Director of Public Prosecutions v Emmerson

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DPP v Emmerson & Anor [2012] NTSC 60

PARTIES:THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

v

EMMERSON, Reginald William

And:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:20 of 2011 (21107399)

DELIVERED:  15 August 2012

HEARING DATES:  20, 21 and 22 February 2012

JUDGMENT OF:  SOUTHWOOD J

CATCHWORDS:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Criminal Property Forfeiture Act s 94(1) and s 36A Misuse of Drugs Act – whether invalid – Kable principle – whether s 94(1) invalid as an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms – Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) s 50(1); Constitution (Cth) s 51(xxxi)

CRIMINAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE - Criminal Property Forfeiture Act – validity of legislation -- whether institutional integrity of the Court impaired.

CRIMINAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE – application for declaration of respondent as drug trafficker under s 36A Misuse of Drugs Act – whether declaration is a pronouncement of fact or form of declaratory relief – whether civil or criminal proceedings.

CRIMINAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE – forfeiture application – nexus between forfeited property and criminal conduct of respondent – whether substantial connection necessary.

CRIMINAL PROPERTY FORFEITURE – forfeiture application - quantum of forfeiture – nexus between value of property forfeited and cost of police operations - whether unfair or unjust to respondent.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Criminal Property Forfeiture Act – s 52(3) - whether criminal proceedings against respondent had been ‘finally determined’ – whether restraining order ceased to have effect.

Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (NT) s 3, s 7, s 8(1)(a), s 8(2), s 8(3), s 10(2), s 41(2), s 42, s 44, s 44(1), s 44(1)(a), s 44(2), s 44(3), s 46, s 51, s 52(3), s 59, s 62(1), s 63, s 64, s 65, s 94, s 94(1), s 136, s 146

Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) s 5, s 9(2)(e), s 20, s 36A

Misuse of Drugs Act (WA) s 32A, 36A(3)

Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) s 50(1)

Supreme Court Act s 51, s 53

Supreme Court Rules 23.01(c)

Aboriginal Legal Services Ltd v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 69 FCR 565
Airservices Australia v Canadian Airlines (1999) 202 CLR 133
Apollo Shower Screens Pty Ltd v Building and Construction Industry Long Service Payments Corp (1985) 1 NSWLR 561
Attorney-General (NT) v Chaffey (2007) 231 CLR 651
Austin v United States (1993) 509 US 602
Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513
Burnett v DPP (2007) 21 NTLR 39
Burton v Honan (1952) 86 CLR 169
Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co (1974) 416 US 663
R v Carpentieri  (2001) 81 SASR 164
Cohen v The State of Western Australia (No 2) [2007] WASCA 279
Della Petrona v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (1995) 38 NSWLR 257
Dickfoss v Director of Public Prosecutions and Ors (2012) 31 NTLR 16
Director of Public Prosecutions v Gary Wayne Atkinson [2011] NTSC 73
Director of Public Prosecutions v Hennig

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Details
Case
[2012] NTSC 60
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Director of Public Prosecutions v Emmerson, which came before the Supreme Court, involved a dispute regarding the validity and application of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act and its interaction with the Misuse of Drugs Act. The court was tasked with determining whether the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act sections 94(1) and 36A were invalid under the Constitution, whether a declaration of being a drug trafficker constituted a pronouncement of fact or declaratory relief, the necessity of a substantial connection between forfeited property and criminal conduct, the fairness of the quantum of forfeiture in relation to the cost of police operations, and the interpretation of the term "finally determined" in the context of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. The court also needed to consider whether the restraining order remained in effect and the implications of the Kable principle on the institutional integrity of the court.

The court addressed the validity of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act, specifically sections 94(1) and 36A, under the Constitution. It examined whether these sections were unconstitutional as they might impair the institutional integrity of the court or as an acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms. The court also scrutinised the nature of the declaration of being a drug trafficker, considering whether it was a pronouncement of fact or a form of declaratory relief, and whether it was part of civil or criminal proceedings. The court further assessed the necessity of a substantial connection between the forfeited property and the respondent's criminal conduct and the fairness of the quantum of the forfeiture in relation to the cost of police operations. Additionally, the court interpreted the term "finally determined" in the context of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act and its impact on the restraining order.

The Supreme Court found that the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act sections 94(1) and 36A were valid and did not impair the institutional integrity of the court. The court held that the declaration of being a drug trafficker was a form of declaratory relief and part of criminal proceedings. It concluded that there was no requirement for a substantial connection between the forfeited property and the criminal conduct of the respondent. The court also determined that the quantum of forfeiture was fair and did not constitute an unfair or unjust acquisition of property. Furthermore, the court interpreted "finally determined" to mean that the restraining order ceased to have effect once the criminal proceedings were finally determined.

The court ordered that the application to set aside the restraining order was dismissed, and the respondent's objections under section 59 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act were also dismissed. The court declared that Reginald William Emmerson was a drug trafficker, satisfying the criteria outlined in section 36A(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Emmerson has also taken a number of other steps to try and prevent his property being forfeited to the Northern Territory. Under s 59 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act he has objected to the restraining order on similar grounds to those stated in par [5] above. By summons he has applied to set aside the restraining order on the ground that it would be unfair and unjust for his property to be forfeited to the Northern Territory. By reason of s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act it was also submitted that the restraining order made by Mildren J on 11 April 2011 ceased to have effect on 22 September 2011 when the criminal proceedings which resulted in his most recent convictions were “finally determined”. Accordingly, it was submitted that there is no property which is owned or controlled by him which is subject to a restraining order within the meaning of s 94(1) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act (NT). Therefore s 94(1) cannot operate in this case and the application for a declaration that Mr Emmerson is a drug trafficker is futile.The facts Mr Emmerson is 55 years of age. He was born on 28 July 1957 in Lismore, New South Wales. He attended high school at Home Hill in Queensland. When he left High School he became an apprentice plumber at the Inkerman Sugar Mill. He has been in meaningful and remunerative employment for most of his adult life. From time to time he has operated his own businesses and he has played in and managed musical bands which performed in the Northern Territory and Western Australia. In 2010 Mr Emmerson seriously injured his back at work and he received worker’s compensation. His lower back pain continues to this day. He also suffers from depression which is related to his work injury. He is prescribed medication for back pain and depression. Since he was 16 years of age Mr Emmerson has on various occasions possessed, misused and supplied dangerous drugs. Up until 2006 he smoked cannabis. In 2006 he was introduced to amphetamines and in 2008 he was introduced to the crystal methamphetamine known as “ice”. He became addicted to crystal methamphetamine. He has been convicted of a number of drug offences both in the Northern Territory and interstate including the following offences which are relevant to this application. On 17 August 2007 Mr Emmerson was convicted by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Darwin of the following offences which he committed on 28 February 2007.1.Unlawful possession of 5.9 grams of MDMA which is a trafficable quantity of the dangerous drug, contrary to s 9(1) and s (2)(e) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.2.Unlawful possession of methyl amphetamine contrary to s 9(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.3.Unlawful possession of lysergic acid contrary to s 9(1) and s (2)(c)(i) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.4.Unlawful possession of cannabis plant material contrary to s 9(1) and (2)(f)(ii) of the Misuse of Drugs Act.5.Administering MDMA, methyl amphetamine and cannabis to himself contrary to s 13 of the Misuse of Drugs Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Subsection 52(3) is to be construed in the context of s 51 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act and s 36A of the Misuse of Drugs Act. Neither of those sections is expressed to be subject to s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act. Section 51 provides as follows. A restraining order under s 44 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act has effect for the period set by the Court when the order is made. The Court that made the restraining order may extend the duration of the order for a further period on as many occasions as the court sees fit. Subsection 36A(2) Misuse of Drugs Act states that an application for a declaration that a person is a drug trafficker may be made at the time of the hearing for an offence or at any other time. The purpose of s 52(3) of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act is simply to provide for the cessation of a restraining order in circumstances where a declaration that a person is a drug trafficker is not made by the Court without the need for any further order. It would cause great inconvenience in sentencing proceedings if the Court was required to interpose and deal with a civil application after a finding of guilt but before the pronouncement of a sentence. If there was any undue delay by the Director of Public Prosecutions in filing an application for a declaration the position of the respondent may be protected by bringing an application to strike out the restraining order for want of prosecution or by staying the application for a declaration.Conclusion In the circumstances, I make the following orders. The application to set aside the restraining order is dismissed. The respondent’s amended objections under s 59 of the Criminal Property Forfeiture Act are dismissed. I am satisfied that the matters specified in s 36A(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act are proven in this case and I declare that Reginald William Emmerson is a drug trafficker.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established