DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) v K
[2024] SADC 133
Judgment of his Honour Judge Burnett
18 October 2024
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - CONFISCATION OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME AND RELATED MATTERS - RESTRAINING OR FREEZING ORDER
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION - SUPPLYING, OMITTING OR SUBSTITUTING WORDS
The applicant, the Director of Public Prosecutions (the DPP), has sought a restraining order pursuant to s 24 of the Criminal Assets Compensation Act 2005 (SA) (the Act) over funds that were seized from the bank account of the respondent. The restraining order was sought pursuant to s 24(1)(a) of the Act in that the respondent had been charged with a serious offence, namely trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a controlled drug.
The respondent contended that a restraining order should not be made over the funds as s 24(1)(a) should be read as subject to an implied limitation that such an order may only specify property if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the property is property of the suspect that is the proceeds of, or an instrument of, a serious offence. The respondent contended that this implied limitation was necessary because the restraining order is made to secure the contingent liability of a person, in the event of a conviction, to forfeit property to the State and therefore the restraint must be proportionate to that contingent liability. The respondent further contended that any forfeiture of property would be made under s 47 of the Act. Section 47(1)(a) requires that the court be satisfied that the property that is to be forfeited is the proceeds of the offence and s 47(3) requires that the court be satisfied that the property is an instrument of the offence. Therefore, it was contended to ensure the proportionality between the restraining order and the property to be forfeited, the restraining order under s 24(1)(a) could only specify property that was the proceeds of, or an instrument of, the offence.
The respondent contended that for the same reasons an exclusion order should be made under s 34 of the Act.
Held:
(1)The DPP is entitled to a restraining order over the funds. The respondent is not entitled to an order excluding the funds from the restraining order.
(2)The circumstances in which a court may insert additional words into a statute are limited. It is ultimately a judgment of matters of degree. Words will not be added that fill "gaps disclosed in legislation" or makes an insertion which is "too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact used by the legislature”: Taylor v Owners-Strata Plan No 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531, Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) v Australian Football League (2006) 14 VR 35 applied.
(3)The proposed additional words are inconsistent with the mandatory wording in s 24(1)(a) and the structure of the Act in setting out the circumstances in which a…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) v K and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2024] SADC 133
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues that the court addressed were whether the statutory language in question permitted the application of a freezing order and how the terms of the statute should be interpreted. The court had to consider the general approaches to statutory interpretation, particularly whether it was appropriate to supply, omit, or substitute words within the relevant provisions to achieve a just and equitable outcome. The interpretation of these provisions was critical in determining whether the freezing order was authorised by law.
In its reasoning, the court examined the statutory provisions and the surrounding context to ascertain the legislative intent. The court held that the plain meaning of the statutory language did not support the application of a freezing order as it was not explicitly provided for. However, the court also considered whether the omission of certain words was justified to ensure the effectiveness of the statutory scheme in combating criminal activity. Ultimately, the court concluded that such an omission would be inappropriate as it would alter the clear legislative intent. Consequently, the court found that the freezing order was not authorised by the statute and was therefore unlawful.
The court's decision led to the quashing of the freezing order placed on K's assets. The final orders of the court included a declaration that the freezing order was invalid and an injunction preventing further enforcement of the order. This outcome underscored the importance of adhering to the statutory language and the legislative intent in the application of criminal procedures.