White v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ,
GUMMOW, HEYDON, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ

GARY ERNEST WHITE  APPELLANT

AND

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
FOR WESTERN AUSTRALIA  RESPONDENT

White v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2011] HCA 20
8 June 2011
P44/2010

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia

Representation

S A Shirrefs SC with H J E van den Heuvel for the appellant (instructed by Holborn Lenhoff Massey)

B Fiannaca SC with I S Jones for the respondent (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) ("the Act") provides for the confiscation of property used in criminal offences. Where property so used neither belongs to nor is effectively controlled by the offender, s 22 of the Act enables a declaration to be made, on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions ("the DPP"), that property owned by the offender is available for confiscation instead of the crime-used property. Such an order is called a crime-used property substitution declaration[1].  A judge of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dismissed an application for such a declaration against the appellant, who had been convicted in 2003 of a wilful murder committed in 2001[2].  An appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia by the DPP was allowed[3].  On 25 March 2010, the Court of Appeal made the declaration sought by the DPP.

    [1]Act, s 3 and Glossary.

    [2]Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v White (2009) 194 A Crim R 192.

    [3]Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v White (2010) 199 A Crim R 448.

  2. The wilful murder, of which the appellant was convicted, was committed immediately outside the boundary fence of fenced and gated premises at 10 Jade Street, Maddington, Western Australia.  At the time of the offence the appellant was leasing those premises.  The appellant had shot at the deceased five times inside the premises, the gates to which had been locked at the appellant's direction.  At least two of the shots wounded the deceased.  The deceased climbed over one of the locked gates to escape the appellant, but was fatally shot while on the ground outside the gate.  The sentencing judge described the killing as "a cold-blooded execution".  The appellant was sentenced to strict-security life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 22 years.

  3. A "crime-used property substitution declaration" can be made if "the crime-used property is not available for confiscation"[4] and if "it is more likely than not that the [appellant] made criminal use of the crime-used property"[5]. It was accepted in the litigation that the rented premises were not available for confiscation. Thus, the questions raised by this appeal are whether the premises, leased by the appellant, were "crime-used property" within the meaning of s 146 of the Act and whether he made "criminal use" of those…

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Details
Case
[2011] HCA 20
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the interpretation of the *Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000* (WA) and specifically the conditions under which a "crime-used property substitution declaration" could be made. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought such a declaration against the appellant concerning premises leased by him. It was not disputed that the premises were "crime-used" within the meaning of s 146(1)(c) of the Act, nor that the property was unavailable for confiscation. The central dispute revolved around whether the appellant had made "criminal use" of the premises as required by s 147 of the Act, which is a prerequisite for the declaration under s 22.

The High Court was required to determine whether the definition of "criminal use" in s 147 of the Act encompassed conduct falling within the definition of "crime-used" in s 146(1)(c). Section 146(1)(c) defines property as "crime-used" if any act or omission done, omitted to be done, or facilitated in or on the property in connection with the commission of a confiscation offence. Section 147 defines "criminal use" as using or intending to use property in a way that brings it within the definition of crime-used property. The appellant argued that conduct captured solely by s 146(1)(c) did not constitute "criminal use" under s 147.

The High Court reasoned that while the ordinary meaning of "use" might suggest a narrower scope, the phrase "in connection with" in s 146(1)(c) indicated a broad relationship between the acts or omissions on the property and the commission of a confiscation offence. The Court concluded that, in purpose and context, the conduct described in s 146(1)(c) could be brought within the meaning of "makes criminal use of property" in s 147 without doing violence to the language of the latter section. Therefore, the conditions for making a crime-used property substitution declaration were satisfied.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

A "crime-used property substitution declaration" can be made if "the crime-used property is not available for confiscation"[4] and if "it is more likely than not that the [appellant] made criminal use of the crime-used property"[5]. It was accepted in the litigation that the rented premises were not available for confiscation. Thus, the questions raised by this appeal are whether the premises, leased by the appellant, were "crime-used property" within the meaning of s 146 of the Act and whether he made "criminal use" of those premises within the meaning of s 147 of the Act. Those are necessary conditions for the making of a declaration under s 22. On their proper construction and application to the facts of this case, both conditions were fulfilled. The appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal should be dismissed.[4]Act, s 22(1)(a).[5]Act, s 22(1)(b).Factual background On the appeal to this Court, the parties were on common ground as to relevant facts before the jury. Those facts, which were set out in the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant, may be summarised as follows:.The premises at Jade Street, Maddington, were in an industrial area. The appellant rented them and operated a trucking business from them..The premises were surrounded by a cyclone fence. Entry was gained through two gates, each six-feet high, surmounted by three strands of barbed wire and with a chain and two padlocks..On 19 August 2001, the deceased attended the property with a Mrs Miller for the purpose of obtaining amphetamines. Both had consumed alcohol and amphetamines earlier. When they arrived, there were three young women already at the premises, two unidentified men, and a man known as Rainbow..On that day, the appellant instructed Sidney Reid to go to the premises, lock the gates and not let anyone come in or out. He did not give Reid a reason for this instruction..Reid complied with the appellant's instructions. He drove to the property, parked his car there, and asked Rainbow, who had a key, to lock the gates. Rainbow did so. He and Rainbow then went up to the house..The appellant denied that he had telephoned Reid asking him to close the gates. He accepted that the deceased and Mrs Miller may have turned up at the property unannounced..The appellant and one Richard Samuels drove to the property and arrived there shortly after the gates had been locked. They unlocked the gates, drove the car onto the property, locked the gates behind them and walked to the house..The appellant told Mrs Miller and the other women to leave the premises. They left in a car. Rainbow unlocked the gates to let the women out. He then relocked them..The appellant confronted the deceased about the repayment of money. The deceased did not reply. The appellant said he would make an example of him. As the deceased walked from the house towards the back of the property, he was followed by the appellant, who produced a gun and shot him in the left shoulder..The deceased ran from the appellant who fired a further three shots at the deceased, before the deceased reached the locked gates..The deceased climbed the locked gates to leave the premises. As he reached the top of the gates, the appellant shot him in the buttocks..The deceased came down on the other side of the gates and collapsed on the ground. The appellant then unlocked the gates, walked out of the premises and shot the deceased in the head, killing him. He then moved the deceased's body onto the premises before transporting and disposing of it.Statutory framework

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ GUMMOW J HEYDON J
Her Honour went on to hold, however, that this conclusion would not support a finding that the appellant had made criminal use of the premises within the meaning of s 147. Her Honour held, in effect, that while conduct by the appellant rendering property "crime-used" within the meaning of ss 146(1)(a) and (b) would constitute criminal use of the property for the purposes of s 147, the same was not true of conduct by the appellant only caught by s 146(1)(c)[27].[27](2009) 194 A Crim R 192 at 212-213 [103]-[109].The decision of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal held, contrary to the finding of the primary judge, that the property was crime-used within the meaning of s 146(1)(a). In so doing, the Court held that it was not necessary, for the application of s 146(1)(a), that the act or acts constituting the relevant use had to be done with the intention or purpose of committing the specific unlawful act constituting the confiscation offence. The use of the premises for the purposes of s 146(1)(a) could be "indirectly in connection with the facilitation of a confiscation offence."[28][28](2010) 199 A Crim R 448 at 457 [39]. The Court of Appeal also held, contrary to the primary judge's conclusion, that the primary defined term in ss 22, 146 and 147 is "crime-used" and that it incorporates the word "used" to encompass all the activities listed in ss 146(1) and (3). This indicates that all those activities are intended to be uses for the purposes of s 147[29]. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made by the primary judge.[29](2010) 199 A Crim R 448 at 459 [48].The appellant's argument The steps in the appellant's argument in this Court may be summarised as follows:1.A crime-used property substitution declaration, under s 21 of the Act, cannot be made against a person unless that person made criminal use of the crime-used property within the meaning of s 147 of the Act.2.Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, the premises at Maddington were not crime-used within the meaning of s 146(1)(a). The Court of Appeal's finding to the contrary was based on factual conclusions not open on the evidence.3.It was not disputed that the premises were crime-used property within the meaning of s 146(1)(c).4.The conduct covered by s 146(1)(c) did not establish criminal use of the property by the appellant within the meaning of s 147. As appears from the above, the appellant's appeal must fail unless he can show that the conduct referred to in s 146(1)(c) does not constitute "criminal use" of property for the purposes of s 147. If the conduct referred to in s 146(1)(c) does constitute "criminal use" then, having regard to the undisputed application of that paragraph to the facts of this case, the necessary conditions for the making of a crime-used property substitution declaration under s 21 were satisfied. It is desirable therefore, to turn first to that question of construction.The construction of "criminal use" under s 147 As was submitted by the appellant, s 146(1)(c) has a broad application. It covers cases in which acts or omissions were done or facilitated in or on the property in connection with the commission of a confiscation offence. On the face of it, the mere doing of an act in or on a property in connection with the commission of a confiscation offence, does not necessarily fit comfortably within the concept of use applied to property. The relevant ordinary meaning of the verb "use" is to "[m]ake use of (a thing), esp. for a particular end or purpose; utilize, turn to account"[30]. According to that ordinary meaning, "use" would be a subset of the class of conduct described in s 146(1)(c). However, the relationship which the words "in connection with" forge between "act or omission done on the property" and "the commission of a confiscation offence" suggests that even though it may involve an extension of the verb "use", the conduct described in s 146(1)(c) can be brought within the meaning "makes criminal use of property" in s 147, without doing violence to the language of the latter section. In this case, purpose and context favour that interpretation.[30]Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th ed (2007) at 3484.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ, GUMMOW J, HEYDON J