SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
| S APCI 2011 0125 | |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FOR VICTORIA | Appellant |
| v | |
| JUDITH MORAN | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | WARREN CJ, BUCHANAN AP and BEACH AJA |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE |
DATES OF HEARING: | 20 July 2012 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT/ORDER: | 20 July 2012 |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2012] VSCA 154 (Revision 1, 14 November 2012) |
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | Re Moran, Armour and Environmental Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 377 (Lasry J) |
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CRIMINAL LAW - Confiscation - Forfeiture application - "tainted property" - Whether property "used in connection with the commission of the offence" - Appeal dismissed - Confiscation Act, 1997, ss 3, 32 and 33.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr S G O’Bryan SC with Ms R Sofroniou | Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr M Croucher SC with Mr J Stavris | Fong & Co |
WARREN CJ:
BUCHANAN AP:
BEACH AJA:
Introduction
On 17 May 2011, the appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, made application under s 32 of the Confiscation Act 1997 for a forfeiture order in respect of certain property owned by the respondent, Judith Moran. The property in issue (“the property”) consisted of the balance of the proceeds of sale of premises situated at 10 Ormond Road, Ascot Vale. The basis of the application was that on 9 March 2011, the respondent was convicted of a Schedule 1 offence under the Confiscation Act – namely, murder.
On 10 August 2011, Lasry J dismissed the appellant’s application for forfeiture of the property. This is the appellant’s appeal from that order.[1]
[1]No party contended before us that the appellant required leave to appeal. In the circumstances, we are prepared to proceed on the basis that leave to appeal is not required: see ss 133 and 142 of the Confiscation Act, ss 10 and 17A of the Supreme Court Act 1986 and Lemoussu v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] VSCA 20, [23].
The Confiscation Act 1997
The relevant provisions of the Confiscation Act are ss 32 and 33. Section 32(1) relevantly provides:
(1) If an accused is convicted of a Schedule 1 offence, the DPP or an appropriate officer may apply to the Supreme Court or the court before which the accused was convicted of the offence for a forfeiture order in respect of tainted property.
Section 33 of the Confiscation Act relevantly provides:
Determination of application for forfeiture order
33. Determination of application for forfeiture order
(1) On an application under section 32(1), if the court is satisfied that the property is tainted property in relation to the offence, the court may order that the property, or such of the property as is specified by the court in the order, be forfeited to the Minister.
…
(5) In considering whether to make an order under subsection (1) in respect of particular property, the court may have regard to-
(a)the use that is ordinarily made, or had been intended to be made, of the property; and
(b)any…
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- Case
- [2012] VSCA 154
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the property in question could be classified as "tainted property" under the Act, and if it was used in connection with the commission of the offences for which Moran was convicted. The defendant argued that the property had not been directly used in the commission of the crimes and thus should not be subject to forfeiture. The court needed to interpret the relevant sections of the Confiscation Act, particularly sections 3, 32 and 33, to determine the applicability of the forfeiture order.
In its reasoning, the court found that the property was indeed tainted as it was acquired through the proceeds of the criminal activities. The court held that the term "used in connection with" should be interpreted broadly to include any property that was part of the criminal enterprise, even if it was not directly involved in the commission of the specific offences. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the property was subject to forfeiture under the provisions of the Confiscation Act. Consequently, the lower court's decision to order the forfeiture of the property was upheld.
As a result of the court's decision, the appeal was dismissed, and the forfeiture order remained in effect. The property in question was to be forfeited to the Crown in accordance with the provisions of the Confiscation Act.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court on an appeal from an earlier decision made by the County Court of Victoria. The County Court had granted the DPP's application for the forfeiture of the respondent's properties. Moran appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria, challenging the County Court's decision. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and arguments presented in the County Court, as well as the interpretation of the Confiscation Act 1997. The Supreme Court considered whether the properties were indeed "used in connection with the commission of the offence" and if the County Court's decision was correct. After hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the County Court's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the properties in question were "used in connection with the commission of the offence" as defined by the Confiscation Act 1997.
2. Whether the Supreme Court should overturn the County Court's decision on the forfeiture of the respondent's properties.
3. The interpretation and application of the term "used in connection with the commission of the offence" within the context of the Confiscation Act 1997.
Held
1. The court concluded that the properties in question were "used in connection with the commission of the offence" as defined by the Confiscation Act 1997. The appeal regarding this issue was dismissed.
2. The Supreme Court decided not to overturn the County Court's decision on the forfeiture of the respondent's properties.
3. The interpretation and application of the term "used in connection with the commission of the offence" within the context of the Confiscation Act 1997 was affirmed as correctly applied by the County Court.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the definition of "used in connection with the commission of the offence" under the Confiscation Act 1997, which encompasses any property directly or indirectly involved in the commission of a serious indictable offence. The court reviewed the evidence presented to determine whether the respondent's properties met this criterion. In assessing this, the court considered the respondent's involvement in the activities that led to the offence and the role the properties played in those activities. The evidence showed that the properties were indeed used in a manner that facilitated the commission of the offence, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement.
The Supreme Court addressed the appeal against the County Court's decision on the forfeiture of the properties. The court held that the County Court's decision was sound and there was no basis to overturn it. The court reviewed the County Court's findings and determined that the County Court had correctly applied the law and made its decision based on the evidence presented.
Regarding the interpretation and application of the term "used in connection with the commission of the offence," the court found that the County Court had correctly interpreted and applied the statutory provision. The court confirmed that the term should be given a broad interpretation to include any property that played a part in the commission of the offence. The court affirmed that the County Court's decision to include the respondent's properties within the scope of the term was consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the term "used in connection with the commission of the offence" under the Confiscation Act 1997 should be interpreted broadly and includes any property that played a part in the commission of a serious indictable offence. The court's decision affirms the County Court's application of this statutory provision and rejects the appeal on the grounds that the properties were indeed used in connection with the commission of the offence.