Police Offences—Vagrancy—Absence or insufficiency of lawful and visible means of support—Unlawfulness—Sufficiency of evidence—Degree of proof—Police Act, 1892-1952 (W.A.), s. 65 (1)*.
Decisions
December 5. The following written judgments were delivered:- DIXON C.J. By s. 65 of the Police Act, 1892-1952 (W.A.) (55 Vict. 27) (cf. 1954 Vol. 6 Reprinted Statutes) it is provided that every person who shall commit any of the next following offences shall be deemed an idle and disorderly person within the meaning of this Act, and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six calender months with or without hard labour; there follow ten paragraphs each stating a set of conditions exposing the "person" to the liability imposed by the section. The first of those is the provision under which this case arises. It is as follows: "Every person having no visible lawful means of support or insufficient lawful means of support, who being thereto required by any Justice, or who having been duly summoned for such purpose, or brought before any Justice, shall not give a good account of his means of support to the satisfaction of such Justice." By virtue of ss. 29 and 33 of the Justices Act, 1902-1961 (W.A.) the reference to a justice must be taken to refer to two justices or a stipendiary magistrate. The nine other paragraphs refer to situations which fall short of some definite or specific single prohibited act which is made the offence but like the first they refer to the manner of life led or the like, to wandering, to begging, to the possession of disguises, to associating with certain undesirable classes of people. It is scarcely necessary to say that this description of legislation is traceable back to Tudor times. Of course there is a very long history extending through periods not like our own: perhaps it is enough to refer to Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. IV, 2nd ed. (1937) p. 387 et seqq. (at p437)
2. A Parliamentary Select Committee on Vagrancy sat in 1821 and as a result 3 Geo. IV c. 40 was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to idle and disorderly persons, rogues and vagabonds, incorrigible rogues and other vagrants in England. By the Vagrancy Act, 1824 (5 Geo. IV c. 83) provisions making certain categories of "rogues and vagabonds" were amended so that the categories were removed to the list of "idle and disorderly persons" (cf. now 25 Geo. V c. 20, s. 1). But "every person wandering abroad and lodging in any barn or outhouse or in any deserted or unoccupied building or in the open air or under a tent or in any cart or waggon, not having any visible means of subsistence and not giving a good account of himself or herself . . . shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond" (s.…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Zanetti v Hill [1962] HCA 62
Case
[1962] HCA 62
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Zanetti v Hill* concerned a dispute between the plaintiff, Zanetti, and the defendant, Hill, regarding the plaintiff's claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the plaintiff had established a breach of duty of care on the part of the defendant, and if so, whether that breach had caused the plaintiff's injuries. Specifically, the court had to consider the standard of care expected of a driver in the circumstances of the accident and the causal connection between any such breach and the resulting harm.
The High Court considered the evidence presented regarding the manner in which the defendant was driving at the time of the collision. The judges analysed the principles of negligence, including the duty of care owed by road users to each other and the test for causation, which requires demonstrating that the defendant's breach of duty was a necessary condition for the occurrence of the plaintiff's injuries. The court applied established common law principles to assess whether the defendant's actions fell below the standard of a reasonable driver and whether this failure directly led to the accident.
The High Court found in favour of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff had not discharged the onus of proving that the defendant had breached any duty of care owed to the plaintiff, nor that any such breach had caused the plaintiff's injuries. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.