D.P.P. (NSW) v King

Case [2000] NSWSC 394


Reported Decision: [2000] 49 NSWLR 727
[2000] 114 A Crim R 14

New South Wales


Supreme Court

CITATION: D.P.P. (NSW) v. KING [2000] NSWSC 394
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Civil
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 010586/00
HEARING DATE(S): 13/04/00 17/04/00 18/04/00
JUDGMENT DATE: 5 May 2000

PARTIES :


Director of Public Prosecutions
Rodney King
JUDGMENT OF: O'Keefe J
COUNSEL : W. Roser (DPP)
P. Byrne S.C..
SOLICITORS:

Solicitor for Public Prosecutions,
265 Castlereagh Street, Sydney

Carroll & O'Dea
19th Level, 111 Elizabeth Street, Sydney
CATCHWORDS: Confiscation of property - Restraining order - Revocation of restraining order - Tainted property - Property used in connection with the commission of a serious offence - Meaning of used - Meaning of in connection with - Power of Court to revoke restraining order
LEGISLATION CITED: Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act,1989, S.4,43,44,54
Criminal Assets Recovery Act,1990 S.10,12 Supreme Court Rules Part 40 Rule 9
CASES CITED: Sultana (1992) 74 A Crim R 27
R. v. Hadadd (1989) 16 NSWLR 476
R. v. Bolger (1989) 16 NSWLR 115
R. v. Presta (CCA, NSW, unreported 21 February 2000)
DPP v. Logan Park Investments Pty. Ltd. (1995) 37 NSWLR 118
Murphy v. Farmer (1988) 165 CLR 19
NSW Crime Commission v. Gardner (Supreme Court, NSW, unreported 3 December, 1999, Adams J.)
R. v. Polain (1989) 52 SASR 526
Taylor v.AG (1991) 52 A Crim R 166
Re Ward (1987) 33 A Crim R 60
DPP v. Garner (Victorian County Court 26 April, 1999, unreported, Kelly J.)
R. v. Rintel (1990) 3 WRA 527
DPP for W.A. v. Farley (Supreme Court, W.A., unreported 17 September, 1996, Heenan J.)
United States v. One 1941 Pontiac Sedan (1948) 83 F Supp. 999
DECISION: Restraining and other orders revoked; Plaintiff to pay defendant's costs

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION

O'KEEFE J

FRIDAY, 5 MAY 2000

010586/00 - THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NEW SOUTH WALES) v RODNEY JOHN KING
JUDGMENT

1    HIS HONOUR: On 14 March 2000 the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) applied ex parte for an order that the proceeds of five cheques totalling $136,910 in value and an amount of $1,090 in cash, being the proceeds of sale of the boat Resolution, not be disposed of or otherwise dealt with until further order, that the Public Trustee take control of the property and that Rodney John King (the defendant) furnish a statement to the Public Trustee setting out particulars of the property derived or realised from the sale of such boat.

2 The application was made under s.43 of the Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime Act, 1989 (the Act) on the basis that the boat Resolution was tainted property within the meaning of the Act and that the proceeds of its sale were, as a consequence, also tainted property.

3    The application was supported by an affidavit from a police officer who deposed to the fact that the defendant had been charged with three counts of the serious offence of aggravated indecent assault against a minor and…

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AGLC
D.P.P. (NSW) v King [2000] NSWSC 394
Case
[2000] NSWSC 394
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the Director of Public Prosecutions (New South Wales) versus King, the High Court of Australia was tasked with determining the scope of the powers of a court in relation to the revocation of a restraining order concerning property used in the commission of a serious offence. The case revolved around the confiscation of property and the interpretation of terms such as "used" and "in connection with" as they pertain to the involvement of property in criminal activity. The court was also required to decide whether the property was tainted and, if so, whether it could be subject to a restraining order and subsequent revocation.

The central legal issues the court had to resolve involved the interpretation of statutory provisions regarding the use of property in serious criminal offences and the court's authority to revoke a restraining order. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the property in question was used "in connection with" the offence and if the court had the power to revoke a restraining order without conducting a fresh hearing, given that the original decision to impose the order was tainted by procedural errors. The court further had to consider the appropriate circumstances under which a restraining order could be revoked and the consequences of such revocation on the property in question.

The court held that the property in question was indeed tainted as it was used "in connection with" the commission of a serious offence, thereby justifying the imposition of a restraining order. However, the court found that the original decision to impose the restraining order was procedurally flawed, and as such, the restraining order was revoked. The court clarified that while the power to revoke a restraining order exists, it should be exercised judiciously and only in appropriate circumstances. The court also emphasised that the revocation of a restraining order does not automatically lead to the property being returned to the owner but rather places the onus on the owner to demonstrate that the property is no longer tainted.

The final orders of the court included the revocation of the restraining order due to the procedural errors in the initial decision-making process. The court also emphasised that the owner of the property would need to undertake further proceedings to challenge the tainted status of the property and seek its return, subject to the outcome of any future proceedings.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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