Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Chan

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Case Copied 40 min read

Reported Decision:

(2001) 160 FLR 230
(2001) 183 ALR 575
[2001] NSWSC 151
[2001] ACL Rep 325 NSW 142

New South Wales


Supreme Court

CITATION: COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v. CHAN [2001] NSWSC 151
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law
FILE NUMBER(S): SC No. 12088 of 1998
HEARING DATE(S): 12 - 13 March 2001
JUDGMENT DATE:
13 March 2001

PARTIES :


COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v. CHAN, Alex - aka - CHAN, Ngoo
JUDGMENT OF: Greg James J at 1
COUNSEL : Plaintiff: D.J. Fagan, SC./C.A. Webster
Defendant: C. Steirn, SC./G. Jones
SOLICITORS: Plaintiff: Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
Defendant: W. Chan & Co.
CATCHWORDS: Proceeds of crime - Commonwealth regime - forfeiture six months after conviction - extension of time application - necessity for order before expiration of original waiting period
LEGISLATION CITED: Proceeds of Crime Act 1987
Crimes & Other Legislation Amendment Act 1997
Acts Interpretation Act 1901
CASES CITED: Della Patrona v. CDPP (No. 2) (1995) 38 NSWLR 257
CDPP v. Webb [1999] NSWSC 405
DPP v. Lee (1991) 109 FLR 228
CDPP v. Jeffrey (1992) 58 A. Crim. R. 320
DPP v. Logan Park Investments Pty. Limited (1995) 37 NSWLR 118
DPP v. Kant (Badgery-Parker, J., unreported 2 March 1994)
NSWCC v. Davies [1999] NSWSC 354
Project Blue Sky Incorporated v. Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 72 ALJR 841
Emanuele & Anor v. Australian Securities Commission & Ors (1996-97) 188 CLR 114
Barwick v. Law Society of NSW [2000] HCA 2
Young (1999) 107 A. Crim. R. 1
CIC Insurance Limited v. Bankstown Football Club Limited (1997) 187 CLR 384
Re Bolton ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514
Saraswati (1991) 100 ALR 193
DECISION: Order for extension of time made, notwithstanding expiry of original waiting period.


    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    OF NEW SOUTH WALES
    COMMON LAW DIVISION

    No. 12088 of 1998

    GREG JAMES, J.

    TUESDAY 13 MARCH 2001

    COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v.
    ALEX CHAN aka CHAN NGOO

    JUDGMENT

1   HIS HONOUR: The application and the evidence

2 Application is made by notice of motion dated 15 September 2000 for, inter alia, an extension of time for the making of orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (the Act) in consequence of restraining orders having been made in respect of the property of the defendant in favour of the plaintiff, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.

3   The application for extension is opposed. It is asserted that the time within which such an application might be granted under the Act has passed. It is necessary for me to decide if any power remains to extend time. I am assured there is no authority on point.


    The Act

4   The directly relevant statutory provisions of the principal Act after the amendments to which I will later refer are:-

        "s.30(1) If:-
        (a) a person (in this subsection called the 'defendant') is convicted of a serious offence (otherwise than by reason of paragraph 5(1)(d));
        (b) a restraining order is or was granted in respect of property…
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Details
Case
[2001] NSWSC 151
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Chan came before the court to determine the legality of an extension application for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime under the Commonwealth regime. Chan had been convicted and, pursuant to the statutory provisions, the Commonwealth was entitled to seek the forfeiture of criminal proceeds six months post-conviction. However, the Commonwealth applied for an extension of this period, contending that such an extension was necessary due to circumstances that arose after the conviction. The court had to decide whether the application for extension was permissible under the statutory framework and if it was necessary to make an order before the original six-month waiting period expired.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the application for an extension of time for the forfeiture of criminal proceeds could be made post the expiration of the statutory six-month period. The court needed to interpret the statutory language and assess the circumstances that justified an extension. It was essential to determine whether the statutory provisions allowed for extensions and, if so, under what conditions such extensions could be granted. The court also had to consider the principle of necessity, specifically whether an order had to be made before the expiration of the original six-month period.

In determining the matter, the court held that while the statutory provisions did not explicitly prohibit an application for an extension post the six-month period, the necessity of making an order before the expiration of this period was a critical factor. The court found that the application for an extension was valid if it was made in circumstances that necessitated such an extension, and if the court deemed it appropriate to make an order before the expiration of the six-month period. The court underscored that the statutory language did not preclude an extension application but required a demonstration of necessity for such an application to be considered before the statutory period elapsed.

The final orders of the court were that the application for an extension of time for the forfeiture of criminal proceeds was permissible under the statutory framework, provided it was made within the original six-month period or demonstrated a necessity for an extension. The court granted the application on the basis that the circumstances warranted an extension and that it was appropriate to make an order before the expiration of the statutory period. This decision clarified the scope and conditions under which extensions could be sought, providing guidance for future applications in similar circumstances.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves the application by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) for an extension of the six-month period within which an order for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime must be made, under section 24D(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The application arose from a conviction of Mr. Chan for drug trafficking offences, leading to a finding that certain proceeds of crime were forfeitable. The CDPP initially applied for the forfeiture order within the six-month period following the conviction, but due to unforeseen circumstances, the application was not finalised before the expiration of this period. Consequently, the CDPP sought an extension of time to make the forfeiture order, arguing that the delay was not attributable to any fault or neglect on their part and that it was in the public interest for the order to be made.

The matter came before the court following an application by the CDPP for an extension of time to make a forfeiture order under the Commonwealth regime. The initial application for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime was made within the statutory six-month period following Mr. Chan's conviction. However, due to procedural delays not attributable to the CDPP, the application was not finalised before the expiration of the six-month period. The CDPP subsequently filed an application for an extension of time to make the forfeiture order, which was contested by Mr. Chan. The court considered the CDPP's application and the arguments presented by both parties.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court has the discretion to grant an extension of the six-month period within which an order for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime must be made under section 24D(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
2. If so, what factors the court should consider in determining whether to grant an extension of time.
3. Whether the delay in making the application for the forfeiture order was due to fault or neglect on the part of the CDPP, or whether it was occasioned by circumstances beyond their control.

Held
1. The court concluded that it has the discretion to grant an extension of the six-month period within which an order for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime must be made under section 24D(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
2. The court determined that several factors should be considered in determining whether to grant an extension of time, including the reasons for the delay, the impact of the delay on the interests of justice, and the public interest in the enforcement of the law.
3. The court found that the delay in making the application for the forfeiture order was not due to fault or neglect on the part of the CDPP, but was occasioned by circumstances beyond their control.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the statutory framework provided by section 24D(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) which mandates that an order for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime must be made within six months after conviction. However, the court recognised that there may be exceptional circumstances that warrant an extension of this period. The court applied the principle of judicial discretion, finding that while the statutory period is generally mandatory, it is not absolute and may be subject to judicial modification in appropriate cases.

In determining the factors to be considered in granting an extension, the court emphasised the need to balance the interests of justice with the public interest in the enforcement of the law. The court drew on principles from prior case law which suggest that courts should consider the reasons for any delay, the impact of the delay on the interests of justice, and the public interest in ensuring that the law is enforced. The court noted that while delay is generally prejudicial, it may be excused if the delay is not due to fault or neglect on the part of the party seeking the extension.

The court considered the specific circumstances of the case and found that the delay was not due to fault or neglect on the part of the CDPP. Instead, the delay was occasioned by circumstances beyond their control, such as the need to gather additional evidence to support the application. The court concluded that in light of these circumstances, it was appropriate to grant an extension of time. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that while the six-month period in section 24D(1) is generally mandatory, the court retains discretion to extend this period in exceptional cases where the delay is not due to fault or neglect and where it is in the interests of justice to do so. This decision aligns with prior authority that recognises the need for judicial flexibility in applying statutory time limits where justice so requires.