Director of Public Prosecution v Western

[2015] SADC 164

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION v WESTERN AND ANOR

[2015] SADC 164

Judgment of His Honour Judge Tilmouth

30 November 2015

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - PECUNIARY PENALTY AND LIKE ORDERS - ASSESSMENT OF BENEFIT

Held:

1. Applications for pecuniary penalty orders dismissed insofar as brought outside the time limit of nine months from the day of conviction allowed by s 95(5)(a) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. For this purpose ‘the day of conviction’ does not occur when an offender is committed to a superior court for sentence by the summary court; it occurs when pleas of guilty are entered in the superior court and an allocutus administered, and if not when a further step in the sentencing process is taken.

2. As the respondents are found to have derived benefits from the commission of serious offences to the extent of $110,200, it is appropriate to make a pecuniary penalty order as against Mr Western in that sum, however the application against Mr Lawson fails because it was commenced out of time.

3. As neither respondents were prosecuted or convicted of all offences of which they might have derived benefits indirectly from the commission thereof in accordance with an arrangement entered into by them with another person, within the meaning of s100(b)(ii) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act, there was no basis for making any further pecuniary penalty order against them, other than with respect to the offences for which both were prosecuted, convicted and sentenced.

Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) s 3, s 35, s 47, s 95, s 99, s 100, s 101, s 220, s 227; Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 (UK) s 4; Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1986 (Vic) s 12; Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 (NZ) ; Criminal Confiscation Property Bill 2000 (WA) s 16; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 21; R v McDowell [2014] 2 Cr App R (S) 14, referred to.
R v Ahmad [2015] AC 299; R v Muldoon [2015] SASCFC 69, applied.
Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2006) 226 CLR 486; R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; R v Dickens [1990] 2 QB 102; R v Porter [1990] 1 WLR 1260; Director of Public Prosecutions v Nieves [1992] 1 VR 257; R v Pedersen [1995] 2 NZLR 386; Allen v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 41 A Crim R 51; R v Peterson [1992] 1 VR 297; R v Hall (2013) 227 A Crim R 544; R v Fagher (1989) 16 NSWLR 67; R v May [2008] 1 AC 1028; R v Green [2008] 1 AC 1053; R v Fields [2014] 2 WLR 233; R v Muldoon [2015] SASCFC 69, considered.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION v WESTERN AND ANOR
[2015] SADC 164

-

Preliminary

1. The Director of Public Prosecutions for this State (the DPP) brings an application against the respondents Sam Western and Nathan Lawson for the payment of amounts to be assessed by the Court.

2. Both men were convicted of numerous charges, mostly of trafficking in the controlled drug cannabis.  The DPP seeks an assessment of the amount they are liable to pay of $488,600, said to be the total amount in cash realised in the commission of those offences.  These reasons explain why the DPP’s application must fail with respect to Mr Lawson and only partially succeed with respect to Mr Western.  The application was originally brought against five named respondents, however notices of discontinuance were filed with respect to Robert Lawson on 5 June 2014, Christopher Western on 23 April 2015 and Lynette Lawson on 29 April 2015.

3. Given that s 95(8) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA) provides any person ‘who would be subject to a pecuniary penalty order … may appear and adduce evidence at the hearing of the application’, the court wrote to both remaining respondents inquiring if they wished to attend in person or appear by way of audio visual link. Both were incarcerated at Cadell Training Centre when these applications were heard. Neither wished to appear, although Mr Lawson’s mother Lynette Lawson attended to represent his interests, and of course Mr Western is represented by counsel, Mr M Mead.

   Background facts

4. The DPP’s application relies principally on the sentencing remarks in relation to both respondents of 28 February 2014.[1]  These reveal that between 5 January and 7 December 2011, 52 parcels containing cash were sent from Queensland to South Australia.  These parcels were collected by either Mr Lawson or Mr Western, or someone connected with them.  Eighteen of those parcels were intercepted by police, opened and found to collectively contain the $488,600 referred to above. 

   [1]    DCCRM-13-985, sentencing remarks.

5. A broad summary of the facts underpinning the charges is as follows.  Messrs Western and Lawson were alleged to have co-ordinated a South Australian syndicate selling cannabis interstate.  A Mr Slaven and another man organised purchasing cannabis from both of them.  The other man received the parcels of cannabis in New South Wales.  Mr Slaven sent cash payments for the cannabis by way of Australia Post parcels from Queensland.  Communications on behalf of the two sides of the operation were conducted through Slaven and Western.  The parcels containing the cash were in amounts ranging from $20,000 to $50,000.  They were forwarded to South Australia for the purposes of purchasing large quantities of cannabis.

6. Those parcels were posted to two post office boxes controlled by the respondents.  Parcels of cannabis were then dispatched by them to an Adamstown Post Office box controlled by one Jason Lackey.  Adamstown is a suburb of Newcastle in New South Wales.  On 13 December 2011 Mr Western sent a parcel containing 272 g of cannabis to this address.  This dispatch became the subject of Count 19 on the information filed in the criminal jurisdiction of the court.  The following day, 12 hydroponic plants and 3,698.5 g of cannabis were seized from a Paralowie address occupied by Mr Lawson (counts 20 and 21) and 4,555 g of cannabis was seized from a vehicle linked to him (count 22).  Counts 23-26 inclusive also related to separate cannabis seizures linked to him.

7. A further $377,100 in cash was found in the possession of Mr Slaven. He conceded during the sentencing process that $110,000 of this related to the cannabis purchasing enterprise. A forfeiture order was made on 28 February 2014 by the sentencing Judge of $110,000 with respect to cash seized by police from him, pursuant to s 47 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA).

   The criminal indictment

8. The original Information filed in the District Court charged numerous offences as follows.  Nathan Lawson was individually charged on the Information on counts 1-18, and 20-25 inclusive.  Counts 20-22 referred to cannabis and grow houses forming part of the same continuing enterprise on the prosecution case, but was not as yet distributed when the police raided on the 19 December 2011.  Each man appears to have played different but significant roles, Slaven by moving cash around and by selling and collecting some of the cannabis parcels and in communicating with Sam Western.  He and Lawson were primarily responsible for sourcing the cannabis, its cultivation, packaging and dispatch by post.

9. Nathan Lawson, Nicholas Slaven and Sam Western were jointly charged on count 19.  Nathan Lawson and Lynette Lawson were charged jointly on count 26.  Eight other charges came before the District Court by way of committals for sentence, which for the purpose of these reasons were assigned the nominal counts 27-34.  Sam Western was individually charged on the nominal counts 32-34 inclusive, as diligently plotted by my Associate Ms Woods, in the chart which has become Appendix A to these reasons.  Counts 27-31 inclusive, jointly charged Nicholas Slaven and Sam Western, in contrast with counts 32-34 which were pressed against Sam Western alone.  The respondents together with Mr Slaven were jointly charged in respect of count 19 and they were each committed for trial to the District Court.  Each pleaded guilty to that count on 9 August 2013.

10. The gravamen of the offending was alleged to be a long running and ongoing interstate cannabis operation.  On the prosecution case both Sam Western and Nathan Lawson established grow houses in order to cultivate, harvest, and package cannabis.  They were also alleged to have assisted family members and other associates to set up grow houses and to cultivate cannabis, which they then purchased and sent interstate for sale at a profit.  On 14 December 2011 police searched a number of properties used by various respondents to cultivate and package the cannabis as an integral part of the interstate trafficking operation.  In particular, at an address in Paralowie, police located 12 cannabis plants hydroponically grown in two grow rooms and 3,698.5 g of cannabis, either drying or packaged.  These became the subject of counts 20 and 21 respectively against Mr Lawson and counts 32 and 33 against Mr Western, which ultimately were not proceeded with against Mr Lawson, whereas Mr Western was committed for sentence on these two counts.  At another address in the nearby suburb of Salisbury Downs, police seized 4,555 g of cannabis from a vehicle parked at the rear.  This formed the subject of count 22 against Mr Lawson for which he was committed for trial, and count 34 on which Mr Western was committed for sentence.

11. Further seizures followed at a Unit in Seaton, where police found 10 small cannabis plants on a laundry floor, and 4,989.0 g of cannabis sealed in vacuum bags in the lounge and kitchen (counts 23 and 24 solely against Mr Lawson).  At a house in Kadina, police located nine cannabis plants grown hydroponically in one room, and 21 cannabis plants comprised of three clones in a bedroom (count 25).  A further 18 plants were seized from two grow rooms at a house in Seaton owned by the mother of Mr Lawson and used by him (count 26).

12. The DPP made a conscious decision to accept pleas from different accused, on various charges and on differing bases.[2]  Counts 2-4, 6-8, 10-14, 16, 18, 20 and 21 were thereupon not proceeded with.  The submission mounted on behalf of Sam Western in these proceedings is that the sentencing Judge did not make concrete or binding findings of fact in relation to the receipt of cash as between the several defendants, and it follows the two respondents.  Upon their arrest neither were found to be in possession of substantial assets or cash.  It was therefore submitted that it becomes necessary for the DPP to identify precisely the benefits obtained by each respondent individually, with respect to the commission of which offences and that it is inappropriate to make any orders.

    [2]    T6.22-.38, 14 February 2014.

    Legislative context

13. The precise order sought by the DPP is described in the legislation as a ‘pecuniary penalty order’. It is conceded the onus of proof on the balance of probabilities lies with the DPP, as dictated by s 220(1) and (2) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. The application is brought in the first instance pursuant to s 95(1) thereof, which requires the court to be satisfied the respondents were convicted of serious offences (which is conceded) and that each derived ‘benefits’ from the commission of such offences. It is the latter requirement which is the focus of these proceedings.

14. Section 95(1) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act provides:

    95—Making pecuniary penalty orders

    (1)     A court must, on application by the DPP, make an order (a pecuniary penalty order) requiring a specified person to pay to the Crown an amount determined under Subdivision 2 if satisfied that—

    (a)the person has been convicted of, or has committed, a serious offence; and

    (b)     the person derived benefits from the commission of the offence.

    Section 3 thereof provides ‘a person derives a benefit’ if ‘the person’ or ‘another person at the request or direction of the first person, derives the … benefit ... whether directly or indirectly’.

15. It is submitted by the DPP that by employing the expression ‘must’ in the opening words to s 95(1), an order becomes obligatory once the twin requirements provided for therein are satisfied. That proposition is to be doubted given the decision of the Full Court in Department of Public Prosecutions (SA) v George.[3]

    [3] (2008) 102 SASR 246, [80], [170], [216]-[218], [226]-[228], [239], [245].

16. Once such an order is made, the quantum is determined by applying the formula provided by s 99 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. This reads:

    99—Determining penalty amounts

    The amount that a person is ordered to pay under a pecuniary penalty order (the penalty amount) is determined by—

    (a) in the case of an application under section 95(1)—

    (i)assessing under this Subdivision the total value of the benefits the person derived from—

    (A)    the commission of the serious offence; and

    (B)the commission of any other offence that constitutes unlawful activity; and

    (ii)subtracting from the total value the sum of the reductions (if any) in the penalty amount under sections 107 and 108; or

    (b)     in the case of an application under section 95(2)—assessing the value of the instrument (as at the time of assessment) and subtracting from the value the sum of the reductions (if any) in the penalty amount under sections 107 and 108.

17. In the process of assessing the value of such benefits, the DPP submits the court must have regard to the evidence before the sentencing judge, particularly as to money accumulated in connection with the commission of the subject offences, and whether that money came into the control of the respondents, or another person at their request or direction.

18. Section 100 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act provides:

    100—Evidence the court is to consider in assessing the value of benefits

    In assessing the value of benefits that a person has derived from the commission of a serious offence or serious offences, the court must have regard to the evidence before it concerning—

    (a)     the money, or the value of property other than money, that, in connection with the commission of the offence or offences, came into the possession or under the control of—

    (i)    the person; or

    (ii)    another person at the person's request or direction; and

    (b)     the value of any other benefit that, in connection with the commission of the offence or offences, was provided to—

    (i)    the person; or

    (ii)another person at the person's request or direction or in accordance with an arrangement entered into by the person; and

    (c)     if any of the illegal activity consisted of doing an act or thing in relation to a drug—

    (i)the market value, at the time of the offence, of similar or substantially similar drugs; and

    (ii)the amount that was, or the range of amounts that were, ordinarily paid for the doing of a similar or substantially similar act or thing; and

    (d)     the value of the person's property before, during and after the commission of the offence or offences; and

    (e)     the person's income and expenditure before, during and after the commission of the offence or offences; and

    (f)    any other matter the court considers relevant.

    As this provision expressly provides that the court ‘must have regard to’ evidence of the various matters set out therein, it does not define the specific benefit derived from a serious offence, but rather guides the court as to the value of the benefits once proved to be so derived: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Gay.[4]

    [4] [2015] TASSC 15, [67]-[69]

19. Section 102 proceeds to require the court to value the benefit as at the time it makes its assessment, and section 103 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act forbids the court from subtracting any expenses or outgoings incurred by the offender in relation to such offences. This is consistent with the position under case law: Director of Public Prosecutions v Nieves;[5] R v Pedersen;[6] R v Dickens.[7]

    [5] [1992] 1 VR 257, 262.

    [6] [1995] 2 NZLR 386, 392.

    [7] [1990] 2 QB 102.

20. Legislation of this kind was intended to be draconian, because the fundamental underlying purpose of the above provisions is to deprive criminals of their ill-gotten gains: Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA);[8] International Finance XX Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime Commission;[9] V v New South Wales Crime Commission;[10] Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v Tape.[11]

    [8] (2006) 226 CLR 486, [50].

    [9] (2009) 240 CLR 319, [82].

    [10] [2013] NSWCA 282, [72].

    [11] [2013] SADC 175, [14].

21. The submission for the DPP is that by reference to the amount of $488,600 in the sentencing remarks, the sentencing Judge effectively binds the court to reach the conclusion that this sum represents the relevant quantum for the purposes of making the pecuniary penalty orders sought, being a finding necessarily made beyond reasonable doubt: R v Olbrich.[12] 

    [12] (1999) 199 CLR 270, 281.

22. Obviously the central consideration is proof of the fact that each respondent ‘derived benefits from the commission of the offence’, in addition to proof of the value of any other benefit provided to the respondents by another person at his or their request or direction, or in accordance with an arrangement entered into by the respondents. These criteria which are contained in s 100(b) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act, have not as yet been the subject of judicial consideration in this State.

    The underlying sentences

23. The course of proceedings in the criminal court against both respondents is a complicated one.  Both Sam Western and Nathan Lawson were presented on an Information dated 17 June 2013 containing 26 counts together with two other defendants.  It comprised the 18 counts of trafficking in the controlled drug cannabis, four of trafficking in a large commercial quantity of cannabis and four of cultivating cannabis plants for sale.  Samuel Western was committed for sentence on an additional five counts of selling cannabis (which appear in Appendix A as trafficking in a controlled drug), two of trafficking in a large commercial quantity of cannabis and one of cultivating cannabis.

24. On 28 February 2014, both men together with Nicholas Slaven, were sentenced by this court sitting in its criminal jurisdiction by her Honour Judge Davey.  The defendants each received head sentences of seven years and six months imprisonment.  The respondents Nathan Lawson and Sam Western were subjected to non-parole periods of three years and nine months, commencing from the 9 August 2013, when they were first remanded in custody.  Nicholas Slaven was given a non-parole of 4 years and 6 months, effective from 21 October 2013.  The difference between the non-parole period aspects of the sentences lies in what her Honour considered to be that ‘Mr Lawson and Mr Western are not only younger but have demonstrated better prospects of rehabilitation’.[13] At the same time her Honour made another order for forfeiture of $110,000 cash seized by police in the possession of Mr Slaven, pursuant to s 47 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act.  As these are separate amounts to those claimed in the application for pecuniary penalty orders, no occasion arises for a deduction on account of these earlier orders. 

    [13]   Sentencing Remarks, page 13, [5].

25. In a separate sentence imposed on 5 May 2014, Lynette Lawson was sentenced with respect to a charge of cultivating cannabis to 10 months imprisonment suspended, to be of good behaviour for three years.  This sentence related to the cultivation of 18 plants on the Seaton premises owned by her in conjunction with her son, the second respondent (count 26). 

1. In the result, the first respondent Samuel Western was sentenced on one offence for which he was committed for trial (count 19), plus eight charges committed for sentence and nominally recorded as counts 27-34 inclusive for Registry purposes, as appears in Appendix A, comprising five counts of trafficking, two counts of trafficking in a large commercial quantity and one count of cultivating a controlled plant.  Nathan Lawson was sentenced on counts 1, 5, 9, 15, 17, 19, and 22-26 (inclusive),   comprising five counts of trafficking in cannabis, three counts of trafficking in a large commercial quantity of cannabis and three counts of cultivating controlled plants for sale.

2. For his part Nicholas Slaven was sentenced on counts 19, and counts 27-31 inclusive, being those counts for which he was committed for sentence, comprising five counts of trafficking and one count of trafficking in a large commercial quantity of cannabis.

   The sentencing remarks

3. It appears that the DPP made considered decisions as to which pleas to accept, from which accused and as to which charges.  Nolle prosequis were then entered on 15 counts, namely counts 2-4, 6-8, 10-14, 16, 18 and 20-21.  Unsurprisingly the sentencing Judge expressed some degree of frustration in her sentencing remarks of 28 February 2014 over the failure of the Director to provide an:[14]

   … adequate explanation as to why there are different charges and pleas in respect of all three offenders with some different maximum penalties notwithstanding the DPP’s assertion that they should... be treated equally in terms of their involvement ...

   [14]   Sentencing Remarks, page 4, [3].

4. Her Honour accepted however that broadly speaking the three men had equal involvement in conducting the enterprise, whilst noting neither Mr Nathan Lawson nor Mr Sam Western were found to be in possession of very substantial assets or cash arising from the enterprise.[15] 

   [15]   Sentencing Remarks, page 5 [2], page 3, respectively.

5. The sentencing remarks also reveal the further factual basis of sentence, namely that Mr Slaven was found on his arrest in Queensland in possession of $377,100.  He conceded $110,000 was part of the proceeds derived from the cannabis enterprise, whilst denying the balance was related to illegal activity, a contention rejected by her Honour.[16]  This sum was in addition to the sum of $488,600 mentioned earlier.  As also mentioned earlier, no distinct finding was made as to what amounts of money related to which counts, or which accused,[17] apart from a concluding observation that ‘(N)othing that has fallen from me should be taken to indicate that I think that the balance of those funds were lawfully obtained.’[18]

   [16]   Sentencing Remarks, page 12, [5].

   [17]   Sentencing Remarks, page 13, [1].

   [18]   Sentencing Remarks, page 14, [5].

6. As to issues related to the potential proceeds, her Honour noted that Mr Slaven was found with $377,100 in cash ‘found in a locked white box in your home’, which she considered to be indicative of ‘the importance of your role within the organisation’ and from which he appears ‘to have made substantial profits’.[19] She noted however that he ‘pleaded guilty to a lesser number of offences and with a lower level of penalty overall’.[20] Her Honour made no discrete findings with reference to benefits or proceeds relating to Mr Lawson, or Mr Western, other than as already noted.

   [19]   Sentencing Remarks, page 12, [3].

   [20]   Sentencing Remarks, page 12, [3].

7. During the course of submissions in mitigation, no counsel disputed the respective cash amounts or the circumstances in which they were received.  Nor was any issue taken with respect to the total cash of $488,600 being in the 18 parcels to which the original first 18 counts related.  It can be seen that the respondents were jointly presented on count 19 (together with Mr Slaven), and on most of the committals for sentence, the nominal counts 27-31 inclusive.  Those counts to which the $488,600 related – counts 1-18 inclusive – were laid solely against Mr Lawson, of which only counts 1, 5, 9, 15 and 17 proceeded.

8. As noted earlier, it was accepted by the parties in the criminal proceedings that the $488,600 sum related to the offences charged in counts 1-18 on the District Court Information dated 17 June 2013.  Of those counts 1-18 on the District Court Information, Messrs Western and Slaven were also charged with counts 1, 5, 9, 15, and 17.  However as Western entered pleas of guilty to those charges in the lower court and was therefore committed for sentence on those counts, they therefore do not appear on the District Court Information.  The charges against Western representative of counts 1, 5, 9, 15 and 17 are assigned the nominal count numbers 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, as represented in Appendix A.

9. As such, by charging and accepting the pleas in this way, all three defendants Lawson, Western and Slaven were effectively jointly charged in respect of the five counts, which tabulate as follows involving the following cash sums:[21]

   -       1 and 27:   $21,600

   -       5 and 28:   $21,600

   -       9 and 29:   $21,600

   -       15 and 30: $25,200

   -       17 and 31: $20,200

   [21]   Sentencing Remarks, page 6 at [4], [5], [6], [7] and [8].

10. Following the nolle prosequis entered by the Prosecution during the course of the sentencing proceedings, the breakdown of the counts involving sums proven to be derived by each defendant, are as follows:

    -       LAWSON:         Counts 1, 5, 9, 15, 17

    -       WESTERN:       Counts 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

    -       SLAVEN:           Counts 27, 28, 29, 30, 31

    It is therefore clear that the defendants entered pleas of guilty and were sentenced for the same joint offending in relation to what was for practical purposes, the same five counts, which involved total proceeds derived by them of $110,200.

    Applications within time?

11. A preliminary point taken in a written submission filed with the court and articulated in later oral submissions on behalf of the respondents, was that the applications for pecuniary penalty orders were issued out of time.  The applications were filed by the DPP with the court on 14 April 2014.  The court record demonstrates the guilty pleas were entered in the summary court on 17 May 2013.  Arraignment in the District Court on the charges committed for trial were first heard on 17 June 2013.  On that date the arraignments of Nathan and Lynette Lawson were adjourned to the 24 June 2013, whereas pleas of not guilty were entered by Mr Western and Mr Slaven as to count 19.  Pleas of guilty were taken by Judge Davey from Nathan Lawson on 24 June 2013, on counts 1, 5, 9, 15, 17, 22, 23, 24 and 25, on 9 August 2013 for count 19, and on 24 October 2013 for count 26 from Nathan and on 7 April 2014 from Lynette Lawson.  Whereas for Sam Western all charges but count 19 proceeded on the basis of the committals for sentence.  The exception was his joint plea of guilty with Messrs Lawson and Slaven on 9 August 2013 to count 19.

12. For reasons given later, the point of conviction on the offences against both respondents in the District Court, crystallised after their pleas were entered, when either an allocotus was administered, or they were remanded, that is to say when some further step in the sentencing process was taken.  For the purpose of counts 1, 5, 9, 15, and 17, in relation to Nathan Lawson convictions were entered on 24 June 2013 when the allocotus was administered to him after his pleas of guilty were taken.  Clearly the application for pecuniary penalty orders based on these offences is well out of time.

13. Ordinarily a conviction occurs when a plea of guilty is entered and once an allocotus is administered: Director of Public Prosecutions v Nguyen;[22] Director of Public Prosecutions v Hall,[23] or alternatively when the court finally indicates a determination of the question of guilt: R v Tonke & Goss;[24] Maxwell v The Queen;[25] R v Shillingsworth;[26] R v Collins;[27] R v Hall.[28]

    [22] (2008) 19 VR 662.

    [23] [2014] SADC 156, [4].

    [24]   [1963] UR 121.

    [25] 1996) 184 CLR 501, 509, 520.

    [26]   [1985] 1 Qld R 537, 543.

    [27] (1994) 76 A Crim R 204, 210.

    [28] [2014] SADC 156 at [4], and on appeal (2015) 122 SASR 12 at [28].

14. The precise point of conviction in the District Court with respect to those charges on which Mr Western was committed for sentence, without an allocotus being administered, is not so clear. Section 95(5) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act requires applications for pecuniary penalty orders to be made ‘before the end of the period of nine months commencing on the conviction day’. The definition of ‘conviction’ in s 5 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act does not assist, except only to confirm that a conviction can occur on a day other than the day on which sentence is pronounced.

15. The common law was to the effect that the return of a verdict of guilty amounts to a conviction.  The position was not as clear where an accused person pleaded guilty.  Barwick CJ cautioned that for clarity ordinarily judges should indicate a conviction is entered: Griffiths v The Queen.[29] A remand specifically for sentence equally marks the point of conviction: Della Patrona v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2);[30] Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Helou.[31]

    [29] (1977) 137 CLR 293, [302].

    [30] (1995) 38 NSWLR 257.

    [31] (2003) 58 NSWLR 574.

16. The act of committal for sentence by a summary court proceeds according to s 105(2)(c)(i)(B) of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).  It is noticeable that the statutory mechanism providing for committal for sentence does not employ the language of conviction, or even of guilt.  Rather s 105(2)(b)(i) of the Summary Procedure Act provides only that a defendant may ‘admit the charge’, and s 105(2)(c)(i)(B) thereupon requires the summary court to ‘commit the defendant to a superior court for sentence’.  The statutory language and construct of the committal mechanism is therefore strongly suggestive of a Parliamentary intention to defer the fact of conviction and sentence to the superior Court: R v Muldoon.[32]  The subsequent mechanism for allocating the forum for various offences to be committed to the Supreme or District Courts provided for in s 108, reinforces that view, as does the capacity for a change of plea following committal for sentence, provided for in s 111(2) of the Summary Procedure Act when the court is ‘satisfied that the interests of justice require it to do so’.

    [32] [2015] SASCFC 69 at [31].

17. Another fundamental consideration is one of jurisdiction.  A summary court committing a defendant for sentence in a superior court, simply has no jurisdiction to sentence that defendant.  It therefore necessarily lacks the jurisdiction to impose a conviction, as a conviction is an inseparable component of the sentencing process.  This was the point left open by Aickin J in Griffiths v The Queen.[33]  Still further, it is authoritatively established that a plea of guilty does not of its own force without more, constitute a conviction: R v Tonke & Goss;[34] R v Jerome,[35] Griffiths v The Queen,[36] and Maxwell v The Queen.[37]

    [33] (1997) 137 CLR 293, 337.

    [34] [1963] VR 121, 127-128.

    [35] [1964] Qd R 595, 604.

    [36] (1997) 137 CLR 293, 334.

    [37] (1996) 184 CLR 501, 508-509, 519-521.

18. On the clear construction of the relevant provisions of the Summary Procedure Act, it must follow that the respondent Sam Western was not convicted in the requisite sense by the mere entry of a pleas of guilty in the summary court, or for that matter in the act of committal for sentence.  Convictions were effectively entered when he appeared in the District Court on 9 August 2013 with respect to the offences for which the pecuniary penalty orders are sought.  The applicant’s filing with the court on 14 April 2014 is therefore plainly out of time with respect to Mr Lawson, being more than nine months following conviction, whereas it is within time with respect to Mr Western.

19. A belated attempt was made on behalf of the DPP to salvage the situation by reference to s 99 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. This provides:

    Subdivision 2 – Pecuniary penalty order amounts

    99-Determining penalty amounts

    The amount that a person is ordered to pay under a pecuniary penalty order (the penalty amount) is determined by-

    (a) in the case of an application under section 95(1)-

    (i)assessing under this Subdivision the total value of the benefits the person derived from-

    (A)     the commission of the serious offence; and

    (B) the commission of any other offence that constitutes an unlawful activity; ...

    Section 3 defines ‘unlawful activity’ as follows:

    unlawful activity means an unlawful act or omission-

    (a)     that constitutes a serious offence; or

    (b)     that would, if committed in this State, constitute a serious offence.

20. It is unclear what work the ‘any other offence that constitutes an unlawful activity’ aspect of s 99 has to do, although doubtless it is to be given effect ‘according to its spirit, true, intent and meaning’: s 21 Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA). For this purpose the DPP latches onto the plea to count 19 taken on 9 August 2013, which is within the nine months for bringing an application provided for in s 95(5).

21. This submission last articulated in a written submission by the DPP dated 17 November 2015, must fail for a variety of reasons. First, s 99 is not concerned with primary liability for the imposition of pecuniary penalty orders, but rather with the amount or value thereof once that liability is first established. The DPP has failed to demonstrate the liability of Mr Lawson for such an order in the first place for the reasons set out above, so the application of s 99 simply does not arise. Secondly, by s 5 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act a ‘conviction’ relates to a specified offence.  As count 19 is not an offence committed over which the respondents are alleged to have derived benefits from, it can be of no avail to the DPP here.

22. Thirdly, by parity of reasoning with that of the Full Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v George,[38] such a contention would serve to indirectly by-pass the partially ameliorate or hardship provisions furnished by s 95(3) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act, thus achieving indirectly what cannot be done directly. Section 95(3) provides:

    (3)  In considering whether it is appropriate to make a pecuniary penalty order under subsection (2), the court may have regard to-

    (a)any hardship that may reasonably be expected to be caused to any person (other than the person against whom the order is sought) by the operation of the order; and

    (b)the use that is ordinarily made, or was intended to be made, of the property; and

    (c)the gravity of the offence or offences concerned; and

    (d) any other matter the court thinks fit.

    [38]   Above.

23. That is to say it would be to ‘trump’ the conclusion that a person was not liable to a pecuniary penalty order under s 95(2), simply because the person happened to commit ‘any other offence that constitutes unlawful activity’, even though no benefit was derived therefrom, and even though the person might otherwise satisfy the potentially exculpatory criteria set out in s 95(3).

    Analogous case law

24. There are in fact no authorities directly on point construing the subject statutory provisions, so it becomes necessary to consider those made under analogous legislation for guidance.  In R v Porter,[39] the Court of Appeal (UK) considered a confiscation order for an amount to be paid jointly and severally by two defendants convicted of the same drug offence.  An order in that form was held to be erroneous and set aside by substituting an order for the payment of one-half of the amount of the benefit by each defendant.  Garland J, speaking for the court, wrote:[40]

    However this Court takes the view that the Act of 1986 does not contemplate, as the judge thought, joint penalties, even though there has been a joint venture. There must be certainty in sentencing. A convicted person is entitled to know the extent of his monetary liability; a fortiori when he is liable to lose his liberty if he fails to discharge a monetary penalty.

    [39] [1990] 1 WLR 1260.

    [40] Ibid at 1263.

25. Then in Director of Public Prosecutions v Nieves[41] the Court of Criminal Appeal proceeded to distinguish R v Porter,[42] citing Allen v DPP,[43] on the basis that:[44]

    Notwithstanding the different method of enforcement under the UK Act, in our opinion an order made under s 12 of the Victorian Act is in the nature of a penalty to which a convicted person is subjected in consequence of his commission of the offence of which he or she is being convicted. It is in substance a part of his sentence for the offence.

    [41] [1992] 1 VR 257.

    [42]   Above.

    [43] (1989) 41 A Crim R 51 at 56.

    [44]   Above at 264.

26. The court added the observation that in ‘the absence of evidence, the court may assume each convicted person who was a party to the offence shared equally the benefits derived from the joint offence: cf Porter at 128’.[45]  Therefore it was ordered repayment by each convicted person of a specific and equal share of the benefit obtained, despite their observation that ‘this case was undoubtedly a joint enterprise’.[46] 

    [45]   Above at 264.

    [46]   Ibid pp 264-268.

27. However in R v Peterson[47] a differently constituted quorum explained the Court’s earlier decision in Nieves in this manner:[48]

    As it follows from Nieves’ Case that the actual recipient of money paid in exchange for drugs does not himself necessarily derive a benefit and attract a pecuniary penalty order in the sum of the money so received, it must, we believe, follow that in a disputed case an inquiry should be made designed to ascertain the value of the benefit actually derived by the particular person “as the result of committing the offence”.

    [47] [1992] 1 VR 297.

    [48] Ibid at 301.

28. The court in Peterson considered that because the actual recipient of money paid in exchange for drugs had not personally derived a benefit such as to attract a pecuniary penalty order in the sum of money so received, and because Mr Peterson had immediately passed to another person that money, the primary Judge’s order refusing to make an order should stand for lack of proof.  The true value of the benefit Mr Peterson actually received was considered to be contained in the drugs received for his own use, the quantity or value of which was not investigated.  Marks J was at pains to point out that the orders are based on the ‘value of the benefit derived by the offender against whom the order is sought from the crime’.[49]  His judgment continued:[50]

    The court imposing the penalty must therefore be satisfied what it was that the offender derived. What fruits of the crime the offender “handled” is not necessarily what he or she “derived”. But evidence without more (as in Nieves) that the offender did handle the money or part of it yielded by the criminal transaction might be sufficient “prima facie” to support an order. It will depend on the circumstances.

    [49] Ibid at 303, emphasis in original.

    [50] Ibid.

29. Both Victorian decisions have proven influential in other Australian jurisdictions.  For instance Nieves was applied by the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions,[51] holding the assessment of the value of the benefit, relates only to that part of the property, advantage or benefit the offender did not establish was acquired otherwise than as a result of involvement in the confiscation offence.  The applicable legislation provided for declarations in cases of those acquiring a criminal benefit ‘wholly or partly derived or realised, directly or indirectly, as a result of the … involvement in the commission of the confiscation offence’.[52]

    [51] (2007) 33 WAR 227.

    [52]   Criminal Confiscation Property Bill 2000 (WA) s16(1)(c).

30. After examining the case law in point, Steytler P, with whom McLure and Buss JJA agreed, came to this conclusion:

    [44] However, the division of the Act dealing with criminal benefits (Pt 3, Div 2) seems to me to be designed to ensure that criminals do not benefit from their crimes rather than to impose upon them penalties over and above those that might be expected from the courts acting in their ordinary criminal jurisdiction. That seems to me to be apparent from the whole notion of a criminal benefit (even accepting that that notion is broadly conveyed by the words “property, service, advantage or benefit”).

1. In so doing his Honour drew a distinction between provisions dealing with property used in or in connection with the commission of confiscation offences, in which case all the property the offender owns or effectively controls is liable to confiscation, as lying in a different category to criminal benefits.[53]

   [53] (2007) 33 WAR 227 at [45].

2. The comparable statutory provision under consideration in R v Hall[54] was to the effect that the court was required to determine whether an offender ‘derived any benefit’ and if so to assess the value of that benefit.  The Court of Appeal held in effect that a stringent standard of proof was not required when undertaking that assessment.  In so doing it applied the comments from its earlier decision in R v Fagher, in which Roden J had observed:[55]

   Calculation or assessment of the value of the benefits derived by a particular offender from any criminal transaction, is likely to be difficult. There will be no audited accounts available, nor can one expect a contract or other documentation evidencing the nature of the dealings among the several participants who may be involved. Additionally, if the participants themselves give evidence of the details of those transactions, their evidence is unlikely to be the most reliable, and to the extent that it may be relied upon is unlikely to disclose clearly defined legal relationships.

   [54] (2013) 227 A Crim R 544.

   [55] (1989) 16 NSWLR 67 at 71.

3. The Victorian decisions referred to earlier, were also considered by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Pedersen.[56]The legislation under review provided for a pecuniary penalty order in respect of ‘benefits derived by a person from the commission of a serious offence’.  Although several judgments were delivered, a consensus emerged that whatever ‘benefits’ precisely meant, it included the proceeds of sale of property.

   [56] [1995] 2 NZLR 386.

4. Of course these cases were decided on legislation with varying degrees of relevance to the local position.  They are in unison in general terms however, in connecting the benefit derived by the particular offender against whom an order is sought, directly with the commission of a specific qualifying offence.

   Criminal Assets Confiscation Act - construction

5. It is now necessary to return to the legislation at hand. Sections 95(1)(b), 99(a)(i), s 100 and s 101(1) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act each tie the ‘derived benefits’ to the commission of an offence, or specific offences. In ordinary usage, ‘benefits’ is a wide protean term, certainly wider in breadth than related and more precise expressions that might otherwise be employed, such as ‘proceeds’, ‘earnings’, ‘receipts’ and the like. Section 100(a) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act replicates the necessity for proof of demonstrable connection with the benefits derived from the commission of a qualifying offence coming into the offender’s possession or control.  The question whether benefit was derived therefrom must therefore depend upon an ‘identification of the criminal conduct admitted or proved’: R v McDowell.[57]

   [57]   [2014] 2 Cr App R (S) 14, [34].

6. Section 100(a)(i) and (ii) extend the concept of control to benefits acquired by ‘another person at the person's request or direction’, and to benefits acquired ‘in accordance with an arrangement entered into by the person’. The former expression adopts the language of agency and is apt to apply to innocent agents such as couriers, friends or nominees acting as a conduit of the offender. The latter expression is more akin to that of complicity and is therefore more apt to apply to accomplices. It is well understood by the criminal law that when two or more persons reach an understanding or arrangement to commit a crime, they are equally liable for the acts constituting that crime, regardless of what part each played in its commission, that is to say they are acting in concert in committing the crime: R v Lowery and King (No 2);[58] Osland v The Queen.[59]The language of s 100(a)(ii) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act is consistent with importing these concepts.

   [58] [1972] VR 560, 560.

   [59] (1998) 197 CLR 316 [73].

7. As so understood, it emerges that s 95 coupled with s 100(a) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act, are to be read as applying to offenders (all other pre-requisites being met) having:

   1.possession or control of ‘derived benefits’ from the commission of an offence, or offences;

   2.possession or control of ‘derived benefits’ indirectly from the commission of an offence though the agency of another person at the offender's request or direction, that is to say through the agency of an innocent agent; or

   3.possession or control of ‘derived benefits’ indirectly from the commission of an offence in which the offender is complicit, that is as a co-conspirator, or joint criminal adventurer with persons acting in criminal concert.

8. The latter conclusion derives in the first place from the very words of s 100(b)(ii) ‘in accordance with an arrangement entered into by the person’. It is a conclusion that is coincidentally supported by reference to analogous decisions in the United Kingdom. For instance in R v May[60] the House of Lords determined that to apportion liability between parties jointly liable pursuant to a joint criminal purpose, would be contrary to principle and unauthorised by the legislative scheme under consideration.  The defendant and others were convicted of conspiracy to cheat and ordered to pay amounts equal to the total benefit received jointly by all the conspirators.[61]  Their Lordships considered the sum the defendants had jointly obtained or benefited from, was in law as much his as if he was acting alone, and should not therefore be apportioned.  This decision was followed shortly after in R v Green,[62] in which the House of Lords held that where two or more defendants obtain control of property from joint criminal conduct, each was liable to be deprived of the total value of the benefit under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (UK).  This case involved drug related conspiracy charges.

   [60] [2008] 1 AC 1028.

   [61] Ibid, [46].

   [62] [2008] 1 AC 1053.

9. Both decisions were applied by the Court of Appeal in R v Fields,[63] which construed s 6(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (UK) as authorising jointly obtained benefits to be valued in the whole amount of property obtained in respect of each defendant.  It was held the three defendants who were convicted of conspiracy to defraud, were each properly adjudged liable to a confiscation order in the full amount of a joint benefit, without apportionment or a deduction.

   [63] [2015] AC 299.

10. The same view was taken in R v Ahmad[64] by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, another case of conspiracy to defraud and which, because of its importance, is quoted at length:

    [44] In so far as technical English property law concepts are concerned, it may be more accurate to refer to several conspirators acquiring possession in common of any asset or money, rather than jointly owning the asset or money. However, rather than invoking English property law concepts, it is more appropriate to treat such conspirators as obtaining the asset or money together, which has the same meaning as “jointly”, provided that the latter word is understood in its ordinary English, and not its technical, legal sense. “Obtain” is the statutory word, and “joint” reflects the criminal enterprise. While some aspects of English property law in connection with ownership may be esoteric, there is nothing remote from daily life about two burglars jointly (i e together) obtaining a television. The burglars do not become the owners of the television, and the argument about them being “joint owners” or “owners in common” proceeds on a wrong premise. Each burglar has usurped the rights of the owner.

    [45]    The basic point made by Lord Bingham, and discussed in paras 41-42 above, therefore appears to us to be, to put it at its lowest, sustainable, given the statutory language, which is not concerned with ownership but with obtaining. As just demonstrated, it is perfectly acceptable, as a matter of ordinary language, to describe the people involved in a criminal joint enterprise which results in the obtaining of a chattel, cash, a credit balance or land, as having jointly obtained the item concerned, in the sense of having obtained it between them. The fact that the item may have been physically taken or acquired by, or held in the name of, one of them does not undermine the conclusion that they jointly obtained it. The word “obtain” should be given a broad, normal meaning, and the non-statutory word “joint”, referred to by Lord Bingham in R v May [2008] AC 1028, paras 17, 27-34, should be understood in the same non-technical way.

    [46]    Accordingly, where property is obtained as a result of a joint criminal enterprise, it will often be appropriate for a court to hold that each of the conspirators “obtained” the whole of that property. That is the view expressed in R v May, para 48(6), first sentence (although the word “owns” is probably inappropriate), in R v Green [2008] AC 1053, para 15, and in R v Allpress [2009] 2 Cr Ap R (S) 399, para 31 (as quoted and approved in R v Mackle [2014] AC 678, para 65). However, that will by no means be the correct conclusion in every such case.

    [47]    As was said in R v Sivaraman [2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 469, para 12(6) and in R v Allpress, paras 30-31 (and approved in R v Mackle, paras 64-65), when a defendant has been convicted of an offence which involved several conspirators, and resulted in the obtaining of property, the court has to decide on the basis of the evidence, often relying on common sense inferences, whether the defendant in question obtained the property in the sense of assuming the rights of an owner over it, either because he received it or because he was to have some sort of share in it or its proceeds, and, in that connection, “the role of a particular conspirator may be relevant as a matter of fact, but that is a purely evidential matter”.

    [48]    In some cases, one or more of the conspirators may be able to show that he was only involved to a limited extent, so that he did not in any way obtain the property which was obtained as a result of the crime. Examples include acting as a paid hand in the enterprise – e g an intermediary, a courier or a drugs “mule” (as considered in R v May, paras 15 and 17, and in R v Allpress, paras 80-82) or a latecomer to a conspiracy in which nothing was obtained after his arrival (as discussed in R v May, para 19).

    [64] [2015] AC 299.

11. These remarks apply general principles of complicity long since acknowledged by the criminal law.  The ultimate conclusion was not wedded to questions of statutory construction of s 71(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK), which provides ‘a person benefits from an offence if he obtains property as a result of or in connection with its commission and his benefit is the value of the property so obtained’, or of s 76(4) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ‘a person benefits from conduct if he obtains property as a result of or in connection with the conduct’.  These cases involve joint presentments and all engaged principles of criminal liability on a complicity basis.

    Facts applied to legal principle

12. Based on the remarks of the sentencing Judge and the underlying evidence on which the sentences were based, all defendants including the two respondents, might well have been parties to a joint criminal enterprise to traffic in cannabis. As such they might therefore have been parties to an ‘arrangement’ in connection with the commission of those offences, within the meaning of s 100(b)(ii) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act.

13. They were not however presented in that way. The charges were laid individually for the most part, and the DPP elected to accept pleas on some charges whilst entering nolle prosequis on others.  The respondent’s convictions and sentences related to individual and separate charges.  The specific monies claimed derive entirely from counts 1-18 inclusive, which indict the respondent Nathan Lawson alone.  Nolle prosequis were entered with respect to counts 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 18.  However there was effectively a joint presentment with respect to the two respondents on counts 1, 5, 9, 15 and 17.  These were only ‘separated’ because Mr Lawson was committed for trial whereas Mr Western was committed for sentence.  It must follow therefore that derived benefits are the proceeds confined to those counts and their corresponding nominal equivalents, counts 27, 28, 29, 30 and 37.

14. Accordingly it is appropriate to make a pecuniary penalty order against Mr Western with respect to those counts in the combined sum of $110,200, being the total of benefits derived from the commission of these offences.

    Conclusion and orders

15. The application for pecuniary penalty orders against Mr Lawson is dismissed as falling outside the time allowed for bringing such applications prescribed by s 95(5)(a) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act.  The application for a pecuniary penalty order succeeds as against Mr Western, in the sum of $110,200 in respect of those offences he was convicted of and is proven to have derived benefits from.

16. There will be no order for costs so far as Mr Lawson is concerned, as he was not represented.  There will be an order that the DPP pay any disbursements incurred.  As Mr Western is substantially although not wholly successful, there will be an order that the DPP pay two thirds of his costs on a party/party basis to be agreed or taxed: s 227 Criminal Assets Confiscation Act; Director Public Prosecutions v Dobie;[65] Diez v Director of Public Prosecutions.[66]

    [65] (2010) 203 ALR 52 at [48].

    [66] (2004) 62 NSWLR 1.

    Appendix A - Table of Offences

    SUMMARY

    As to Nathan LAWSON

    Sentenced for RegSystems counts 1, 5, 9, 15, 17, 19, 22-26 (inclusive). 

    These counts comprise:

    -5 counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Drug;

    -3 counts of Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug;

    -3 counts of Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale.

    As to Samuel WESTERN

    Sentenced for RegSystems counts 19 and 27-34 (inclusive).

    These counts comprise:

    -5 counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Drug;

    -3 counts of Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug;

    -1 count of Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale.

    As to Nicholas SLAVEN

    Sentenced for RegSystems counts 19, and 27-31 (inclusive).

    These counts comprise:

    -5 counts of Trafficking in a Controlled Drug;

    -1 count of Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug.

    As to Lynette LAWSON

    Sentenced for RegSystems count 26 comprising 1 count of Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale.

    Legend:  C/S = Committed for Sentence;   C/T = Committed for Trial;   NPW = not proceeded with by prosecution;  SR = Sentencing Remarks; ROP = Record of Proceedings (Court Endorsement);  RegSystems = District and Supreme Court Database

RegSystems Count number	C/S or C/T?	Offence	Defendant	Offence Date and Place	Plea	Date of plea	Where plea recorded	Considered in Sentence?
1.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	1 June 2011 at Salisbury	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y- pg 6 para4
2.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	14 July 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
3.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	3 August 2011 at Regency Park	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
4.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	5 August 2011 at Regency Park	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
5.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	6 August 2011 at Regency Park	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y – pg 6 para 5
6.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	12 August 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
7.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	23 August 2011 at Regency Park	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
8.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	26 August 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
9.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	2 September 2011 at Salisbury	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y –pg 6 para 6
10.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	6 October 2011 at Regency Park	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
11.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	14 October 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
12.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	20 October 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
13.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	28 October 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
14.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	15 November 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
15.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	22 November 2011 at Salisbury	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y –pg 6 para 7 (incorrectly dated 22 May 2011)
16.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	30 November 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
17.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	2 December 2011 at Salisbury	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y- pg 6 para 8
18.	C/T	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	8 December 2011 at Salisbury	NPW	-	Transcript 24 June 2013	N
19.	C/T	Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	13 December 2011 at Salisbury	G	9 August 2013	ROP 9 August 2013	Y – pg 6 para 10
	C/T		Nicholas Slaven	13 December 2011 at Salisbury	G	9 August 2013	ROP 9 August 2013	Y – pg 6 para 10
	C/T		Sam Western	13 December 2011 at Salisbury	G	9 August 2013	ROP 9 August 2013	Y – pg 6 para 10
20.	C/T	Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Paralowie	NPW	-	Transcript 9 August 2013	N
21.	C/T	Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Paralowie	NPW	-	Transcript 9 August 2013	N
22.	C/T	Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Salisbury Downs	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y – pg 7 paras 1 & 6
23.	C/T	Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Seaton	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y – pg 7 para 2
24.	C/T	Trafficking in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Seaton	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y – pg 7 para 3
25.	C/T	Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Kadina	G	24 June 2013	ROP 24 June 2013	Y – pg 7 para 4
26.     (as amended)	C/T	Cultivating Controlled Plants for Sale	Nathan Lawson	14 December 2011 at Seaton	G	24 October 2013	Transcript 24 October 2013	Y – pg 7 para 5
	C/T		Lynette Lawson		G	7 April 2014	ROP 7 April 2014	Y –Sentence dated 5 May 2014
27.	C/S	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nicolas Slaven	1 June 2011 at Salisbury	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y- pg 6 para4
	C/S		Sam Western		G	Lower court	Lower court	Y- pg 6 para4
28.	C/S	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nicolas Slaven	6 August 2011 at Regency Park	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y – pg 6 para 5
	C/S		Sam Western		G	Lower court	Lower court	Y – pg 6 para 5
29.	C/S	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nicolas Slaven	2 September 2011 at Salisbury	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y –pg 6 para 6
	C/S		Sam Western		G	Lower court	Lower court	Y –pg 6 para 6
30.	C/S	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nicolas Slaven	22 November 2011 at Salisbury	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y –pg 6 para 7 (incorrectly dated 22 May 2011)
	C/S		Sam Western		G	Lower court	Lower court	Y –pg 6 para 7 (incorrectly dated 22 May 2011)
31.	C/S	Trafficking in a Controlled Drug	Nicolas Slaven	2 December 2011 at Salisbury	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y- pg 6 para 8
	C/S		Sam Western		G	Lower court	Lower court	Y- pg 6 para 8
32.	C/S	Cultivate a Controlled Plant	Sam Western	14 December 2011 at Paralowie	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y – pg 7 para 7
33.	C/S	Traffic in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug	Sam Western	14 December 2011 at Paralowie	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y – pg 7 para 8
34.	C/S	Traffic in a Large Commercial Quantity of a Controlled Drug	Sam Western	14 December 2011 at Salisbury Downs	G	Lower court	Lower court	Y – pg 7 para 6