SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court: Civil)
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v GEORGE
[2008] SASC 330
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice White)
26 November 2008
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES - SPECIFIC INTERPRETATIONS
Respondent convicted of producing marijuana – marijuana grown and stored in shed on respondent’s property – appellant sought a Pecuniary Penalty Order (PPO) in relation to the property – respondent’s house on the property – shed occupied only small proportion of total area of property – whether property ‘used in, or in connection with’ the commission of the offence of producing marijuana so that property liable to PPO – appeal against decision of Magistrates Court that property not used in or in connection with commission of offence.
Held: (Doyle CJ, White J agreeing, Vanstone J contra) Property is ‘used in, or in connection with, the commission of an offence’ where it facilitates, assists or contributes to the commission of an offence – use of the land facilitated and contributed to the commission of the offence – land an ‘instrument’ of the offence and liable to a PPO – appeal allowed.
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PERMISSIVE, DIRECTORY AND MANDATORY PROVISIONS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - ORDERS FOR COMPENSATION, REPARATION, RESTITUTION, FORFEITURE AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - PECUNIARY PENALTY ORDER
Section 95(1) Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) provided that a Court ‘must’ make a Pecuniary Penalty Order (PPO) upon being satisfied of the existence of certain matters – whether ‘must’ in section 95(1) to be construed as conferring a discretion on the Court to make a PPO – whether implication should be drawn that a PPO cannot be made where there has been a decision to exclude property from statutory forfeiture or a decision not to make a forfeiture order in respect of the property.
Held: section 95(1) to be construed as conferring a discretionary power on the Court – (Doyle CJ, White J agreeing, Vanstone J contra) even if ‘must’ interpreted literally, no implication to be drawn that PPO not to be made after order made excluding property from statutory forfeiture or decision not to make forfeiture order in respect of property.
MAGISTRATES - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY - PROCEDURE - THE HEARING - GENERAL MATTERS - RELEVANT PRINCIPLES, JURISDICTION AND POWERS
If s 95(1) Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) to be interpreted as requiring court to make PPO upon being satisfied of the existence of certain matters, whether an abuse of court's process for DPP to apply for a PPO in respect of property after a court has made an order excluding the same property from statutory forfeiture, or has refused to make a forfeiture order in relation to the same property.
Held: application by DPP for a PPO in such circumstances…
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- Case
- [2008] SASC 330
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were twofold. Firstly, the court had to interpret the phrase "used in, or in connection with, the commission of an offence" as it appeared in the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA). The court needed to establish whether the property in question facilitated or contributed to the offence of producing marijuana. Secondly, the court had to consider whether the word 'must' in section 95(1) of the Act conferred a discretionary power on the Court to make a PPO, or if it imposed a mandatory requirement. Additionally, the court needed to determine if there was an implied prohibition against making a PPO after a decision to exclude property from statutory forfeiture or a decision not to make a forfeiture order in respect of the property.
In its reasoning, the Court of Appeal held that the property was indeed 'used in, or in connection with' the commission of the offence because it facilitated and contributed to the offence, thus qualifying as an 'instrument' of the offence. Consequently, the property was liable to a PPO. The majority, Doyle CJ and White J, found that the word'must' in section 95(1) of the Act conferred a discretionary power on the Court, rather than imposing a mandatory requirement. Vanstone J dissented on this point, holding that 'must' should be interpreted literally as imposing a mandatory requirement. However, even if interpreted literally, the majority found no implication that a PPO could not be made after a decision to exclude property from statutory forfeiture or a decision not to make a forfeiture order in respect of the property. The court also observed that the interpretation of the Act that would allow statutory forfeiture to occur despite pending applications or unresolved appeals seemed inappropriate and merited further consideration by the Parliament.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders proposed by Doyle CJ were agreed upon. The Court directed that the property be subject to a PPO in accordance with the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi