Western v Director of Public Prosecutions (SA)

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Full Court)

WESTERN v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA)

[2017] SASCFC 177

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Justice Blue, The Honourable Justice Lovell and The Honourable Justice Hinton)

22 December 2017

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - PECUNIARY PENALTY AND LIKE ORDERS - ASSESSMENT OF BENEFIT

On 28 February 2014, the appellant and his co-accused, Mr Slaven and Mr Lawson, were sentenced to periods of imprisonment for a number of offences concerning a longstanding, large scale cannabis growing and distribution operation in South Australia and New South Wales. The sentencing Judge also made a forfeiture order in the amount of $110,000 against Mr Slaven, which amount formed part of $377,100 found in his possession.

On 14 April 2014, the Director of Public Prosecutions applied under s 95 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) for a pecuniary penalty order in the sum of $488,600 in respect of the benefit derived by the appellant and Mr Lawson from the offending.

On 30 November 2015, a Judge of the District Court held that the Director’s application with respect to Mr Lawson failed as being out of time, but made a pecuniary penalty order against the appellant in the sum of $110,200. While 18 parcels sent to the appellant and Mr Lawson intercepted by police contained cash totalling $488,600, the appellant’s derived benefits were limited to the money contained in five parcels the subject of counts 1, 5, 9, 15 and 17 on the Magistrates Court Information. A pecuniary penalty order was made under s 95(1) limited in amount to the monetary value of the benefits derived from the commission of those offences.

Three questions arose for determination on the appeal:

(i) Was the confiscation Judge correct to find that the appellant’s “conviction day” for the purposes of s 95(5) of the Confiscation Act was 9 August 2013, and, accordingly, that the Director’s application for a pecuniary penalty order with respect to the appellant’s trafficking offences was made within time?

(ii) Should the pecuniary penalty order made have been reduced under s 107 of the Confiscation Act by an amount equal to the value of cash forfeited by Mr Slaven?

(iii)    Should the confiscation Judge have apportioned the benefits derived from the commission of counts 1, 5, 9, 15 and 17 between the appellant and Mr Lawson?

Per Blue J:

1.      The action was conducted as an adjunct to the criminal proceedings without a trial or evidence taking place. It should have been conducted as an independent civil proceeding with formal evidence and addresses. In the circumstances there is no basis on which the benefit derived by the appellant can be determined and the matter must be remitted to the District Court for trial.

Per Lovell and Hinton JJ (Blue J agreeing):

1. The Director’s application filed on 14 April 2014 was made before the end of the period of 9 months commencing on 9…

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Details
Case
[2017] SASCFC 177
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the assessment of benefits derived by the appellant from serious offences, in proceedings brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) for a pecuniary penalty order. The appeal was heard by Blue, Lovell and Hinton JJ.

The central legal issue was whether the confiscation judge had sufficient evidence before them to properly assess the value of the benefits derived by the appellant from the commission of serious offences, as required by ss 100 and 101 of the relevant legislation. The court also considered the admissibility and weight of sentencing remarks in confiscation proceedings.

The Full Court expressed serious misgivings about the approach taken by the Director in the confiscation proceedings, finding the factual basis provided insufficient for determining the appellant's derived benefits. The court agreed that sentencing remarks were strictly inadmissible in confiscation proceedings unless the parties agreed, and therefore could not bind the confiscation judge. The court applied the principles outlined in ss 100 and 101, which require the court to consider various forms of evidence when assessing benefits, including property and income, and to presume expenditure represents a benefit unless proven otherwise.

The appeal was allowed, the order of the confiscation judge was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a rehearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Sections 100 and 101 and 98A provide:100—Evidence the court is to consider in assessing the value of benefitsIn assessing the value of benefits that a person has derived from the commission of a serious offence or serious offences, the court must have regard to the evidence before it concerning—(a)the money, or the value of property other than money, that, in connection with the commission of the offence or offences, came into the possession or under the control of—(i) the person; or(ii) another person at the person’s request or direction; and(b)the value of any other benefit that, in connection with the commission of the offence or offences, was provided to—(i) the person; or(ii) another person at the person’s request or direction or in accordance with an arrangement entered into by the person; and(c)if any of the illegal activity consisted of doing an act or thing in relation to a drug—(i) the market value, at the time of the offence, of similar or substantially similar drugs; and(ii) the amount that was, or the range of amounts that were, ordinarily paid for the doing of a similar or substantially similar act or thing; and(d)the value of the person’s property before, during and after the commission of the offence or offences; and(e)the person’s income and expenditure before, during and after the commission of the offence or offences; and(f)any other matter the court considers relevant.101—Value of benefits derived(1)If—(a) an application is made for a pecuniary penalty order against a person in relation to a serious offence or serious offences; and(b) at the hearing of the application, evidence is given that the value of the person’s property during or after the commission of the offence or offences, or any other unlawful activity that the person has engaged in, exceeded the value of the person’s property before the commission of the offence or offences,the court is to treat the value of the benefits derived by the person from the commission of the offence or offences as being not less than the amount of the greatest excess.(2)The amount treated as the value of the benefits under this section is reduced to the extent (if any) that the court is satisfied that the excess was due to causes unrelated to the commission of the serious offence or serious offences or any other unlawful activity that the person has engaged in.(3)If, at the hearing of the application, evidence is given of the person’s expenditure during or after the commission of the serious offence or serious offences, or any other unlawful activity that the person has engaged in, the amount of the expenditure is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to be the value of a benefit that was provided to the person in connection with the commission of the serious offence or serious offences.(4)Subsection (3) does not apply to expenditure to the extent that it resulted in the acquisition of property that is taken into account under subsection (1).98A—Property subject to a person’s effective controlFor the purposes of this Division, the court may treat as property of a person any property that is, in the court’s opinion, subject to the person’s effective control.

Decision

Reasons for decision

We have serious misgivings about the approach taken by the Director.[76] On sentencing the State and the convicted offender are not joined in an issue. It is also the case that the manner in which the confiscation proceeding unfolded and the issues identified and debated was unsatisfactory. The supposed factual basis provides, in fact, no sufficient basis upon which to determine the appellant’s derived benefits. We agree with Blue J that the sentencing remarks were strictly inadmissible and absent agreement of the parties, the remarks could not bind the confiscation Judge. We are left in the position where the matter must be remitted for rehearing.[76] Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] 1 KB 587.Conclusion We would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the confiscation Judge, and remit the matter for rehearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established