Emmerson v Director of Public Prosecutions

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Emmerson v The Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors [2013] NTCA 04

PARTIES:  EMMERSON, Reginald William

v

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

and

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

and

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:AP 9 of 2012

(21107399)

DELIVERED:  28 MARCH 2013

HEARING DATES:  8 & 9 NOVEMBER 2012

JUDGMENT OF:  RILEY CJ, KELLY & BARR JJ

APPEALED FROM:  SOUTHWOOD J

No 20 of 2011 (21107399)

CATCHWORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW —Acquisition of property — Criminal property forfeiture — Whether forfeiture of property that is not ‘crime-used’ or ‘crime-derived’ is acquisition of property without just terms — Whether sufficient connection between crime and property — Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) s 50(1) —Constitution s 51(xxxi) — Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) s 36A — Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) s 94(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Judicial power — Kable principle — Institutional integrity of courts — Defining characteristics of courts — Whether declaration that a person is a “drug trafficker” impedes institutional integrity — Whether judges have “decisional independence” when making a declaration — Whether declaration involves a justiciable controversy — Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) s 36A.

CRIMINAL LAW — Criminal property forfeiture — Application for declaration that respondent is a drug trafficker — Whether declaration is a pronouncement of fact or form of declaratory relief — Whether civil or criminal proceedings — Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) s 36A.

CRIMINAL LAW — Criminal property forfeiture — Forfeiture application — Quantum of forfeiture — Whether value of property forfeited must be proportionate to cost of deterring, detecting and prosecuting criminal activities of offender — Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT) s 10(2).

CRIMINAL LAW — Criminal property forfeiture — Forfeiture application — Whether criminal proceedings against respondent had been “finally determined” — Whether restraining order ceased to have effect — Criminal Property ForfeitureAct 2002 (NT) s 52(3).

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:A Wyvill SC with N Aughterson

First and Second

Respondents:  R Jobson

Attorney-General

for the Northern Territory:         M Grant QC (Solicitor-General) with


R Bruxner

Solicitors:

Appellant:Ward Keller

Respondents:  Solicitor for the Northern Territory

Judgment category classification:    A

Judgment ID Number:  Ril1303

Number of pages:  73

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

Emmerson v The Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors [2013] NTCA 04

No. AP 9 of 2012

BETWEEN:

REGINALD WILLIAM EMMERSON

Appellant

AND:

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

First Respondent

AND:

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
    Second Respondent

AND:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
    Intervener

CORAM:     RILEY CJ, KELLY & BARR JJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 28 March 2013)

Riley CJ:

Introduction

  1. On 15 August 2011 the appellant was declared to be a “drug trafficker” pursuant to s 36A(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.  By virtue of that declaration the property of the appellant, which had previously been made the subject of a restraining order, was…

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Details
Case
[2013] NTCA 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Emmerson v Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant sought to challenge the constitutional validity of certain statutory provisions and their application in his case. Emmerson was declared a "drug trafficker" under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1990 (NT) based on prior convictions for drug-related offences. The declaration led to the forfeiture of his property under the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act 2002 (NT). Emmerson argued that the requirement for the court to make the declaration without sufficient evidence infringed upon judicial independence and the institutional integrity of the courts.

The court was tasked with determining whether the statutory scheme that required the court to declare a person a "drug trafficker" upon certain criteria being met was constitutional. Specifically, the court had to decide if such a declaration, which could lead to property forfeiture, violated the principles of judicial independence and institutional integrity. Additionally, the court had to interpret whether the declaration was a factual finding or a form of declaratory relief and whether it involved a justiciable controversy. The proportionality of the property forfeiture in relation to the deterrence, detection, and prosecution costs of the criminal activities was also examined.

The court held that the statutory scheme improperly involved the Supreme Court in legislative policy and executive decision-making, thereby compromising the independence and institutional integrity of the court. The court found that the mandatory declaration of a person as a "drug trafficker" without sufficient evidence undermined judicial decisional independence and was inconsistent with the Kable principle. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the declaration made by Southwood J on 15 August 2012 was set aside. The respondent’s application for a declaration under s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) was dismissed.

The court’s reasoning was grounded in the importance of maintaining the independence of the judiciary and the principle that courts should not be used to give effect to legislative policy or executive decisions. The decision emphasized that the statutory scheme, which required the court to make declarations leading to property forfeiture, was unconstitutional to the extent it depended on the Supreme Court’s role in making such declarations.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The legislative scheme involves the courts in three separate areas. The first is in determining the guilt or otherwise of the person of offences referred to in s 36A(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. The second is, on the application of the DPP, to determine whether to make a restraining order in relation to the property of the person as permitted under s 44 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. The third is, on the application of the DPP, to determine whether the person fulfils the criteria provided in s 36A(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act and, if that be so, to declare the person to be a “drug trafficker”. The Court is not called upon to make any orders for forfeiture of property. Forfeiture occurs by operation of s 94 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act and without further involvement of the Court.(a) Declaration of facts which may not be true. Subsections 36A(1) to (3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act are in the following terms:36A Declared drug trafficker (1)The Director of Public Prosecutions may apply to the Supreme Court for a declaration that a person is a drug trafficker. (2)An application under subsection (1) may be made at the time of a hearing for an offence or at any other time. (3)On hearing an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions under subsection (1), the court must declare a person to be a drug trafficker if: (a)the person has been found guilty by the court of an offence referred to in subsection (6) that was committed after the commencement of this section; and (b)subject to subsection (5), in the 10 years prior to the day on which the offence was committed (or the first day on which the offence was committed, as the case requires), the person has been found guilty: (i)on 2 or more occasions of an offence corresponding to an offence referred to in subsection (6); or (ii)on one occasion of 2 (or more) separate charges relating to separate offences of which 2 or more correspond to an offence or offences referred to in subsection (6). The declaration of a person as a “drug trafficker” pursuant to this section does not necessarily mean that the person is, in fact, a drug trafficker as that expression is widely understood. For example, it would be sufficient if the person had been convicted on three separate occasions, over a ten-year period, of possessing 50g of cannabis on each occasion without there being any suggestion of the person actually trafficking in drugs. The Court does not consider whether the person in fact trades in illegal drugs or buys and sells illegal drugs or is commercially involved in illegal drugs. However, in most cases, the declaration that a person is a drug trafficker will be made in relation to a person who fits the description in common parlance. It is the submission of the appellant that the declaration of a person as “a drug trafficker” is both stigmatic and a significant act of legal and social censure. It is a mark of disapproval by society. The appellant submitted that the requirement imposed upon the Court to make a declaration of fact (ie the offender is a drug trafficker) without proof of the fact to be declared and where there is likelihood that the fact may be false is “inconsistent with the subsistence of judicial decisional independence”[29] as “[d]ecisional independence is a necessary condition of impartiality”.[30] The appellant submitted that the appearance created by the scheme is that the forfeiture of the property arises from the exercise by the Court of its judicial function in making a declaration that a respondent is a drug trafficker. It was submitted that the legislation clothed a statutory forfeiture scheme with the appearance of judicial process. It was further argued that the effect of this section is to subject the Court to direction by the Executive in the performance of the uniquely judicial function of quelling controversies by the ascertainment of facts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion the overlapping legislative scheme involves the enlistment of the Supreme Court, to an impermissible extent, to give effect to legislative policy and executive decision-making. It impinges upon the independence of the Supreme Court and thereby undermines its institutional integrity. The scheme is invalid, to the extent it depends upon the Supreme Court’s declaration under s 36A Misuse of Drugs Act. Conclusion The appeal should be allowed. The declaration made by Southwood J on 15 August 2012 that the appellant is a drug trafficker should be set aside and the respondent’s application for a declaration under s 36A Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) should be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant referred to the recent decision of Kourakis CJ in Bell v Police[40] as providing support for the argument of the appellant in this regard. However, reference to the scheme established under the legislation considered in those proceedings reveals a materially different statutory scheme from that now under consideration.[41]Was the restraining order in effect at the time of the declaration? It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that, as a result of the operation of s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act, the restraining order imposed in this matter ceased to have effect on 22 September 2011 when the criminal proceedings relied on to support the restraining order were “finally determined”. It was submitted that, in the present case at the time of the declaration of the appellant as a drug trafficker, there was no property subject to a restraining order within the meaning of s 94(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act and therefore no property which could be the subject of forfeiture. The relevant subsection is as follows:(3)If a restraining order has been issued under section 44(1)(a) in relation to property of a person who has been charged, or who was to be charged and a charge has been laid within 21 days after the date of the order, the order ceases to have effect: (a)if the charge is finally determined but the person is not declared under section 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act to be a drug trafficker; or (b)if the charge is disposed of without being determined. It was submitted that this provision imports a temporal limitation and to determine otherwise would be to create uncertainty in relation to property rights. It was argued that, in the absence of such a limitation, people wishing to deal with the property would have no way of knowing whether or not, at some future time, an application for a declaration under s 36A might be made or when the restraining order might expire.[42] A range of arguments was pressed in support of the submission. The same submissions were also pressed before the learned trial Judge and were rejected. His Honour concluded that there was no temporal limitation attached to the subsection and there is nothing in the wording of the subsection to require that the declaration must be sought and made contemporaneously with the final disposition of the relevant charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act. His Honour observed that the subsection caters for situations where, notwithstanding the determination of the charge, a declaration that a person is a drug trafficker is not made. This would arise where there was a finding of not guilty, a failure by the DPP to prove other relevant criteria or a discontinuance or withdrawal or dismissal of the application. In those circumstances the restraining order would cease to have effect without the need for further order of the Court. A consideration of the legislative scheme lends support to the conclusions of his Honour. The legislative scheme allows the DPP to seek a restraining order at a time prior to the criteria for a declaration of a person as a drug trafficker becoming available. At the time of the application the person may not have been charged with the final offence or the charge may not have been finalised. The purpose of the restraining order is to preserve the property. The duration of the order is for the period set by the Court and the Court may extend the period on as many occasions as it sees fit.[43]