Constitutional Law (Cth.)—Customs—Statute—Validity—Forfeiture of goods—Seizure—Condemnation—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 51 (i.), (ii.), (xxxi.), (xxxix.)—Customs Act 1901-1950, (No. 6 of 1901—No. 56 of 1950), ss. 203, 229, 262. Customs—Forfeiture—Seizure of goods in hands of bona-fide purchaser for value—Customs Act 1901-1950 (No. 6 of 1901—No. 56 of 1950).
Decisions
DIXON C.J. This matter is a reference from a judge sitting in the original jurisdiction dealing with a matter coming before him in consequence of ss. 38A and 40A of the Judiciary Act 1903-1950. (at p174)
2. The matter came before his Honour, Mr. Justice McTiernan, who, having heard some argument, made an order that it be referred to the Full Court to consider all inter se questions arising upon the evidence adduced at the hearing of the case before the Supreme Court. The proceeding is an action instituted in the Supreme Court in the ordinary way by writ of summons. The action was by the purchaser of a motor car against the vendor and the cause of action was based on The Sale of Goods Act of 1896 (Q.). The provision of The Sale of Goods Act upon which the cause of action arose was the familiar one which entitles the buyer of goods to an implied warranty that he shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods he takes under the sale. The motor car was seized in the hands of the purchaser by the Customs as goods forfeited to the Crown pursuant to s. 229 of the Customs Act 1901-1950. The car was an American automobile which was imported in 1950. It was actually landed on or about 24th April 1950, by one Doyle. It would appear that Doyle had not at that time a licence for the importation of the goods and under the Customs (Import Licensing) Regulations such a licence was necessary. He did, however, obtain one, and the goods after entry for home consumption, pursuant to the licence, were delivered out of the control of the Customs. It would seem that in obtaining the licence he made a representation which subsequently the Customs authorities came to regard as untrue. At all events, he was prosecuted under three informations upon which he was convicted. (at p175)
3. The first conviction was for that on 2nd May 1950, he, Doyle, did mislead an officer in a particular likely to affect the discharge of his duty, in that in relation to an application for a licence, pursuant to the Customs (Import Licensing) Regulations, he did represent to such officer that a certain Buick 1949 second-hand car was a bona-fide gift to him from a certain person, whereas the fact was that the motor car was not a bona-fide gift to him from that person. (at p175)
4. The second information was for that he did make on the same date…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Continue reading Burton v Honan
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
AGLC
Burton v Honan [1952] HCA 30
Case
[1952] HCA 30
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia considered a dispute concerning the forfeiture of goods under the *Customs Act 1901-1950*. The case involved Mr. Burton, who had purchased goods that were subsequently seized by customs authorities. The core of the dispute revolved around whether these goods, acquired by Mr. Burton in good faith and for valuable consideration, could be lawfully forfeited.
The Court was required to determine the validity of the forfeiture provisions of the *Customs Act* as they applied to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the Act, in authorising the forfeiture of such goods, was consistent with the Commonwealth's constitutional powers, particularly those relating to customs and excise, and the acquisition of property on just terms.
The Court reasoned that the *Customs Act* validly provided for the forfeiture of goods involved in customs offences, irrespective of whether the current possessor was a bona fide purchaser for value. It was held that the power to legislate with respect to customs, granted by section 51(ii) of the Constitution, extended to enacting laws that ensured the effective collection of duties and the prevention of evasion, which included forfeiture as a deterrent and a means of recovering revenue. The Court found no inconsistency with section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, as the forfeiture provisions did not constitute an acquisition of property by the Commonwealth in the relevant sense, but rather a consequence of the goods being involved in a contravention of the Act.