Emmerson v The Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors [2013] NTCA 04
PARTIES: EMMERSON, Reginald William
v
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
and
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
and
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
TITLE OF COURT: COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:AP 9 of 2012
(21107399)
DELIVERED: 28 MARCH 2013
HEARING DATES: 8 & 9 NOVEMBER 2012
JUDGMENT OF: RILEY CJ, KELLY & BARR JJ
APPEALED FROM: SOUTHWOOD J
No 20 of 2011 (21107399)
CATCHWORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW —Acquisition of property — Criminal property forfeiture — Whether forfeiture of property that is not ‘crime-used’ or ‘crime-derived’ is acquisition of property without just terms — Whether sufficient connection between crime and property — Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) s 50(1) —Constitution s 51(xxxi) — Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) s 36A — Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) s 94(1).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Judicial power — Kable principle — Institutional integrity of courts — Defining characteristics of courts — Whether declaration that a person is a “drug trafficker” impedes institutional integrity — Whether judges have “decisional independence” when making a declaration — Whether declaration involves a justiciable controversy — Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) s 36A.
CRIMINAL LAW — Criminal property forfeiture — Application for declaration that respondent is a drug trafficker — Whether declaration is a pronouncement of fact or form of declaratory relief — Whether civil or criminal proceedings — Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) s 36A.
CRIMINAL LAW — Criminal property forfeiture — Forfeiture application — Quantum of forfeiture — Whether value of property forfeited must be proportionate to cost of deterring, detecting and prosecuting criminal activities of offender — Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) s 10(2).
CRIMINAL LAW — Criminal property forfeiture — Forfeiture application — Whether criminal proceedings against respondent had been “finally determined” — Whether restraining order ceased to have effect — Criminal Property ForfeitureAct 2002 (NT) s 52(3).
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:A Wyvill SC with N Aughterson
First and Second
Respondents: R Jobson
Attorney-General
for the Northern Territory: M Grant QC (Solicitor-General) with
R Bruxner
Solicitors:
Appellant:Ward Keller
Respondents: Solicitor for the Northern Territory
Judgment category classification: A
Judgment ID Number: Ril1303
Number of pages: 73
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWINEmmerson v The Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors [2013] NTCA 04
No. AP 9 of 2012
BETWEEN:
REGINALD WILLIAM EMMERSON
Appellant
AND:
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
First Respondent
AND:
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
Second RespondentAND:
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
Intervener
CORAM: RILEY CJ, KELLY & BARR JJ
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 28 March 2013)
Riley CJ:
Introduction
On 15 August 2011 the appellant was declared to be a “drug trafficker” pursuant to s 36A(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. By virtue of that declaration the property of the appellant, which had previously been made the subject of a restraining order, was…
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- Case
- [2013] NTCA 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the statutory scheme that required the court to declare a person a "drug trafficker" upon certain criteria being met was constitutional. Specifically, the court had to decide if such a declaration, which could lead to property forfeiture, violated the principles of judicial independence and institutional integrity. Additionally, the court had to interpret whether the declaration was a factual finding or a form of declaratory relief and whether it involved a justiciable controversy. The proportionality of the property forfeiture in relation to the deterrence, detection, and prosecution costs of the criminal activities was also examined.
The court held that the statutory scheme improperly involved the Supreme Court in legislative policy and executive decision-making, thereby compromising the independence and institutional integrity of the court. The court found that the mandatory declaration of a person as a "drug trafficker" without sufficient evidence undermined judicial decisional independence and was inconsistent with the Kable principle. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the declaration made by Southwood J on 15 August 2012 was set aside. The respondent’s application for a declaration under s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) was dismissed.
The court’s reasoning was grounded in the importance of maintaining the independence of the judiciary and the principle that courts should not be used to give effect to legislative policy or executive decisions. The decision emphasized that the statutory scheme, which required the court to make declarations leading to property forfeiture, was unconstitutional to the extent it depended on the Supreme Court’s role in making such declarations.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant referred to the recent decision of Kourakis CJ in Bell v Police[40] as providing support for the argument of the appellant in this regard. However, reference to the scheme established under the legislation considered in those proceedings reveals a materially different statutory scheme from that now under consideration.[41]Was the restraining order in effect at the time of the declaration? It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that, as a result of the operation of s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act, the restraining order imposed in this matter ceased to have effect on 22 September 2011 when the criminal proceedings relied on to support the restraining order were “finally determined”. It was submitted that, in the present case at the time of the declaration of the appellant as a drug trafficker, there was no property subject to a restraining order within the meaning of s 94(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act and therefore no property which could be the subject of forfeiture. The relevant subsection is as follows:(3)If a restraining order has been issued under section 44(1)(a) in relation to property of a person who has been charged, or who was to be charged and a charge has been laid within 21 days after the date of the order, the order ceases to have effect: (a)if the charge is finally determined but the person is not declared under section 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act to be a drug trafficker; or (b)if the charge is disposed of without being determined. It was submitted that this provision imports a temporal limitation and to determine otherwise would be to create uncertainty in relation to property rights. It was argued that, in the absence of such a limitation, people wishing to deal with the property would have no way of knowing whether or not, at some future time, an application for a declaration under s 36A might be made or when the restraining order might expire.[42] A range of arguments was pressed in support of the submission. The same submissions were also pressed before the learned trial Judge and were rejected. His Honour concluded that there was no temporal limitation attached to the subsection and there is nothing in the wording of the subsection to require that the declaration must be sought and made contemporaneously with the final disposition of the relevant charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act. His Honour observed that the subsection caters for situations where, notwithstanding the determination of the charge, a declaration that a person is a drug trafficker is not made. This would arise where there was a finding of not guilty, a failure by the DPP to prove other relevant criteria or a discontinuance or withdrawal or dismissal of the application. In those circumstances the restraining order would cease to have effect without the need for further order of the Court. A consideration of the legislative scheme lends support to the conclusions of his Honour. The legislative scheme allows the DPP to seek a restraining order at a time prior to the criteria for a declaration of a person as a drug trafficker becoming available. At the time of the application the person may not have been charged with the final offence or the charge may not have been finalised. The purpose of the restraining order is to preserve the property. The duration of the order is for the period set by the Court and the Court may extend the period on as many occasions as it sees fit.[43]