Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander

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DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v ALEXANDER

[2003] SASC 340

Full Court:  Mullighan, Debelle and Gray JJ

  1. MULLIGHAN J The respondent was charged on complaint with producing cannabis contrary to s 31(1)(b) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 and possessing cannabis for sale contrary to s 32(1)(e) of that Act. These charges allege minor indictable offences and there has not been an election for trial by jury. Consequently the information will be heard and determined in the Magistrates Court. The alleged offences were detected on 13th September 2002.

  2. On 21st January 2003 the appellant made an application in the Civil Jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court for a restraining order pursuant to s 15 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 1996 prohibiting the respondent from dealing until further order, with the property situated at 9 Duffield Avenue, Mount Barker, being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title, Register Book Volume 5128 Folio 255 and, presumably, the improvements thereon (“the property”). Both of the offences charged are indictable offences under the law of this State and each of them is a “local forfeiture offence” and a “forfeiture offence” as defined in s 3 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. The second charge is also a serious drug offence under the law of this State and for that reason is also with those definitions. A serious drug offence is defined in s 3 of the Act as meaning an offence involving trade in a drug, or the production, manufacture or preparation of a drug for trade.  “Drug” is defined in that section as meaning a substance that is a drug of dependence or a prohibited substance as defined in the Controlled Substances Act 1984. Cannabis is a prohibited substance: s 12(4) of that Act and Schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances (Prohibited Substances) Regulations 2000.

  3. The application was heard on 21st March 2003 by a learned Magistrate who refused to make the order. Instead, she made an order pursuant to s 26 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 prohibiting the respondent, until further order, from transferring, mortgaging, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the property. The appellant appeals against the decision of the learned Magistrate in refusing the application and in making the order pursuant to s 26 of the Magistrates Court Act.

    Background

  4. Police officers went to the property at about 9.45 am on Friday 13th September 2003 having received information about the cultivation of cannabis at the property.  The respondent was at the property and the police officers were shown two rooms built within a garage containing eight cannabis plants, as well as hydroponic and other equipment being used in their cultivation.  They also found a bucket containing green waste cannabis leaf clippings that weighed 2300 grams. It has not yet been determined how much of this material is cannabis. The respondent produced a pipe used for smoking cannabis. A set of digital kitchen scales was located in a dresser adjacent to the kitchen in…

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Details
Case
[2003] SASC 340
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against Alexander involves the interpretation and application of the Crimes (Serious Drug Offences) Act 2014 in the context of restraining and forfeiture orders. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia, where the appellant challenged the refusal of the primary judge to make a restraining order under section 15(5)(d) of the Act, which mandates automatic forfeiture of property associated with serious drug offences.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the mandatory forfeiture provision under section 15(5)(d) of the Act precludes the court from making a restraining order to preserve property liable to forfeiture pending the resolution of the serious drug offence charges against the defendant. The court had to determine if the statutory requirement for automatic forfeiture, without judicial discretion, was compatible with the broader principles of justice and whether the legislature intended such automatic forfeiture in all cases.

The court held that while restraining orders are necessary and appropriate to preserve property in serious drug offence cases, the automatic forfeiture provision under section 15(5)(d) was flawed. The court believed that the exceptions listed in the Act were not broad enough to cover all circumstances that might warrant a court to refrain from ordering forfeiture. The court compared the current Act unfavourably to its predecessor, the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1986, which allowed for a discretionary approach in both making restraining orders and forfeiture orders. The court found the automatic forfeiture mechanism in the current Act to be inappropriate and potentially unjust, leading to an undesirable situation where courts might prematurely consider forfeiture at the restraining order stage.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal but did not make a restraining order. The appeal was allowed on the basis that the mandatory forfeiture provision should not be applied in a way that prevents the court from making a restraining order to preserve property. The court suggested that the legislature should amend the Act to provide for judicial discretion at both the restraining order and forfeiture stages, similar to the former legislation. The court concluded by agreeing with the reasoning and proposed order of Mullighan J.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander centre on the enforcement of restraining orders and forfeiture orders in the context of serious drug offences. The case involves a situation where the respondent, Alexander, was charged with serious drug-related offences and was subsequently subject to both a restraining order and a forfeiture order under the Crimes (Serious and Organised Crime Control) Act 2008 (SA). Alexander was arrested and charged with manufacturing a commercial quantity of a controlled drug, possessing a commercial quantity of a controlled drug with intent to supply it, and possessing an amount of a controlled drug with intent to supply it. Following his arrest, a restraining order was made to preserve property that was suspected of being involved in or derived from the alleged offences. This order was later replaced by a forfeiture order under section 15 of the Act, which mandated the automatic forfeiture of the property.

The central issue in the case arose from the interaction between the restraining order and the forfeiture order. The respondent argued that the automatic forfeiture provision in section 15(5)(d) of the Act was inappropriate, particularly in cases involving serious drug offences. Alexander contended that the court should have a discretion to decide whether to make a forfeiture order, rather than the order being automatic. This argument was based on the assertion that a court should consider various factors, including the interests of justice, before deciding on the forfeiture of property. The case proceeded through the lower courts, with Alexander appealing the decision to the higher court.

Throughout the proceedings, the facts remained consistent, focusing on the sequence of events following Alexander's arrest, the imposition of the restraining order, and the subsequent application of the forfeiture order. The respondent's legal team emphasised the need for a judicial discretion to balance the preservation of property pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the potential forfeiture of assets. The appeal highlighted the perceived deficiencies in the current legislative framework, particularly the lack of a judicial discretion in cases of serious drug offences, which contrasted with the previous regime under the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1986 (SA).

The matter, Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander, came before the court on appeal from an earlier decision of the South Australian District Court. The District Court had convicted Alexander of serious drug offences and ordered the forfeiture of certain property under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The appeal focused on the interaction between restraining orders and forfeiture orders in the context of serious drug offences. The appellant argued that the automatic forfeiture provision under section 15(5)(d) of the Act was inappropriate and that the court should have the discretion to order forfeiture only after considering whether a conviction has been secured. The appellant contended that the previous statutory regime, which provided for a court discretion both when considering a restraining order and when considering a forfeiture order, operated more satisfactorily. The appeal was heard on its merits, with the appellant submitting that the current legislation caused courts to prematurely consider the question of forfeiture, which was undesirable. The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and compared them to the previous legislative framework, concluding that the current automatic forfeiture provisions were deficient. The appeal was determined based on the arguments presented regarding the procedural and legislative framework, without delving into the substantive legal issues, which would be addressed in subsequent sections of the case note.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MULLIGHAN J DEBELLE J GRAY J
This appeal highlights what I believe to be a serious deficiency of this Act in relation to the interaction between restraining orders and forfeiture orders where a person is convicted of a serious drug offence. It is plainly necessary and appropriate for a court to be able to make a restraining order to preserve property liable to forfeiture pending the disposition of the serious drug offence with which a person has been charged. There can be no question about the utility of a restraining order in those circumstances. It fulfils a like purpose to an interim injunction. However, it is inappropriate for s 15(5)(d) to provide for automatic forfeiture in the manner there prescribed. The exceptions are not sufficiently broad to embrace the number of factors which might cause a court not to make a forfeiture order. The Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1986, the statutory predecessor of this Act, provided in s 6 for an interim order, which the Act called a “sequestration order”, but did not provide for automatic forfeiture. The court had a discretion both when considering whether to make a sequestration order and when considering whether to make a forfeiture order: see Attorney-General v Myer (1989) 51 SASR 234 and in Taylor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia (1991) 55 SASR 462. That regime which invested a court with a discretion at both stages operated satisfactorily. The present regime will have the tendency to cause courts to consider whether it is appropriate to order forfeiture at the time when they are considering whether to make a restraining order. The existence of automatic forfeiture and the interests of justice dictate such a course. That is plainly undesirable. It is far more satisfactory to make a restraining order to preserve the property pending the hearing of the charges and defer the question whether to make a forfeiture order until after it is know whether the person charged has been convicted. For the reasons already given, there should be a discretion whether to order forfeiture even in the case of serious drug offences. I respectfully suggest that it is appropriate for the Parliament to consider amending the legislation to repeal the provisions relating to automatic forfeiture and, as with the former legislation, to invest the court with a discretion both when considering whether to make a restraining order and when considering to make a forfeiture order.Conclusion For these reasons, I would allow the appeal but would not make a restraining order. I agree with the reasons of Mullighan J and with the order he proposes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MULLIGHAN J, DEBELLE J, GRAY J

The court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Alexander considered whether the Crimes (Serious Drug Offences) Act 1986 properly provides for the making of restraining orders and the appropriateness of automatic forfeiture provisions. The court found that it is necessary and appropriate for a court to make a restraining order to preserve property liable to forfeiture pending the disposition of serious drug offence charges. This aligns with the purpose of an interim injunction, ensuring that property is preserved until the outcome of the charges. The court held that the Act's provision for automatic forfeiture under section 15(5)(d) is inappropriate as the exceptions are not broad enough to account for various factors that might influence a court's decision not to make a forfeiture order.

In evaluating the legislation, the court compared the current Act to its predecessor, the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1986, which provided courts with a discretion at both stages of the process: when considering whether to make a sequestration order and when considering whether to make a forfeiture order. Cases such as Attorney-General v Myer (1989) 51 SASR 234 and Taylor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia (1991) 55 SASR 462 underscored the effectiveness of this discretionary regime. The current automatic forfeiture regime, by contrast, tends to compel courts to consider whether forfeiture is appropriate at the time of making a restraining order, which the court deemed undesirable. The presence of automatic forfeiture and the interests of justice require the court to defer the question of forfeiture until after it is known whether the person charged has been convicted.

The court also addressed whether the court should have a discretion to order forfeiture even in cases of serious drug offences, suggesting that the previous regime, which allowed such discretion, operated satisfactorily. The current regime, lacking this discretion, was found to be inadequate. The court concluded that the Parliament should consider amending the legislation to repeal the provisions relating to automatic forfeiture and to restore the discretion to the courts in making both restraining and forfeiture orders. This amendment would align the current legislation more closely with the former regime and better address the interests of justice.

The implications of the current automatic forfeiture regime on the court's consideration of whether to make a restraining order were also considered. The court determined that the existence of automatic forfeiture inevitably influences the court's decision at the restraining order stage, which is contrary to the interests of justice. The court found that it is preferable to make a restraining order to preserve property and to defer the question of forfeiture until after the outcome of the charges is known. This approach ensures a more balanced and fair consideration of the issues involved in serious drug offence cases.

In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal but did not make a restraining order, agreeing with the reasons provided by Mullighan J and the proposed order. The court's reasoning highlights the need for legislative amendments to address the deficiencies in the current Act and to restore the discretion to the courts in making restraining and forfeiture orders.