Hall v Director of Public Prosecutions

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

HALL v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

[2015] SASCFC 19

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Gray, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Parker)

23 February 2015

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - APPEAL OR REVIEW

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - FORFEITURE OR CONFISCATION - PROCEDURE - GENERALLY

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - RESTRAINING OR FREEZING ORDER - VARIATION, EXEMPTION OR RELEASE TO FUND DEFENCE OF CRIMINAL CHARGE

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS - OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AND MATTERS

Appeal against decision to dismiss an application for the exclusion of property from forfeiture under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005 (SA). The appellant was arraigned and pleaded guilty to a serious offence on 9 April 2013. At that time, property of the appellant was subject to a restraining order under section 24 of the Act. Section 74 of the Act provides that property subject to a restraining order is automatically forfeited at the expiration of a six month period commencing on the day of the conviction of a serious offence, unless an extension order is in force pursuant to section 75. On 15 November 2013, the appellant applied for an extension of time in which to file an application pursuant to section 76 excluding particular property from forfeiture. The appellant also sought to rely on section 47 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA). The Judge dismissed the application on the grounds that it was not made within six months of the appellant’s conviction for a serious offence. The Judge also dismissed the application under section 47 of the Limitation of Actions Act pursuant to section 47(2)(d) on the basis that the limitation of six months is essential to the nature or purpose of the forfeiture regime.

Whether the Judge erred in finding that the day of conviction was the day on which the appellant entered a plea of guilty and the allocutus was administered. Whether the Judge erred in holding that the six month limitation after conviction within which to make an application for exclusion of property from forfeiture is essential to the nature or purpose of the forfeiture regime within the meaning of section 47(2)(d) of the Limitation of Actions Act. Whether the Judge erred in finding that applications to extend the relevant period can only be made within six months of conviction. Whether the Judge erred in failing to consider and apply section 48(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act.

Held per Gray J (Stanley and Parker JJ agreeing) dismissing the appeal:

1. The day of conviction for the purposes of section 74 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act was 9 April 2013.

2.  The property the subject of the restraining order was liable to automatic forfeiture to the Crown…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASCFC 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerned the application of the *Limitation of Actions Act 1936* (SA) to an application for the exclusion of property after its forfeiture under section 74(1) of the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act*. The appellant, Mr Hall, was charged with cultivating a commercial quantity of cannabis. Following the seizure of cannabis plants and a restraining order over his property, the property was sold, and the net proceeds were paid into the District Court Suitors’ Fund. Mr Hall was subsequently convicted and sentenced, with his sentence being reduced on appeal. The Director of Public Prosecutions then sought a declaration that the funds held in the Suitors’ Fund had been forfeited to the Crown.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether an extension of time could be granted under the *Limitation of Actions Act* to bring an application for the exclusion of property once forfeiture had already occurred under the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act*. This question arose because the Director asserted that forfeiture had occurred on 9 October 2013, and no application for an extension order had been received by 30 October 2013.

The Court, comprising Gray, Stanley, and Parker JJ, reasoned that the *Limitation of Actions Act* could not be invoked to extend the time for seeking an exclusion order after forfeiture had taken place under section 74(1) of the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act*. The Court noted that section 75 of the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act* itself imposed a time limit, stipulating that any extension for seeking an exclusion order could not extend beyond 15 months from the date of conviction. As Mr Hall's conviction occurred on 1 August 2013, any potential extension could not go beyond 8 July 2014. The Court found that no submissions were made to address how such a circumstance could be managed.

Consequently, the appeal against the orders of the District Court Judge was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The principal issue that arises on this appeal is whether an extension of time can be granted pursuant to the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) in which to bring an application for the exclusion of property, after forfeiture of that property has occurred pursuant to section 74(1) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. Background On 9 February 2010, police officers searched residential premises owned by Mr Hall at Daw Park. They located and seized cannabis plants growing hydroponically and cannabis clones. Mr Hall was charged on Information with the offence of cultivating a commercial quantity of a controlled drug, namely, cannabis. On 17 August 2010, a Master of the District Court made an order on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions for a restraining order over the real property on which the plants were grown, pursuant to section 24 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. On 18 August 2010, an order was made by a different Master of the District Court varying the restraining order pursuant to section 40 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act, permitting the Daw Park property to be sold, selling agents to be appointed and, upon the sale of the property, the discharge of a mortgage and the payment of associated conveyancing costs. Any remaining proceeds were to be paid into the District Court Suitors’ Fund. Following the sale and the discharge of the mortgage the amount of $52,164.32 was paid into the Suitor’s Fund. On 9 April 2013, Mr Hall was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charged offence before a Judge of the District Court. The allocutus was administered. The matter was adjourned for sentencing submissions. On 1 August 2013, Mr Hall was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three years and nine months. A non-parole period of two years was fixed. The Judge declined to suspend the sentence. Mr Hall appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, arguing that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and that, in the circumstances, an order for a suspended sentence should have been made. The appeal was successful to a limited extent.[1] The sentence imposed was reduced, but the Court confirmed that it was inappropriate to suspend the sentence. As a result, Mr Hall was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years and nine months and a non-parole period of 12 months was fixed.[1] R v Hall [2013] SASCFC 126. By application filed on 31 October 2013, the Director of Public Prosecutions sought a declaration pursuant to section 77 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act that the sum of $52,164.32 standing to the credit of this action in the District Court Suitors’ Fund had been forfeited to the Crown pursuant to section 74 of the Act. A further order was sought that the said sum, together with interest, be provided to the Director of Public Prosecutions by way of cheque and that the Director deposit the sum into the Victims of Crime Fund pursuant to section 209. An affidavit filed in support of the application asserted that the Director’s position was that forfeiture under section 74(1) had occurred on 9 October 2013. The deponent further attested that the Director had not, as at 30 October 2013, received an application for an extension order extending the period before the property was forfeited pursuant to section 75.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
One further observation should be made. Under the terms of section 75 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act, any extension of time in which to seek an exclusion order cannot extend beyond 15 months from the date of conviction. As earlier noted, in the present proceeding, had the defendant been entitled to obtain an extension order, that time could not extend beyond 8 July 2014. No submissions were advanced in this Court as to how such a circumstance could be addressed. Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal against the orders of the District Court Judge should be dismissed. STANLEY J: I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of Gray J. PARKER J: I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of Gray J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

The court first addressed the issue of whether an extension of time can be granted pursuant to the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) to bring an application for the exclusion of property after forfeiture has occurred pursuant to section 74(1) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. The court noted that the statutory provisions under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act are specific in their operation and must be strictly followed. The court found that the statutory provisions did not allow for an extension of time post-forfeiture, and the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) could not be used to circumvent these provisions. Therefore, the court held that an extension of time to bring an application for exclusion of property after forfeiture is not permissible under the statutory framework.

Secondly, the court examined whether the forfeiture under section 74(1) of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act occurred on 9 October 2013 as asserted by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The court considered the affidavit filed in support of the application, which attested that the Director had not received an application for an extension order by 30 October 2013. The court found that there was no evidence to contradict the assertion that forfeiture occurred on 9 October 2013. The court concluded that the assertion by the Director of Public Prosecutions was correct, and the forfeiture took place on that date.

The third issue was whether the Director of Public Prosecutions' position that no extension order was received by 30 October 2013 is correct. The court found that the Director's assertion was supported by the affidavit filed in the proceeding. Given the absence of any contradictory evidence, the court accepted that no extension order was received by the Director by 30 October 2013. Therefore, the Director's position was correct in this regard.

Next, the court addressed whether the limitation period for seeking an extension order under section 75 of the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act can be extended beyond 15 months from the date of conviction. The court noted that section 75 explicitly limits the extension period to 15 months from the date of conviction. In the present case, had the defendant been entitled to obtain an extension order, the time could not extend beyond 8 July 2014. The court found that no submissions were advanced to address this limitation, and thus, concluded that the limitation period could not be extended beyond the 15-month period.

Lastly, the court examined whether the appellant's appeal against the orders of the District Court Judge should be dismissed. The court found that the statutory provisions and the court's interpretation of those provisions left no room for the appellant's application for an extension post-forfeiture. Additionally, the court noted that the limitation period for seeking an extension had expired. Consequently, the court held that the appeal against the orders of the District Court Judge should be dismissed.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an extension of time cannot be granted pursuant to the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) to bring an application for the exclusion of property after forfeiture has occurred under the Criminal Assets Confiscation Act. Furthermore, the limitation period for seeking an extension order under section 75 cannot be extended beyond 15 months from the date of conviction.