BRENNAN AND TOOHEY JJ: The point at issue in this appeal is a narrow one. Section 229(1) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ("the Act") provides that the "following goods shall be forfeited to the Crown". Among the goods listed are those in par.(i) which reads:

"All goods in respect of which any entry invoice declaration answer statement or representation which is false or wilfully misleading in any particular has been delivered made or produced."

The point is whether "false" in par.(i) means no more than wrong in fact or whether it imports intentional untruth on the part of the person delivering, making or producing any entry or other matter referred to in the paragraph.

2. Part IV of the Act is concerned with the importation of goods and Div.4 is headed "The Entry, Unshipment, Landing, and Examination of Goods". It is unnecessary to consider the circumstances in which an entry, invoice, declaration, answer, statement or representation may be made in connection with the importation of goods for it was accepted by the respondent that the answers provided by him to a Customs Officer in connection with the importation of a Porsche motor vehicle from New Zealand fell within par.(i).

3. The appellant, who is the Collector of Customs for New South Wales, contended in the Supreme Court of New South Wales that three answers given by the respondent in Form G142 headed "Statement for Vehicle Imported by a Passenger" were false or wilfully misleading. Yeldham J. concluded that two of the answers were neither false nor wilfully misleading and there was no challenge to that finding. To the third question "Did you or your husband or wife, as appropriate, import a vehicle into Australia within the past three years?", the respondent answered "No". That answer was wrong but Yeldham J. held in these terms:

"The evidence in the present case does not establish that the (respondent) made a deliberately or intentionally false statement when he erroneously answered the third question in Form G142 in the negative on 15th May, 1984."

4. Yeldham J. held that the answer given by the respondent was not wilfully misleading and that it was not false in the sense of intentionally untrue, which was the meaning his Honour attributed to the word in par.(i). His Honour therefore granted the respondent a declaration, in proceedings brought under s.208A(3)(b) of the Act, that the motor vehicle had not been forfeited to the Crown. On appeal, that decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Priestley J.A., with whom Hope and Samuels JJ.A. agreed, considered that "wilfully false" supplied "the most appropriate meaning for the word in its setting in the Act".

5. It may be accepted that "false" is not a precise adjective. Nevertheless, it is…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Murphy v Farmer

Details

AGLC: Murphy v Farmer [1988] HCA 31
Case: [1988] HCA 31
Decision Date: 30 June 1988

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland in a dispute between Murphy (the appellant) and Farmer (the respondent). The case concerned the interpretation and application of certain provisions of the *Land Tax Act 1915* (Qld) and the *Land Tax Act 1936* (Qld) in relation to land owned by the appellant.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the land in question was exempt from land tax under the relevant legislation, and if not, what was the correct basis for assessing the land tax payable. Specifically, the court had to determine the meaning of "unimproved value" and "improved value" as defined in the Acts, and how these definitions applied to land that had undergone significant development and subdivision.

The High Court analysed the legislative history and the plain wording of the *Land Tax Acts*. It held that the exemption provisions were to be construed strictly. The court found that the land, by virtue of the improvements made and its subdivision, did not fall within the categories of land that were entitled to exemption. The court further clarified that the "improved value" was to be determined by reference to the value of the land with all its improvements, and that the "unimproved value" was the value of the land without those improvements. The court applied established principles of statutory interpretation, favouring a literal construction of the taxing legislation.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The court ordered that the appellant was liable for land tax as assessed.

Orders