Allen v Director of Public Prosecutions

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Allen v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] QDC 154

PARTIES:

BENJAMIN JAMES DAVID ALLEN

(appellant)

v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

1054/24

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Brisbane Magistrates Court

DELIVERED ON:

18 October 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

6 & 9 September 2024

JUDGES:

Dearden DCJ

ORDER:

(1)   Appeal dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive in that a conviction should not have been recorded – whether the learned magistrate erred in sentencing the applicant on the basis that the complainant was a “child” – whether the learned magistrate erred in concluding that the recording of a conviction was necessary to alert licensing bodies – whether the learned magistrate failed to place sufficient weight on applicant’s risk of re-offending

LEGISLATION:

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 9, 12
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 210, 215, 352
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) Sch 1
Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 ss 17, 18, 177-180, 221, 226

CASES: Jenkins v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 289
House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499
R v Ikin [2007] QCA 224
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550
R v Morse [1979] 23 SASR 98
R v Cay, Gersch and Schell; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2005] QCA 467
R v Briese [1997] QCA 10
COUNSEL: S Dickson for the appellant
N Hopper for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Beavon Lawyers for the appellant
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Introduction

  1. The appellant, Benjamin James David Allen, pleaded guilty in the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 26 March 2024 to the following charge:

    (1)    Sexual assault (10 October 2022).

  2. The appellant was sentenced to 180 hours community service with a conviction recorded.

    Grounds of Appeal

  3. The appellant’s notice of appeal filed 19 April 2024 identified the ground of appeal as:

    “That the sentence, in all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive in that a conviction should not have been recorded.”

  4. The appellant’s outline of submissions[1] identified two bases on which it is submitted the sentence imposed is “manifestly excessive”, namely:

    (1)that the learned magistrate erred in sentencing the applicant when he referred to the complainant as a “child”;  and

    (2)[that the learned magistrate] … failed to place sufficient weight on the applicant’s future risk of re-offending.

    [1]Exhibit 1 – Appellant’s outline of submissions.

  5. In a supplementary outline of submissions on behalf of the applicant the appellant contended that the learned magistrate had further erred as follows:

    “(3)The learned magistrate erred in concluding that a conviction needed to be recorded for licensing bodies to be informed.”[2]

    [2]Exhibit 5 – Appellant’s supplementary outline of submissions, [11].

    The law - appeals

  6. I repeat and rely upon my exposition of the law in respect of sentence appeals in this court as set out in Jenkins v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 289.

  7. As House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499, 505…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 154
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Allen v Director of Public Prosecutions arose in the context of a criminal appeal against conviction. The appellant, who was the head swimming coach at the [redacted] Swim Club, had been convicted of sexual assault against a 16-year-old complainant, who was part of a squad he sometimes coached. The key issue before the court was whether the sentence, which included 180 hours of community service, a $3,000 compensation order, and the recording of a conviction, was manifestly excessive. The appellant contested the necessity of recording the conviction, arguing that it was inappropriate given the circumstances and the risk of reoffending.

The court needed to determine whether the learned magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant on the basis that the complainant was a "child," whether the magistrate was correct in concluding that a conviction should be recorded to alert licensing bodies, and if the magistrate failed to adequately weigh the risk of reoffending. The court examined the magistrate's sentencing remarks, where references to "children" were made in the context of protecting vulnerable individuals, and assessed whether these references constituted an error. The court also considered the statutory definitions of "child" and the nature of the offence committed.

In its reasoning, the court found that the learned magistrate did not err in concluding that a conviction should be recorded to inform relevant licensing bodies. The references to "children" by the magistrate were contextually appropriate and did not signify an error in the sentencing process. The court concluded that the magistrate's sentencing discretion was properly exercised and that there was no manifest excess in the sentence. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

ORDERS:
(1) Appeal dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Appeal dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The facts of the offence were placed before the learned magistrate by way of a statement of facts[3] which articulated the background and offending as follows:[3]Exhibit 1 in the original sentence proceedings.“Background1. The defendant was 33 at the time of the offending and worked as the head swimming coach at the [redacted] Swim Club.2. The complainant … was 16 at the time of the offending. She swam in a squad coached by another person, however, sometimes swam in the squad coached by the defendant at the Swim Club.3. Around April 2022 the defendant started to send the complainant messages via text message and Snapchat. The two exchanged over 900 messages between July and December 2022.4. The defendant asked the complainant whether she was sexually active and that he would keep it a secret from her parents in return for a ‘favour’. Over months, between other conversations, the defendant repeatedly brought up the favour but did not tell the complainant what it was. He asked her to guess the favour each time. Whenever the defendant was alone with the complainant in person, he asked her about the favour and whether the answer was a ’yes’ or a ‘no’. The complainant said she could not say yes without knowing what it was. When she did say no, the defendant asked if it was a ‘definite no’. On several occasions at the Swim Club, the defendant asked whether the complainant had decided, and that he needed a definite answer. After those conversations he told the complainant not to tell anyone.5. On 9 October 2022 the complainant asked what the favour was via Snapchat. The defendant sent her an open-hand emoji and said ‘does this give you a hint?’ The complainant asked whether it was a hand job and whether that would be cheating. The defendant said it was complicated and he was in an open relationship.6. In one message, the defendant said the favour was to do with being on your knees in the office, that it would be messy, and it would take 30 minutes on a Saturday morning after training when there was no one else around.Offending7. On the morning of 10 October 2022, the complainant was in the pool training at the Swim Club. The defendant asked her to get out of the pool to correct her freestyle stroke. She had not been asked to do this previously. The other students stayed in the pool.8. The defendant stood behind her and placed his left hand on her hip to correct her posture and asked her to place both of her hands on the starting block nearby the pool. He used his right hand to grip her right wrist under the guise of correcting her swim stroke with that hand. As he stood behind her, he rotated her arm forwards and then behind her in a freestyle stroke motion. As he moved her hand upward behind her, he brushed her hand against his hard penis underneath his shorts. He did this four times. 9. One of the other students asked the complainant why she had to get out of the pool. She later told another student and a teacher at school.10. The defendant continued to contact the complainant after the offence occurred. 11. On 26 October [2022] the complainant gave a s 93A statement to police.12. On 7 December 2022, the defendant sent the complainant a message saying he was sorry if anything he had previously said was inappropriate and that he was ‘bantering’ to get information about the boys but it may have gone too far.13. On 23 December 2022, the defendant was arrested and issued a notice to appear.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The learned magistrate did not err in concluding that a conviction needed to be recorded for licencing bodies to be informed. This ground of appeal fails. Conclusion It follows that the learned magistrate has not erred, either generally nor specifically, in the exercise of his discretion, and the appeal fails.Order Appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The learned magistrate then proceeded to impose, with the appellant’s consent, 180 hours community service, compensation in the sum of $3,000 payable to the complainant, and ordered that a conviction be recorded.Consideration The appellant identifies clearly that “no issue is … taken with the sentence other than the recording of the conviction.”[33]The learned magistrate erred in sentencing the applicant when he referred to the appellant as a “child”[33]Exhibit 1 – Appellant outline of submissions, [17]. The appellant identifies that in his sentencing remarks, the learned magistrate said:-“It is a child against whom you have offended here, and as I’ve said, protection of our children, the – our vulnerable children – is paramount”.[34] On two further occasions the learned magistrate referred to the protection of children in his sentencing remarks.[35][34]Exhibit 3 – Transcript of sentencing remarks, T1-5 ll 3-5.[35]Exhibit 3 – Transcript of sentencing remarks, T1-5 ll 10 & 15. The appellant argues that:-“In accordance with s 9(4) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, a child is one under 16 years”.[36][36]Exhibit 1 – Appellant outline of submissions, [20]. In addition, the appellant’s submissions note that Criminal Code ss 210 and 215 relate to children being under year 16 years.[37][37]Exhibit 1 – Appellant outline of submissions, [20]. With respect, this is a substantial misunderstanding of the text of PSA s 9(4), which relevantly provides:-“… in sentencing an offender for any offence of a sexual nature committed in relation to a child under 16 years or a child exploitation material offence— (a)the court must have regard to the sentencing practices, principles and guidelines applicable when the sentence is imposed rather than when the offence was committed; and (b) the principles mentioned in subsection (2)(a) do not apply; and (c) the offender must serve an actual term of imprisonment, unless there are exceptional circumstances.” The learned magistrate was, in my view, clearly aware that the offence for which the appellant was to be sentenced (sexual assault pursuant to Criminal Code s 352(1)(a)), was an offence that could be committed against a child aged 16 or 17, or an adult, as opposed to an offence of indecent treatment (Criminal Code s 210), which is an offence of indecent treatment of children under the age of 16 years. The Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) in Sch 1 defines a child to mean “an individual is under 18”. In referring to the complainant as a child, the magistrate was accurately referring to a complainant, aged 16 at the time of the offending and 17 years at sentence. In any event, the learned magistrate was not sentencing the appellant for an indecent sexual assault on a child under 16. I have no hesitation in concluding that the learned magistrate’s references to the protection of “children” were appropriate in context, and were not a reference to an aggravating circumstance pursuant to PSA s 9(4).