R v Palmer - [2008] SADC 122

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v PALMER
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2008] SADC 122
Ruling of His Honour Acting Judge Wilson
17 September 2008
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES
Aggravated driving in a manner dangerous to the public - the accused was doing "doughnuts" for fun on private property, with some friends as passengers, as part of a joint escapade - whether the accused and the deceased and the other two passengers are to be characterised as "the public" - no case to answer - directed verdicts of acquittal - trial judge declines to exercise the Court's discretion under s350(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act to reserve for consideration and determination by the Full Court the relevant question raised by the decision in R v S.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act s19A, s350(2) and (3), referred to.
R v S (1991) 22 NSWLR 548, applied.
Graham v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152; Ardill v Police [2005] SASC 450; Senior v Police [2005] SASC 88, distinguished.

R v PALMER
[2008] SADC 122
REASONS FOR RULING OF NO CASE TO ANSWER
The elements of aggravated causing death by dangerous driving

The elements (or ingredients) of the offence of aggravated causing death by dangerous driving, [s19A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act], which are particularised in the Information, are each to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
Those elements are, first, that the accused was the driver of the motor vehicle, the red HiLux; secondly, that the motor vehicle was being driven in a manner which was dangerous to the public. The sub-elements of that element involve consideration of the concepts of ‘dangerousness’ and ‘the public’; thirdly, that, by driving in that manner, the accused caused the death of the deceased when the HiLux rolled onto its side and the deceased’s head was squashed, leading to his death; and, fourthly, that the accused did all that as part of a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of bad driving.
A key matter of fact
A key matter of fact to be proven (element number two) is that the accused’s manner of driving was dangerous to the public and, to that end, that there were persons at risk characterised as ‘the public’ and, specifically, that those persons were the accused and the deceased and two other passengers, all friends.
I pause here to indicate that the two friends, apart from the accused and the deceased, are Justin Chapman and Steven Buchanan. As to the friendship between those persons, I refer to pp.391, 397, 400, 401, 404 and 414 of the transcript. Those passages in the evidence of Justin Chapman indicate that there was social contact between those men, that there was a relationship of friendship, and that the incident in question arose out of skylarking participated in by all four men of their own volition. Relevant passages in the evidence…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Palmer

Details

AGLC: R v Palmer [2008] SADC 122
Case: [2008] SADC 122
Decision Date: 17 September 2008

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved a criminal case against the accused, Palmer, who was charged with aggravated driving in a manner dangerous to the public. The alleged offence occurred when the accused was engaging in dangerous driving on private property, specifically performing "doughnuts" with friends as passengers. The central issue for the court was whether the accused, the deceased, and the other passengers could be considered as part of "the public" for the purposes of the charge under the relevant statute.

The court was required to determine the scope of the term "the public" within the context of the statute governing aggravated driving in a manner dangerous to the public. The primary legal question was whether the accused's actions constituted a danger to the public when performed on private property and with only a limited number of individuals present. This required the court to interpret the statutory language and assess the implications of the specific circumstances of the alleged offence.

In resolving the matter, the court found that there was no case to answer and directed verdicts of acquittal were entered in favour of the accused. The trial judge declined to exercise the discretion under section 350(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act to reserve the relevant question for consideration and determination by the Full Court, following the decision in R v S. The court's interpretation of the statutory language and the specific circumstances of the offence led to the conclusion that the accused's actions did not constitute a danger to the public as defined by the statute.

The final orders of the court were that the accused be acquitted of the charge of aggravated driving in a manner dangerous to the public. The trial judge's decision not to reserve the matter for the Full Court was upheld, and the accused was discharged without conviction. The court's reasoning was grounded in its interpretation of the statutory language and the specific facts of the case, leading to the conclusion that the accused's actions did not meet the criteria for the offence as defined by the law.

Orders