Owens (1996) 70 ALJR 904
Repatriation Commission v Warren (2008) 167 FCR 511
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Cooper (1990) 26 FCR 13
Thompson v Judge Byrne (1999) 196 CLR 141
Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 231 CLR 381
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491Date of hearing: 3 May 2010 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J F Styring with Mr S J Krischock appeared pro bono Solicitor for the Appellant: Bevan-Rhys James (pro bono) Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S G E McLeish SC with Mr S B Rosewarne Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL…
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- Case
- [2010] FCAFC 43
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court ruled that the statutory seven-year period is not a condition precedent for the exercise of ASIC's disqualification power but rather a consideration relevant to the exercise of that discretion. The court held that there was no implied requirement for ASIC to exercise its power within a shorter period than the seven years stipulated in section 206F(1)(a). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed on the basis that the discretionary relief sought by Mr. Culley was not "appropriate" under section 44(4) of the AAT Act. The court further directed that the parties submit written submissions regarding the costs of the appeal within 14 days.
The court's decision hinged on its interpretation of section 206F, emphasizing that the seven-year window was intended by the legislature to balance the public interest in protecting against incompetent or dishonest corporate officers with the need to avoid unfairly disqualifying individuals due to remote corporate failures. The reasoning was grounded in the principle that clear statutory language should not be subject to unexpressed limitations unless necessary to avoid absurdity or conflict with other provisions. The court concluded that Mr. Culley's appeal did not meet the criteria for the relief sought, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. Each party file and serve within 14 days hereof written submissions as to the costs of the appeal.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, to which reference was made, Gaudron J said, at 183 [63], referring to her earlier judgment in Thompson v Judge Byrne (1999) 196 CLR 141, at 158, and the authorities there cited, that:clear words can only be read as subject to some unexpressed limitation if that is necessary to avoid absurdity, some conflict with another provision of the statute in question or a result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been intended by the legislature.Consideration For the reasons which follow, we have concluded that the language and structure of s 206F exclude any implied requirement for ASIC to exercise its power of disqualification within any shorter period than the seven years immediately before the giving of a “show cause” notice under s 206F(1)(b). Section 206F was part of the Corporations Act as originally enacted. The corresponding provision, identically numbered, had been present in the Corporations Law, which was the immediate predecessor of the Corporations Act having been inserted in the Corporations Law by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Project Act 1999 (Cth). In light of that legislative history, it is unnecessary to call in aid, in construing s 206F, any extrinsic material as we can discern in s 206F no ambiguity to warrant recourse to s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). It is clear enough from its terms and its location in Pt 2D.6 of the Corporations Act that the legislature, in framing s 206F, has been concerned to strike a balance between two competing interests. The section reflects on the one hand, the interest of the public in the existence of a facility for removing from the pool of managers those who are, or have been, officers of two or more corporations which have been wound up for inability to pay their debts. As a result, the public and the market are afforded a measure of protection from those who, as was said in Murdaca (supra), at 143; either through incompetence or dishonesty or a combination of the two, bring about the failure of corporations and thus cause loss to others (Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 220 CLR 129 at [47]-[50]).In the same passage, their Honours discerned in s 206F a concern with “the maintenance of professional management standards in the public interest (Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 231 CLR 381 at [11] and [26]).” On the other hand, the legislature has recognised the need for corporate officers not to be exposed to disqualification as a result of corporate failures separated by an inordinate length of time. In our view, the concern, which we have imputed to Parliament, to strike a balance between these competing interests has been accommodated by fixing in s 206F(1)(a) a “window” of seven years within which two or more corporate collapses must occur in order for an officer involved in them to be at risk of disqualification from managing any other corporation. The intention which we have divined from the language and structure of s 206F is inconsistent with an interpretation of the section which would confine ASIC’s power of disqualification within a narrower retrospective “window” than the seven years expressly stipulated in s 206F(1)(a).