SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
TEDESCO v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)
[2010] SASC 336
Judgment of The Honourable Justice White
6 December 2010
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - DISCRETION TO MAKE ORDER - HARDSHIP
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - PROCEEDS OF CRIME, TAINTED PROPERTY OR CONFISCABLE PROPERTY
Appeal against decision of Magistrate refusing to order exclusion of property from forfeiture under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) - appellant contended that the limited value of his equity in the property was overlooked - whether the forfeiture included the appellant's wife's interest - whether the Magistrate erred in failing to take into account hardship to the appellant's wife and family.
Held: the submission concerning the value of the appellant's equity in the property should not be upheld - the forfeiture did not include the appellant's wife's interest - the Magistrate did not err in his consideration of the hardship to the appellant's family - appeal dismissed.
Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) s 3, s 24, s 34, s 36, s 44, s 47, ss 74-76, s 93, s 95; Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 69, referred to.
Director of Public Prosecutions v George (2008) 102 SASR 246; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Chan (2001) 183 ALR 575; Direct of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Chan (2001) 52 NSWLR 56; Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969)121 CLR 342; DPP v Sienczewski [2010] SASC 16; O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210; Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 231 CLR 381; McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 56 FCR 50; Sinclair v Mining Warden at Maryborough (1975) 132 CLR 473; Taylor v Attorney-General (1991) 55 SASR 462, applied.
TEDESCO v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)
[2010] SASC 336Magistrates Appeal
WHITE J: This is an appeal against a refusal by a magistrate to order the exclusion of a property from forfeiture under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) (the CAC Act).
On 17 May 2006, the appellant committed the offence of possession for sale of cannabis, contrary to s 32(1)(e) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA).[1] The offence involved the possession of more than 37 kilograms of cannabis. The appellant pleaded guilty to that offence and subsequently Judge Nicholson in the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment for two years and four months with a non-parole period of 14 months. He declined to suspend that sentence.
[1] As the appellant’s offence was committed on 17 May 2006, it was s 32 in the form which applied before 3 December 2007 which was…
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- Case
- [2010] SASC 336
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Magistrate correctly interpreted the application of the restraining order to the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property, whether the Magistrate correctly considered the hardship to the appellant's family, and whether the Magistrate was correct in not considering the limited value of the appellant's equity in the property. The court found that the submission concerning the value of the appellant's equity in the property should not be upheld, as the forfeiture did not include the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property. The court also found that the Magistrate did not err in his consideration of the hardship to the appellant's family. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Magistrate was upheld.
The court's reasoning was that the Magistrate correctly interpreted the application of the restraining order to the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property, as the submission concerning the limited value of the appellant's equity in the property should not be upheld. The court also found that the Magistrate did not err in his consideration of the hardship to the appellant's family, as the evidence suggested that the property had been acquired lawfully and without use of the proceeds of any unlawful activity. The court held that the Magistrate's decision was correct and dismissed the appeal. The decision of the Magistrate was upheld, and no orders were made in relation to the appellant's application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's reasoning in the decision of Tedesco v Director of Public Prosecutions involved a thorough examination of several issues pertaining to the application of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA). The court first addressed the appellant's contention that the Magistrate had erred in failing to consider his claim that his equity in the Cheltenham property was only $7,500. The court found that the appellant's submission regarding the limited value of his equity in the property should not be upheld. This was because the evidence suggested that the property had been acquired lawfully and without the use of proceeds from unlawful activities, and thus, the Magistrate was not required to consider the appellant's asserted equity in determining the applicability of the restraining order.
Regarding the inclusion of the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property within the restraining order and the subsequent forfeiture, the court held that the Magistrate did not err in this regard. The court clarified that the wife's interest in the property as a tenant in common was appropriately included in the restraining order, as required by s 24 of the CAC Act. The court observed that the Director's application for the restraining order was based on reasonable grounds to suspect that the property was proceeds of, or an instrument of, a serious offence, irrespective of whether the appellant or his wife had committed the offence. Thus, both the appellant's and his wife's interests were subject to the restraining order and potential forfeiture.
The court further examined whether the Magistrate erred in not taking into account the hardship that the appellant's wife and family would face if they were evicted from the Cheltenham property. The court found no error in the Magistrate's consideration of this issue. The evidence presented indicated that the property was the family home and that eviction would result in significant hardship, a factor the court recognized as relevant under the CAC Act. However, the court held that the Magistrate appropriately balanced this consideration against the statutory requirements for forfeiture.
In considering whether the property was subject to statutory forfeiture under s 74 of the CAC Act before the appellant's application was heard on 9 July 2010, the court noted that statutory forfeiture occurred at the end of the relevant period, which was 12 August 2009, due to an extension order made on 7 November 2008. The court determined that the statutory forfeiture of the Cheltenham property had already occurred by the time the Magistrate heard the application on 9 July 2010, as expressly provided by s 76(2) of the CAC Act.
The court then addressed whether an order excluding the property from forfeiture was possible under s 76 of the CAC Act, given that the property had allegedly already been forfeited under s 74. The court concluded that such an order could not be made because the property had already been forfeited by force of statute, and s 76(2) explicitly precludes an exclusion order if the property has already been forfeited.
Finally, the court considered the appellant's application of 15 July 2009, which was identical to the application of 3 November 2008, and determined that it remained undetermined. The court found that the intended purpose of the application was unclear, and it remained pending. The court also noted that an application for a pecuniary penalty order (PPO) filed by the Director on 5 November 2008 had not been resolved.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Magistrate did not err in failing to consider the appellant's equity value, appropriately included the wife's interest in the forfeiture order, and correctly balanced hardship considerations against statutory requirements. Additionally, the court clarified that an order excluding property from forfeiture cannot be made if the property has already been forfeited under the Act, and pending applications remain undetermined without clear purpose.