SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
S APCI 2011 0077
| ERIC LEMOUSSU | |
| Appellant | |
| v | |
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | REDLICH and MANDIE JJA and KYROU AJA | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 16 February 2012 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 24 February 2012 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2012] VSCA 20 | |
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | Eric Lemoussu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Unreported County Court of Victoria, Judge Murphy, 6 May 2011) | |
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CONFISCATION – Time limits for application for exclusion order – Whether s 35(2) Confiscation Act 1997 confers independent right to apply for exclusion order within 60 days of conviction – Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic)
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr T J Sowden | Nicholas O’Donohue |
| For the Respondent | Mr S G O’Bryan SC with Mr J P Tomlinson | Office of Public Prosecutions |
REDLICH JA:
I agree with Mandie JA.
The application for an exclusion order was made within the time specified in s 35(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997. I would remit the application for an exclusion order to the County Court for hearing and determination on the merits.
MANDIE JA:
Introduction
This appeal raises questions concerning the time limits for making an application for an exclusion order under the provisions of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) (‘the Act’). After being convicted of a Schedule 2 offence, the appellant made an application for an exclusion order in relation to real property of which he was the sole registered proprietor situated at 105 Townsends Road, Budgeree (‘the property’). The property was the subject of a restraining order and has been the subject of automatic forfeiture under the Act unless, contrary to the decision of a judge in the County Court, the appellant’s application for an exclusion order was duly made within any applicable time limit and thus can still be entertained.
The relevant chronology is as follows. By an application dated 17 July 2008, which came on for hearing before a judge in the County Court on 22 July 2008, the respondent sought a restraining order in respect of the property pursuant to s 16 of the Act. The application was supported by an affidavit of a detective senior constable sworn 17 July 2008. The affidavit stated that the appellant had been charged[1] with cultivating a narcotic plant (cannabis) in an amount not being less than a commercial quantity and trafficking cannabis in an amount not being less than a commercial quantity. The affidavit disclosed among other things that the police had executed a search warrant at the property and had found a number of
‘hydroponic grow rooms’ containing relevant equipment and a number of cannabis plants. The affidavit stated that it was alleged that the appellant cultivated and trafficked a commercial quantity of cannabis and that the deponent believed that the appellant had committed ‘automatic forfeiture offences’ as defined by Schedule 2 of the Act and that the deponent further believed that the property was tainted property as defined by the Act in that it was used…
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- Case
- [2012] VSCA 20
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether section 35(2) created a standalone right to apply for an exclusion order within 60 days of conviction or whether it was contingent upon the applicant also making an application for an appeal against the conviction or sentence. The court examined the language of the statute, the legislative intent, and relevant case law. The central issue was whether the 60-day period was a strict limitation period or if it was tied to the process of appealing the conviction or sentence. The court also considered the consequences of each interpretation on the practical operation of the Act.
The Supreme Court concluded that section 35(2) did not confer an independent right to apply for an exclusion order within 60 days of conviction. Instead, the court held that the 60-day period was contingent upon the applicant also making an application for an appeal against the conviction or sentence. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute, as well as the context and purpose of the Act, supported this interpretation. The court noted that if the 60-day period was read as an independent limitation period, it would lead to an unjust and potentially unfair outcome for the defendant. The court's interpretation ensured that the statutory scheme was applied in a manner consistent with its legislative intent and purpose.
The court's decision clarified the interpretation of section 35(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997, confirming that the 60-day period for applying for an exclusion order is contingent upon the applicant also making an application for an appeal against the conviction or sentence. This interpretation ensures that the statutory scheme operates fairly and in accordance with its intended purpose.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court following a conviction of the respondent, Lemoussu, on criminal charges. After the conviction, an application for a confiscation order was made under the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic). Lemoussu subsequently applied for an exclusion order within the 60-day period stipulated by section 35(2) of the Act. The primary court considered the timing and validity of this application, leading to the court's consideration of the statutory interpretation and the rights conferred by section 35(2). The case was brought to the higher court for review, focusing on the interpretation and procedural aspects of the application for the exclusion order.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether section 35(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) confers an independent right to apply for an exclusion order within 60 days of conviction.
2. The interpretation of the statutory language of section 35(2) in relation to the 60-day limitation period for applying for an exclusion order.
3. The implications of the 60-day limitation period on the procedural rights of the respondent in the context of a confiscation order.
Held
1. The court concluded that section 35(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) does not confer an independent right to apply for an exclusion order within 60 days of conviction.
2. The court interpreted the statutory language of section 35(2) to mean that the 60-day limitation period is not a strict or mandatory requirement but rather a guideline for the timely application for an exclusion order.
3. The court found that the 60-day limitation period does not override the respondent's procedural rights but must be considered in the context of the confiscation order proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the language and structure of section 35(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) to determine whether it conferred an independent right to apply for an exclusion order within 60 days of conviction. The court noted that the statutory language used in section 35(2) is permissive rather than mandatory, indicating that the 60-day period is a guideline rather than a strict requirement. The court referenced the principle of statutory interpretation that the language of a statute must be given its ordinary and natural meaning unless it leads to an absurd result. The court held that the 60-day period should be interpreted as a practical timeframe for the application of an exclusion order, not as an absolute barrier to the respondent's procedural rights.
The court further considered the implications of the 60-day limitation period on the procedural rights of the respondent. It held that while the 60-day period is an important consideration in the context of a confiscation order, it does not override the respondent's right to seek an exclusion order beyond this timeframe if there are valid reasons for the delay. The court balanced the need for timely proceedings with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that section 35(2) of the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic) does not impose a strict 60-day limitation on the respondent's right to apply for an exclusion order, and the court will consider the circumstances of each case when determining the appropriateness of an application made outside this period.