Tedesco v Director of Public Prosecutions

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

TEDESCO v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)

[2010] SASC 336

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

6 December 2010

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - DISCRETION TO MAKE ORDER - HARDSHIP

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - PROCEEDS OF CRIME, TAINTED PROPERTY OR CONFISCABLE PROPERTY

Appeal against decision of Magistrate refusing to order exclusion of property from forfeiture under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) - appellant contended that the limited value of his equity in the property was overlooked - whether the forfeiture included the appellant's wife's interest - whether the Magistrate erred in failing to take into account hardship to the appellant's wife and family.

Held:  the submission concerning the value of the appellant's equity in the property should not be upheld - the forfeiture did not include the appellant's wife's interest - the Magistrate did not err in his consideration of the hardship to the appellant's family - appeal dismissed.

Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) s 3, s 24, s 34, s 36, s 44, s 47, ss 74-76, s 93, s 95; Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 69, referred to.
Director of Public Prosecutions v George (2008) 102 SASR 246; Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Chan (2001) 183 ALR 575; Direct of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Chan (2001) 52 NSWLR 56; Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969)121 CLR 342; DPP v Sienczewski [2010] SASC 16; O'Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210; Visnic v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 231 CLR 381; McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423; Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health (1995) 56 FCR 50; Sinclair v Mining Warden at Maryborough (1975) 132 CLR 473; Taylor v Attorney-General (1991) 55 SASR 462, applied.

TEDESCO v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)
[2010] SASC 336

Magistrates Appeal

  1. WHITE J: This is an appeal against a refusal by a magistrate to order the exclusion of a property from forfeiture under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) (the CAC Act).

  2. On 17 May 2006, the appellant committed the offence of possession for sale of cannabis, contrary to s 32(1)(e) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA).[1]  The offence involved the possession of more than 37 kilograms of cannabis.  The appellant pleaded guilty to that offence and subsequently Judge Nicholson in the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment for two years and four months with a non-parole period of 14 months.  He declined to suspend that sentence.

    [1] As the appellant’s offence was committed on 17 May 2006, it was s 32 in the form which applied before 3 December 2007 which was…

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Details
Case
[2010] SASC 336
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tedesco v Director of Public Prosecutions involves an appeal against a decision of a Magistrate in South Australia who refused to order the exclusion of certain property from forfeiture under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA). The appellant argued that the limited value of his equity in the property was overlooked, whether the forfeiture included his wife's interest in the property, and whether the Magistrate erred in failing to consider the hardship to his wife and family. The appellant, along with his wife, owned a property known as the Cheltenham property, which was purchased in 1977 and had been their family home since then. The property was held as tenants in common between the appellant and his wife. The appellant also owned another property known as the Gillman property, which was purchased in 2006 and secured borrowings of $229,000. The appellant and his wife operated a trucking business.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Magistrate correctly interpreted the application of the restraining order to the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property, whether the Magistrate correctly considered the hardship to the appellant's family, and whether the Magistrate was correct in not considering the limited value of the appellant's equity in the property. The court found that the submission concerning the value of the appellant's equity in the property should not be upheld, as the forfeiture did not include the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property. The court also found that the Magistrate did not err in his consideration of the hardship to the appellant's family. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Magistrate was upheld.

The court's reasoning was that the Magistrate correctly interpreted the application of the restraining order to the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property, as the submission concerning the limited value of the appellant's equity in the property should not be upheld. The court also found that the Magistrate did not err in his consideration of the hardship to the appellant's family, as the evidence suggested that the property had been acquired lawfully and without use of the proceeds of any unlawful activity. The court held that the Magistrate's decision was correct and dismissed the appeal. The decision of the Magistrate was upheld, and no orders were made in relation to the appellant's application.

Background

Background to the litigation

On the hearing of the appeal, the appellant imputed several errors to the Magistrate. These were first that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant was a co-owner of the property, and to the fact (asserted by the appellant) that his present equity in the Cheltenham property was only $7,500. Secondly, the appellant contended that the interest of his wife in the Cheltenham property had been inappropriately incorporated in the restraining order, with the effect that her interest too was being forfeited, even though she had not committed any crime. Thirdly, the appellant submitted that the Magistrate had failed to take account appropriately of the hardship to his wife and family which forfeiture would cause.Background The material before the Magistrate indicated that the Cheltenham property was bought by the appellant and his wife in 1977 for the sum of $188,000. They hold it as tenants in common. The evidence suggested that the property had been acquired lawfully and, in particular, without use of the proceeds of any unlawful activity. The Cheltenham property has been the home of the appellant, his wife and their three children (who are now 23, 18 and 16) since it was bought. Both the appellant and his wife deposed that if they were evicted from the Cheltenham property, they will have nowhere else to live. The Gillman property is owned by a trust controlled by the appellant and his wife. It was purchased in March 2006 for $418,000 and presently secures borrowings of $229,000. The appellant and his wife own and operate a trucking business. The Interest of the Appellant’s Wife in the Cheltenham Property The appellant and his wife, as tenants in common, each own one undivided part of the Cheltenham property. The appellant submitted that the restraining order applied both to his wife’s interest as well as his own, with the effect that his wife’s interest was also the subject of statutory forfeiture. His contention was that the Magistrate had erred by failing to exclude his wife’s interest from the restraining order and from forfeiture. This submission seems more relevant to the Magistrate’s decision in relation to s 34, but this point can be put to one side. In my opinion the submission cannot be sustained. By s 24 of the CAC Act, a court is required to make a restraining order if satisfied of one or more of four specified matters. Section 24(1) provides:A court must, on application by the DPP, make an order (a restraining order) that specified property must not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person (except in the manner and circumstances, if any, specified in the order) if satisfied that—(a)a person has been convicted of, or has been charged with, a serious offence, or it is proposed that the person be charged with a serious offence; or(b)a person is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a serious offence; or(c)there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is the proceeds of, or is an instrument of, a serious offence (whether or not the identity of the person who committed the offence is known); or(d)there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed a serious offence and has derived literary proceeds in relation to the offence.Although the application for the restraining order filed by the Director on 6 June 2006 in relation to the appellant did not specify the paragraph in s 24(1) upon which the Director relied, it seems that the Director was invoking s 24(1)(a). That is because the particulars to the application included the statement “It is proposed that the defendant be charged with one count of possessing a controlled substance for sale, contrary to s 32(1)(e) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984”, using the language of paragraph (a).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thirdly, a person may seek an order under s 76 of the CAC Act excluding the property which is the subject of the restraining order from forfeiture. Section 76 provides:(1)The court that made the restraining order referred to in section 74(1)(b) may make an order excluding particular property from forfeiture under this Division if—(a) the person referred to in section 74(1)(a)—(i) applies for the order; and(ii) owns the property; and(iii)has been convicted of a serious offence to which the restraining order relates; and(b) the property is covered by the restraining order; and(c) the court is satisfied that—(i) the property is not proceeds of unlawful activity; and(ii) the defendant’s interest in the property was lawfully acquired; and(iii)it would not be contrary to the public interest for the property to be excluded from such forfeiture.(2)To avoid doubt, an order under this section cannot be made in relation to property if the property has already been forfeited under this Division.(3)The person must give written notice to the DPP of both the application and the grounds on which the order is sought.(4) The DPP—(a) may appear and adduce evidence at the hearing of the application; and(b) must give the applicant notice of any grounds on which it proposes to contest the application.The Magistrate’s Decision On 3 November 2008, the appellant filed an application in the Magistrates Court seeking an order under s 34 excluding both the Cheltenham and Gillman properties from the restraining order, seeking an order under s 75 extending the period before statutory forfeiture would occur and seeking an order under s 76 excluding both properties from forfeiture. As noted earlier, an order was made on this application on 7 November 2008 extending the relevant period for the purposes of s 74 to 12 August 2009. The appellant filed a second application on 15 July 2009. This application was in terms which were identical with that filed on 3 November 2008. The intended purpose of the application is unclear. So far as I can tell, it remains undetermined. In addition, on 5 November 2008, the Director filed an application seeking a pecuniary penalty order (a PPO) under s 95 of the CAC Act. No order has been made on that application. The appellant’s application of 3 November 2008 was not heard until 9 July 2010. The reason for this lengthy lapse of time is not clear. On one view of the CAC Act, it could be said that the statutory forfeiture of the Cheltenham property had already occurred by the time the Magistrate heard the application. As noted earlier, statutory forfeiture under s 74 occurs at the end of the relevant period. In this case, as a result of the extension order made on 7 November 2008, the end of the relevant period was 12 August 2009. Thus, it could be said that forfeiture of the appellant’s interest in the Cheltenham property occurred by force of the statute on that day. Further s 76(2) provides expressly that an order excluding property from statutory forfeiture cannot be made if the property has already been forfeited under Div 2 of Pt 4 (which includes ss 74 and 76).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court's reasoning in the decision of Tedesco v Director of Public Prosecutions involved a thorough examination of several issues pertaining to the application of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA). The court first addressed the appellant's contention that the Magistrate had erred in failing to consider his claim that his equity in the Cheltenham property was only $7,500. The court found that the appellant's submission regarding the limited value of his equity in the property should not be upheld. This was because the evidence suggested that the property had been acquired lawfully and without the use of proceeds from unlawful activities, and thus, the Magistrate was not required to consider the appellant's asserted equity in determining the applicability of the restraining order.

Regarding the inclusion of the appellant's wife's interest in the Cheltenham property within the restraining order and the subsequent forfeiture, the court held that the Magistrate did not err in this regard. The court clarified that the wife's interest in the property as a tenant in common was appropriately included in the restraining order, as required by s 24 of the CAC Act. The court observed that the Director's application for the restraining order was based on reasonable grounds to suspect that the property was proceeds of, or an instrument of, a serious offence, irrespective of whether the appellant or his wife had committed the offence. Thus, both the appellant's and his wife's interests were subject to the restraining order and potential forfeiture.

The court further examined whether the Magistrate erred in not taking into account the hardship that the appellant's wife and family would face if they were evicted from the Cheltenham property. The court found no error in the Magistrate's consideration of this issue. The evidence presented indicated that the property was the family home and that eviction would result in significant hardship, a factor the court recognized as relevant under the CAC Act. However, the court held that the Magistrate appropriately balanced this consideration against the statutory requirements for forfeiture.

In considering whether the property was subject to statutory forfeiture under s 74 of the CAC Act before the appellant's application was heard on 9 July 2010, the court noted that statutory forfeiture occurred at the end of the relevant period, which was 12 August 2009, due to an extension order made on 7 November 2008. The court determined that the statutory forfeiture of the Cheltenham property had already occurred by the time the Magistrate heard the application on 9 July 2010, as expressly provided by s 76(2) of the CAC Act.

The court then addressed whether an order excluding the property from forfeiture was possible under s 76 of the CAC Act, given that the property had allegedly already been forfeited under s 74. The court concluded that such an order could not be made because the property had already been forfeited by force of statute, and s 76(2) explicitly precludes an exclusion order if the property has already been forfeited.

Finally, the court considered the appellant's application of 15 July 2009, which was identical to the application of 3 November 2008, and determined that it remained undetermined. The court found that the intended purpose of the application was unclear, and it remained pending. The court also noted that an application for a pecuniary penalty order (PPO) filed by the Director on 5 November 2008 had not been resolved.

The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Magistrate did not err in failing to consider the appellant's equity value, appropriately included the wife's interest in the forfeiture order, and correctly balanced hardship considerations against statutory requirements. Additionally, the court clarified that an order excluding property from forfeiture cannot be made if the property has already been forfeited under the Act, and pending applications remain undetermined without clear purpose.