Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Belperio

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

LEGAL PROFESSION CONDUCT COMMISSIONER v BELPERIO

[2024] SASCA 102

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice Stein)

22 August 2024

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO COURTS

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES - CONSTRUCTION

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - FUNCTIONS OF TRIBUNALS

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION - LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ACT

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION - WHOLE ACT TO BE CONSIDERED

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION - PURPOSIVE APPROACH

Following the investigation of a complaint regarding the conduct of Mr Belperio (the “Practitioner”), the Practitioner, the Legal Professional Conduct Commissioner (“the Commissioner”), the appellant, laid charges in the Tribunal alleging professional misconduct pursuant to the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (“the Act”). 

The Practitioner applied to the Tribunal for orders dismissing or permanently staying the charges as an abuse of process. The Tribunal determined that charges had been laid without jurisdiction and the Tribunal had implied inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the charges or alternatively, the Tribunal could dismiss the charges as frivolous and vexatious pursuant to s 82(5) of the Act. The Tribunal’s reasons included that:

•the Commissioner had not complied with the necessary regime in ss 77L and 77K of the Act prior to determining to lay the charges;

•section 82 of the Act is a mere machinery provision and did not empower the Commissioner to circumvent the regime in subdivision 2 of division 2 of the Act;

•the Commissioner had adopted the determination of Commissioner May and had not made the necessary determination to lay charges in the Tribunal;

•the Tribunal was competent to consider the extent of its jurisdiction.

The Commissioner seeks orders setting aside the Tribunal’s order on grounds including that the Tribunal erred in its construction of provisions of the Act and erred in finding as a fact that Commissioner Keane had not made the necessary determination to lay the charges.

The substantial questions raised on appeal included: 

•whether the Commissioner’s power to lay a charge is contained in s 82 or s 77L of the Act;

•whether the Commissioner’s satisfaction of the matters referred to in s 77L a pre-condition to the Commissioner laying a charge;

•if so, the consequence of any failure to meet any such pre-condition;

•the meaning of “evidence” in s 77J and 77L;

•whether the Commissioner who makes the determination pursuant s 77L must be the same individual who lays the charge;

•whether the Tribunal has the power to determine its jurisdiction; and

•whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to enquire into the Commissioner’s satisfaction of the matters referred to in s77J.

Held (Stein AJA; Kourakis CJ and Bleby JA agreeing) allowing the appeal, setting aside orders of the…

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Details
Case
[2024] SASCA 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner) appealed to the Supreme Court of South Australia against a decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal to dismiss a charge of professional misconduct laid against Mr Belperio (the Practitioner). The charge arose from a complaint investigated by the previous Commissioner, Mr May, who determined to lay a charge shortly before his term expired. The current Commissioner, Mr Keane, subsequently laid the charge in the Tribunal. The Practitioner contended that the charge was an abuse of process, arguing that the requisite threshold for laying a charge had not been satisfied and that Mr Keane had failed to undertake an independent evaluation of the evidence.

The central legal issues before the Supreme Court were whether the Commissioner had properly exercised the power to lay a charge under the relevant legislation, and whether the Tribunal had erred in dismissing the charge. Specifically, the Court was required to consider the interpretation of sections 77K, 77L, and 82 of the *Legal Practitioners Act 1981* (SA) (the Act), and the extent to which a successor Commissioner must independently evaluate the evidence and reasons of a predecessor before laying a charge. The Court also had to determine whether the Tribunal’s finding that the Commissioner had failed to follow the statutory regime for laying charges was correct.

The Supreme Court, comprising Kourakis CJ, Bleby and Stein JJ, allowed the appeal. The Court reasoned that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the Act. It held that the office of Commissioner is a statutory office, and that a successor Commissioner is entitled to rely on the investigations and determinations of their predecessor. The Court found that the Tribunal’s conclusion that Commissioner Keane had failed to undertake an independent evaluation was based on a misinterpretation of the statutory scheme. The Court emphasised that section 82 of the Act is a machinery provision that confers standing on the Commissioner to lay a charge, and that the Tribunal’s restrictive interpretation, which would require a wholesale re-evaluation of evidence by each successive Commissioner, was not supported by the legislative history or the purposive approach to statutory interpretation. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had incorrectly applied the principles from *Viscariello v Livesey & Anor* and had failed to consider the overall scheme of the Act.

The Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal’s order dismissing the charge and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Commissioner Keane had the power to lay the charges. Background In July 2020, the then Commissioner, Mr May, received a complaint about Mr Belperio (the “Practitioner”). Commissioner May conducted an investigation. The day before his appointment as Commissioner expired in July 2022, Commissioner May determined to lay a charge in the Tribunal against the Practitioner for unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The Practitioner was informed by letter dated 2 August 2022 of Commissioner May’s decision. Expressly noting that the Commissioner was not required to provide any reasons for the decision to lay a charge, the letter stated that the Commissioner’s reasons included:·the serious nature of the complaint;·the conflicting accounts on the evidence as between the complainant and the Practitioner;·that the Commissioner was not able to resolve the conflict without the evidence being tested, the appropriate forum for doing so being the Tribunal;·the need for the Practitioner to have the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant given the serious nature of the allegations and procedural fairness issues;·the Commissioner’s view that the complainant’s evidence, taken at its highest and strongest, if accepted by the Tribunal, would satisfy Briginshaw[4] and amount to either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.[4] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336. The Commissioner’s letter informed the Practitioner that he did not accept the matter was beyond his jurisdiction, there was no compelling basis for him to exercise his discretion under s 77C to close the complaint without further consideration of its merits and laying a charge would need to be done by Commissioner Keane. The Practitioner responded by letter asserting that the Commissioner’s reasons did not disclose a proper basis for laying a charge; the requisite threshold for laying a charge under s 77L of the Act was not satisfied and to lay a charge absent the requisite level of satisfaction would mean the charge was an abuse of process and should permanently be stayed. The Practitioner reiterated that it would be an abuse if Commissioner Keane laid a charge based on Commissioner May’s determination and requested an opportunity to meet prior to such decision being made if Commissioner Keane decided to substitute his own determination. Following the appointment of Mr Keane as Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner, in September 2022, Commissioner Keane by letter informed the Practitioner that he would not be setting aside the decision of Commissioner May and he would be proceeding with laying a charge in the Tribunal. In October 2022, Commissioner Keane laid a charge in the Tribunal against the Practitioner alleging professional misconduct. The charge related to alleged inappropriate and uninvited physical and sexual contact with, or advances to, a female solicitor colleague, junior in age and position to the Practitioner.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 March 2024, the Tribunal dismissed the charge filed on 20 October 2022.Tribunal’s reasons for decision The Tribunal concluded that the office of Commissioner is the personal appointment of an individual to that office, not a statutory office, and Commissioner Keane was required to make the necessary determination to lay the charge. The Tribunal found Commissioner Keane did not undertake any independent evaluation of the evidence, nor look beyond what Commissioner May had referred to in his reasons for his decision to lay a charge.[5] [5] The Tribunal’s reasons footnoted exhibit P2, being the letter dated 2 August 2022, by which Commissioner May’s decision was conveyed to the legal practitioner. The Tribunal concluded that neither Commissioner Keane nor Commissioner May followed the regime required by s 77L and s 77K of the Act which the Tribunal described as being to:·consider and evaluate the whole of the evidence generated during the inquiry;·satisfy themselves a prima facie case existed to found the finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct;·determine whether there were appropriate remedies available to them to deal with the conduct if such findings were made;·after satisfying themselves that having found there was evidence that could not be dealt with pursuant to s 77J, to then lay a charge pursuant to s 77L of the Act. The Tribunal concluded that s 82 is no more than a machinery provision confirming the Commissioner’s standing to lay a charge.[6][6] Relying on Viscariello v Livesey & Anor [2013] SASC 99. The Tribunal considered the Commissioner’s argument would allow him to circumvent and bypass the checks, balances and filtering processes of the investigation process in subdivision 2 of Division 2. That would give the Commissioner unfettered power to lay a charge untethered from the investigation process when the prescribed investigation process and actions following investigation are comprehensive and intertwined. The Tribunal rejected the Commissioner’s submission that the only express constraint upon him in laying a charge pursuant to s 82 was that he may not lay a charge if the power under s 77J had been exercised, or the timeframe in which to lay a charge had expired, as inconsistent with Viscariello v Livesey & Anor.[7] The Tribunal also concluded that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the principle requiring a general power to be read as not applying to the subject matter of a specific power.[8] [7] [2013] SASC 99 at [55] (White J).[8] Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union of Australia [1932] HCA 9; (1932) 47 CLR 1 at 7-8 (Gavan Duffy CJ and Dixon J). While accepting the charges and the factual allegations underpinning the charges are very serious, the Tribunal considered the seriousness of the charges could not impact on a proper consideration of the basis upon which the Commissioner laid the charges, in particular, whether the Commissioner properly exercised powers and the consequent jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the charges.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Generally speaking, a word or phrase in different sections of an Act will be given the same meaning.[16] However, a presumption to that effect will yield to the context.[17] Prior iterations of the Act[16] Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1981] HCA 40; (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 10 (Gibbs CJ) and 15 (Mason J, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreeing).[17] Clyne v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 40; (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 10 (Gibbs CJ), 15 (Mason J, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreeing); Murphy v Farmer [1988] HCA 31; (1988) 165 CLR 19 at 27 (Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).The Act as originally enacted I commence by considering the previous legislative provisions which assist in understanding the framework of Part 6 in its current form.[18] [18] For ease of reference I will refer to the various iterations of the Act after the original Act as the “Act”. Upon its introduction, the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) as originally enacted (“the original Act”) provided for investigations into the conduct of legal practitioners and the commencement of disciplinary proceedings against legal practitioners.[19][19] Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), pt 6, as enacted. The original Act established a Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee.[20] The functions of the Committee were to:·receive, consider and investigate complaints of unprofessional conduct against practitioners; ·conciliate; ·admonish where, in the opinion of the Committee, a complaint had substance but may be adequately dealt with by admonishing; and ·lay charges of unprofessional conduct before the Tribunal. [20] Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), pt 6, div 2, as enacted. The Committee could, of its own motion, investigate the conduct of a practitioner. The Committee was obliged at the direction of the Attorney-General or the Law Society (“Society”) to investigate. No direction could be given unless the Attorney-General or the Society had reasonable cause to suspect the practitioner had been guilty of unprofessional conduct.[21] [21] At the time the original Act was introduced, the conduct the subject of potential disciplinary action was termed “unprofessional conduct”. The Committee had powers to inspect documents and take copies of documents. Where the Committee was satisfied that evidence of unprofessional conduct existed, it was obliged to report to the Attorney-General and the Society. The original Act provided for the creation of a Tribunal called the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal and for the appointment of its members.[22] Section 82 of the original Act provided that a charge may be laid alleging unprofessional conduct on the part of a legal practitioner.[23] Section 82(2) provided that a charge may be laid “under this section by the Attorney-General; the Committee; the Society; or a person claiming to be aggrieved by reason of the alleged unprofessional conduct”. A charge laid under s 82 was required to be in a form prescribed by Rules. [22] Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), pt 6, div 3, as enacted.[23] Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA), pt 6, div 4, as enacted.