Madden v Regina

Case [2014] NSWCCA 291


Court of Criminal Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Madden v Regina [2014] NSWCCA 291
Hearing dates:20 November 2014
Decision date: 20 November 2014
Before: Simpson J at[1]
Price J at [1]
McCallum J at [1]
Decision:

Publication of reserved reasons for refusing leave to appeal.

Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - appeal - application for leave to appeal against decision refusing to quash part of indictment - statutory construction - whether a motorcycle is capable of being "property" within the meaning of s 193D Crimes Act - meaning of the phrase "other valuables" - whether confined to small items of personal property
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900
Criminal Appeal Act 1912
Confiscation of Proceedings of Crime Amendment Act 2005
Cases Cited: Murphy v Farmer [1988] HCA 31; (1988) 165 CLR 19
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Christopher Madden (appellant)
Regina (respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
P Lange, A Martin (applicant)
J Girdham SC (Crown)
Solicitors:
Hansons Lawyers (applicant)
S Thompson - Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
File Number(s):2013/14782
Publication restriction:None
 Decision under appeal 
Jurisdiction:
9101
Date of Decision:
2014-07-14 00:00:00
Before:
Syme DCJ
File Number(s):
2013/14782

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: Christopher Madden was arraigned in the District Court on an indictment alleging two counts of dealing with property that subsequently became an instrument of crime, contrary to s 193D(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. By notice of motion filed 17 June 2014, an application was made to have the indictment permanently stayed. During the hearing of the motion, the application was varied orally so as to seek an order quashing count 2 on the basis that "it does not make out an offence known to law".

  1. The application was heard by Syme DCJ on 7 July 2014 and determined on 14 July 2014. Her Honour granted the application in respect of count 1 but dismissed the application to quash count 2.

  1. On 20 November 2014, the Court dismissed an application under s 5F(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 for leave to appeal against that part of the judgment refusing the application, reserving our reasons. These are our reasons for refusing leave.

  1. Section 193D(1) of the Crimes Act provides:

"If:
(a) a person deals with property intending that the property will become an instrument of crime, and
(b) the property subsequently becomes an instrument of crime,
the person is guilty of an offence."

The offence carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 15 years.

"Property" is defined in s 193D(5) as follows:

"Property" means money or other valuables.
  1. The charges against the applicant arose out of the shooting murder of Darko Janceski in April 2012. The Crown case is that the deceased was shot three times by a male riding a blue Yamaha motorcycle. Matthew Wiggins has been charged with the deceased's murder.

  1. The Crown alleges that the applicant purchased the motorcycle for use by Wiggins in the murder. The motorcycle was purchased with cash. The cash transaction was the subject of count 1…

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Madden v Regina [2014] NSWCCA 291
Case
[2014] NSWCCA 291
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Madden versus Regina, the appellant sought to appeal against a decision that dismissed his application to quash part of an indictment. The indictment charged him with the unlawful taking of a motorcycle. The court of appeal was tasked with determining whether a motorcycle could be classified as "property" under section 193D of the Crimes Act and whether the term "other valuables" was limited to small items of personal property. The court had to interpret these statutory terms to decide the admissibility of the motorcycle as part of the charge.

The central legal issue was the interpretation of the statutory terms "property" and "other valuables" in section 193D of the Crimes Act. The appellant argued that a motorcycle could not be considered "property" in the context of the statute, as it was a larger item and not a small personal item that the term "other valuables" might imply. The court had to determine if the term "property" included motor vehicles and whether "other valuables" was restricted to smaller items. The resolution of these issues was crucial in deciding the validity of the indictment against the appellant.

The court examined the language and purpose of section 193D, considering its context within the Crimes Act and relevant legal principles. It found that the term "property" was not limited to small items of personal property, as it could encompass larger items such as vehicles. The court held that a motorcycle qualified as "property" under the statute. Regarding the term "other valuables," the court concluded that it was not confined to small items but could include larger items such as vehicles. The court thus upheld the indictment as valid, dismissing the application to quash the charge.

The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the lower court. The indictment against the appellant, which included the unlawful taking of a motorcycle, was held to be valid under section 193D of the Crimes Act. The motorcycle was deemed to be "property" and the term "other valuables" was interpreted to include larger items. No further appeal was permitted regarding this matter.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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