Silbert v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

STUART ANTHONY SILBERT (as Executor of the
Estate of Stephen Retteghy deceased)  APPLICANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA  RESPONDENT

Silbert v Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia

[2004] HCA 9
Date of Order:  9 December 2003
Date of Publication of Reasons:  3 March 2004
P16/2002

ORDER

Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia

Representation:

M J Buss QC with M M N Byrne for the applicant (instructed by Talbot & Olivier)

R J Meadows QC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia, with C J Thatcher for the respondent and intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia (instructed by Crown Solicitor for the State of Western Australia)

H C Burmester QC, Acting Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with C J Horan intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

P A Keane QC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland, with G R Cooper intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland (instructed by Crown Law Division, Department of Justice)

M G Sexton SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales, with K M Guilfoyle intervening on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales (instructed by Crown Solicitor for New South Wales)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ, McHUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ.   On 9 December 2003 the Court ordered that this application for special leave be dismissed.  What follows are our reasons for joining in that order.

  2. The applicant sought special leave to appeal to contend that the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988 (WA) ("the Confiscation Act") is invalid in its operation in relation to the estates of deceased persons who before death had been charged with, but not convicted of, serious crimes. The Confiscation Act has been repealed[1] since the application to the Supreme Court of Western Australia in this matter, but it continues to operate in respect of that application[2].  It is convenient therefore to continue to speak of it in the present tense.

    [2]Criminal Property Confiscation (Consequential Provisions) Act, s 6.

  3. Section 6(1) of the Confiscation Act provides that "[w]here a person is convicted of a serious offence" an appropriate officer may, subject to some qualifications not now relevant, apply to the Supreme Court of Western Australia, or to the court before which the person was convicted of the offence, for one or both of a forfeiture order in respect of particular property and a pecuniary penalty order.

  4. Section 3(2) of the Confiscation Act identifies four cases in which "[f]or the purposes of this Act, a person is to be taken to have been convicted of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Silbert v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] HCA 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, brought by Mr Silbert against the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA). The dispute arose from provisions within Western Australia's *Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988* (WA) which, in circumstances where a person charged with a "serious offence" died before their charge was finally determined, deemed that person to have been convicted of that offence. This deeming provision was relied upon by the Director to seek pecuniary penalty and forfeiture orders. The applicant argued that these provisions were constitutionally invalid.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the deeming provisions of the *Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988* (WA) were invalid by reason of being repugnant to the judicial power of the Commonwealth, as established by the principles in *Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)*. Specifically, the court had to determine if the State Act, by deeming a conviction without a court making an inquiry into guilt, amounted to a parliamentary determination of guilt and imposition of a conviction, thereby precluding a court from exercising its judicial function.

The High Court, in dismissing the application for special leave to appeal, implicitly upheld the decision of the majority of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. While the specific reasoning of the High Court is not detailed in the provided text, the context indicates that the deeming provisions were not considered to attract the *Kable* principle. This suggests the Court found that the State Parliament's legislative action, while impacting the process of confiscation, did not impermissibly intrude upon the essential nature of the judicial process or the constitutional separation of powers in a way that rendered the State law invalid. The Court's approach involved construing the legislation and considering its substance, rather than merely its form, in light of constitutional implications.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The reasoning of the majority in Kable was possibly complicated by the references made in their reasons to a suggested consideration of public perception about, and confidence in, the integrity of the courts[35]. Public perception represents a consideration obviously difficult for judges to ascertain objectively and with complete certainty[36]. Properly analysed, I do not consider that this consideration was a criterion for the operation of the constitutional principle expressed in Kable. Instead, I regard it as a description of the likely outcome, in relation to the integrated Judicature provided by the Constitution, unless the principle in Kable is respected by the legislatures and executive governments of the nation and upheld, where necessary, by the courts. Judges should accept the responsibility of stating what is, or is not, inconsistent with (or repugnant to) judicial process – a subject upon which they have both knowledge and experience. They should not feel bound to invoke the fiction of public perceptions to explain or justify such conclusions.[35]See Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 108 per Gaudron J, 118-119 per McHugh J, 133 per Gummow J. See also Mann v O'Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 at 245 per Gummow J.[36]The reference to "public perception" as a criterion of constitutional validity was criticised by Brennan CJ in Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 at 197 [37] with whom, at 275-276 [242], Hayne J agreed.Approach, relevant facts and legislation Do the deeming provisions of the Act, challenged in this application, attract the Kable principle so explained? Clearly, the rule in Kable is not one confined to the extraordinary legislation that was considered in that case. The rule, as expounded by the majority in Kable, is one of general application[37]. I also accept that the rule requires attention to considerations of matters of substance, as befits an implication derived from the Constitution. It is not one confined to matters of form or to the mere expression of legislation, viewed in isolation. I further accept that the orthodox approach of this Court, where constitutional invalidity is charged, applies. In such cases, the first function of a judge is to construe the impugned legislation – to understand what it says and what it does not say[38]. [37]Fairfax (2000) 158 FLR 81 at 84 [15]; cf Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 at 167.[38]Bank of NSW v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1 at 186; R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535 at 565 [66]; Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000) 202 CLR 629 at 662 [81]. The background facts in the application were uncontested. They are stated in detail in the joint reasons in this Court, sufficient for the needs of my opinion[39]. The essential provisions of the Act are mentioned there, in addition to s 3(2) and (5) of the Act, which I have quoted[40]. [39]The joint reasons at [2]-[7].[40]The joint reasons at [3]-[4]. See above at [17]-[18].Points of distinction from the joint reasons Repeal of the Act is not significant: I would not assign any weight, in resolving this application, to the fact that the Act has now been repealed[41]. I say this for three reasons. [41]The joint reasons at [14].

Decision

Reasons for decision

HUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ KIRBY J (dissent)
Where a law intrudes into the traditional area of the courts, this Court should be vigilant lest there be a case of legislative excess or repugnancy. The Constitution, as it has been interpreted, so provides[18]. Unless the courts are vigilant, there is a risk that bad precedents, sanctioned by judicial endorsement, will undermine and erode important constitutional assumptions. Matters traditionally decided by courts of law, that are independent and impartial, may then come to be decided elsewhere, contrary to the express constitutional provisions and to constitutional implications.[18]See Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 27.The issue and the decision of the Full Court The fundamental question presented by the application for special leave is therefore whether the present is an instance where the language of the Act, to which the applicant objected, in terms of what it provided and what it might grow into, justified the intervention of this Court. In the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Wallwork J dissented[19]. By reference to observations of this Court in Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth (War Crimes Act Case)[20], Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan[21], Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)[22] and Nicholas v The Queen[23], his Honour concluded that the deeming provisions of the Act, complained of by the applicant, were "repugnant to judicial process"[24] and thus "inoperative because they were inconsistent with the proper exercise of the judicial power of the Supreme Court of Western Australia"[25]. The majority in the Full Court (Owen and Steytler JJ) disagreed. They upheld the validity of the State Act[26]. It is from the order that followed the majority conclusion that the present application was brought.[19]Silbert v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2002) 25 WAR 330.[20](1991) 172 CLR 501 at 704.[21](1989) 166 CLR 518 at 580.[22](1996) 189 CLR 51 at 102-106, 131.[23](1998) 193 CLR 173 at 186 [16], 208 [73].[24]Silbert (2002) 25 WAR 330 at 339 [51], citing Gummow J in Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 134.[25]Silbert (2002) 25 WAR 330 at 340 [53].[26]Silbert (2002) 25 WAR 330 at 347-348 [85]-[86].The principle in Kable's case On the return of the application, an attempt was made to rely upon – and to clarify – the principle of the federal Constitution, upheld by this Court in Kable[27]. The basic concept in Kable is relatively simple. In my view, the essential ways in which it is expressed by the members of the majority in that decision are not very different from each other, despite complaints to that effect by some judges in intermediate courts[28]. The constitutional implication expressed in Kable has not, so far, attracted enthusiastic application by intermediate courts, although constitutional implications are inherent in the task of construing a written constitution. Some implications are very well established in Australia[29]. Other, even new, implications are occasionally embraced with judicial alacrity[30]. The cases in which Kable has been argued in State and Territory courts were drawn to this Court's attention[31]. In only one case has an argument based on Kable succeeded at that level[32]. Appeals or applications to this Court are pending in some other cases.[27](1996) 189 CLR 51.[28]See R v Moffatt [1998] 2 VR 229 at 249-250 per Hayne JA (referred to in Silbert (2002) 25 WAR 330 at 347 [84]) and John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) (2000) 158 FLR 81 at 111 [169] per Meagher JA.[29]For example Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31; R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254.[30]As in Austin v The Commonwealth (2003) 77 ALJR 491; 195 ALR 321.[31]See Johnston and Hardcastle, "State Courts: The Limits of Kable", (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review 216. [32]In Re Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002 (Q) [2003] QCA 249 (Court of Appeal per Williams JA, White and Wilson JJ).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HUGH, GUMMOW, HAYNE, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ,

The central issue in Silbert v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) was whether the deeming provision in the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988 (WA) amounted to a legislative determination of guilt and imposition of conviction. The court had to consider whether the deeming provision precluded the court from making any or sufficient inquiry into whether the deceased committed the offence, whether it invoked the principles established in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), and if it was inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Furthermore, the court had to determine if the deeming provision in the Act amounted to an intrusion into the traditional area of the courts, and if it was repugnant to judicial process and therefore inoperative. The majority in the Full Court upheld the validity of the State Act, while Wallwork J dissented, considering the deeming provisions to be repugnant to judicial process and inconsistent with the proper exercise of the judicial power of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

In determining whether the deeming provision in the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988 (WA) amounted to a legislative determination of guilt and imposition of conviction, the court considered the principle in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW). The court held that the deeming provision did not amount to a legislative determination of guilt and imposition of conviction, as it did not preclude the court from making any or sufficient inquiry into whether the deceased committed the offence. The court held that the deeming provision was not inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court of Western Australia, as it did not intrude into the traditional area of the courts.

The court also considered whether the deeming provision invoked the principles established in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW). The court held that the deeming provision did not invoke the principles in Kable, as it did not amount to a legislative determination of guilt and imposition of conviction. The court held that the deeming provision was not repugnant to judicial process and therefore not inoperative, as it did not preclude the court from making any or sufficient inquiry into whether the deceased committed the offence.

The court held that the deeming provisions of the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988 (WA) were not repugnant to judicial process and therefore not inoperative. The court held that the deeming provision did not amount to a legislative determination of guilt and imposition of conviction, as it did not preclude the court from making any or sufficient inquiry into whether the deceased committed the offence. The court held that the deeming provision was not inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court of Western Australia, as it did not intrude into the traditional area of the courts.

The ratio decidendi of the case is that the deeming provision in the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1988 (WA) does not amount to a legislative determination of guilt and imposition of conviction, and is not repugnant to judicial process and therefore not inoperative. The court distinguished the deeming provision in the Act from the extraordinary legislation considered in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), holding that the deeming provision did not intrude into the traditional area of the courts and was not inconsistent with the exercise of judicial power by the Supreme Court of Western Australia.