MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | ACT Director of Public Prosecutions v Truong |
Citation: | [2016] ACTMC 4 |
Hearing Date(s): | 15 January 2016, 2 February 2016 |
DecisionDate: | 7 April 2016 |
Before: | Magistrate Campbell |
Decision: | The application is refused. See [113] – [115] |
Category: | Decision |
Catchwords: | CIVIL LAW – standard of proof CIVIL LAW – confiscation of criminal assets – restraining order – application for exclusion order by person other than the offender – interest in the property – party to the relevant serious offence – effective control – whether the applicant’s interest is tainted property |
Legislation Cited | Confiscation of Criminal Assets Act 2003 (ACT) ss 3, 9, 10, 14, 22, 26, 31, 77 Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) dict |
Cases Cited: | ACT Director of Public Prosecutions v King [2016] ACTSC 35 Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (1951) 217 ALR 1 United States v One 1941 Pontiac Sedan 83 F Supp 999 (DC NY, 1948) |
Parties: | ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff) Van Hieu TRUONG (Defendant) Honey NGUYEN (First Interested Party) Toyota Finance Australia Ltd (Second Interested Party) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr Williamson (Plaintiff) Ms Warwick (First Interested Party) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Plaintiff) Mr C Prasad (First Interested Party) |
File Number(s): | AS 8 of 2015 |
MAGISTRATE CAMPBELL:
Background
On 22 May 2015 I dealt with an originating application brought under s 26 of the Confiscation of CriminalAssets Act2003 (ACT) (the Act). The plaintiff, the Director of Public Prosecutions, sought a restraining order under s 31 of the Act in relation to a white Lexus motor vehicle (the car) which bears distinctive ACT registration plates ‘HONEY’.
The defendant in those proceedings was Van Hieu Truong (‘the offender’ for the purposes of the Act). Honey Nguyen, who is the mother of two of his children, was named as Interested Party One.[1] It is she who is the registered owner of the car.[2] Property sought to be restrained and then forfeited under the Act need not necessarily be property of the offender.[3]
The application was brought without notice to Mr Truong or Ms Nguyen. The Act permits this.[4] As the explanatory memorandum explains, the reason behind this provision is to ensure that the objectives of a restraining order are not frustrated by giving offenders warning of impending action to restrain or confiscate their property, thereby giving them time to destroy relevant information or property before the application is heard. The disposition of property in those circumstances might frustrate the purposes of the Act.
The evidence before me…
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- Case
- [2016] ACTMC 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court needed to resolve included the standard of proof required for the confiscation of criminal assets and the application for an exclusion order by a party other than the offender. The court also had to consider the definition of effective control and whether it applied to the applicant's interest in the property. Furthermore, the court examined whether the applicant's interest in the property was tainted as a result of their involvement in the serious offence and whether this would affect the outcome of the application.
The court found that the standard of proof required for the confiscation of criminal assets and the application for an exclusion order was not met by the applicant. The court held that the applicant did not have effective control of the property, and therefore, their interest was not tainted by their involvement in the serious offence. The court ruled that the applicant's interest in the property was not subject to the exclusion order, and the application for the exclusion order was refused. The court concluded that the applicant's interest in the property was not tainted and did not meet the criteria for an exclusion order.
The final orders of the court were that the application for an exclusion order was refused, and the applicant's interest in the property was not subject to the order. The court provided detailed reasons for its decision, explaining that the applicant did not meet the standard of proof required for the confiscation of criminal assets and the application for an exclusion order. The court also highlighted that the applicant's interest in the property was not tainted due to their lack of effective control. The decision underscores the importance of meeting the necessary legal criteria for the imposition of an exclusion order and the confiscation of criminal assets in Australia.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application is refused. See [113] – [115]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi