DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Allen v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] QDC 154
PARTIES:
BENJAMIN JAMES DAVID ALLEN
(appellant)
v
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
1054/24
DIVISION:
Appellate
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Brisbane Magistrates Court
DELIVERED ON:
18 October 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
6 & 9 September 2024
JUDGES:
Dearden DCJ
ORDER:
(1) Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive in that a conviction should not have been recorded – whether the learned magistrate erred in sentencing the applicant on the basis that the complainant was a “child” – whether the learned magistrate erred in concluding that the recording of a conviction was necessary to alert licensing bodies – whether the learned magistrate failed to place sufficient weight on applicant’s risk of re-offending
LEGISLATION:
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 9, 12
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) ss 210, 215, 352
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) Sch 1
Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 ss 17, 18, 177-180, 221, 226CASES: Jenkins v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 289
House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499
R v Ikin [2007] QCA 224
R v Pham (2015) 256 CLR 550
R v Morse [1979] 23 SASR 98
R v Cay, Gersch and Schell; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2005] QCA 467
R v Briese [1997] QCA 10COUNSEL: S Dickson for the appellant
N Hopper for the respondentSOLICITORS: Beavon Lawyers for the appellant
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent
Introduction
The appellant, Benjamin James David Allen, pleaded guilty in the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 26 March 2024 to the following charge:
(1) Sexual assault (10 October 2022).
The appellant was sentenced to 180 hours community service with a conviction recorded.
Grounds of Appeal
The appellant’s notice of appeal filed 19 April 2024 identified the ground of appeal as:
“That the sentence, in all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive in that a conviction should not have been recorded.”
The appellant’s outline of submissions[1] identified two bases on which it is submitted the sentence imposed is “manifestly excessive”, namely:
(1)that the learned magistrate erred in sentencing the applicant when he referred to the complainant as a “child”; and
(2)[that the learned magistrate] … failed to place sufficient weight on the applicant’s future risk of re-offending.
[1]Exhibit 1 – Appellant’s outline of submissions.
In a supplementary outline of submissions on behalf of the applicant the appellant contended that the learned magistrate had further erred as follows:
“(3)The learned magistrate erred in concluding that a conviction needed to be recorded for licensing bodies to be informed.”[2]
[2]Exhibit 5 – Appellant’s supplementary outline of submissions, [11].
The law - appeals
I repeat and rely upon my exposition of the law in respect of sentence appeals in this court as set out in Jenkins v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 289.
As House v The King [1936] 55 CLR 499, 505…
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- Case
- [2024] QDC 154
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court needed to determine whether the learned magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant on the basis that the complainant was a "child," whether the magistrate was correct in concluding that a conviction should be recorded to alert licensing bodies, and if the magistrate failed to adequately weigh the risk of reoffending. The court examined the magistrate's sentencing remarks, where references to "children" were made in the context of protecting vulnerable individuals, and assessed whether these references constituted an error. The court also considered the statutory definitions of "child" and the nature of the offence committed.
In its reasoning, the court found that the learned magistrate did not err in concluding that a conviction should be recorded to inform relevant licensing bodies. The references to "children" by the magistrate were contextually appropriate and did not signify an error in the sentencing process. The court concluded that the magistrate's sentencing discretion was properly exercised and that there was no manifest excess in the sentence. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
ORDERS:
(1) Appeal dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
(1) Appeal dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The learned magistrate then proceeded to impose, with the appellant’s consent, 180 hours community service, compensation in the sum of $3,000 payable to the complainant, and ordered that a conviction be recorded.Consideration The appellant identifies clearly that “no issue is … taken with the sentence other than the recording of the conviction.”[33]The learned magistrate erred in sentencing the applicant when he referred to the appellant as a “child”[33]Exhibit 1 – Appellant outline of submissions, [17]. The appellant identifies that in his sentencing remarks, the learned magistrate said:-“It is a child against whom you have offended here, and as I’ve said, protection of our children, the – our vulnerable children – is paramount”.[34] On two further occasions the learned magistrate referred to the protection of children in his sentencing remarks.[35][34]Exhibit 3 – Transcript of sentencing remarks, T1-5 ll 3-5.[35]Exhibit 3 – Transcript of sentencing remarks, T1-5 ll 10 & 15. The appellant argues that:-“In accordance with s 9(4) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, a child is one under 16 years”.[36][36]Exhibit 1 – Appellant outline of submissions, [20]. In addition, the appellant’s submissions note that Criminal Code ss 210 and 215 relate to children being under year 16 years.[37][37]Exhibit 1 – Appellant outline of submissions, [20]. With respect, this is a substantial misunderstanding of the text of PSA s 9(4), which relevantly provides:-“… in sentencing an offender for any offence of a sexual nature committed in relation to a child under 16 years or a child exploitation material offence— (a)the court must have regard to the sentencing practices, principles and guidelines applicable when the sentence is imposed rather than when the offence was committed; and (b) the principles mentioned in subsection (2)(a) do not apply; and (c) the offender must serve an actual term of imprisonment, unless there are exceptional circumstances.” The learned magistrate was, in my view, clearly aware that the offence for which the appellant was to be sentenced (sexual assault pursuant to Criminal Code s 352(1)(a)), was an offence that could be committed against a child aged 16 or 17, or an adult, as opposed to an offence of indecent treatment (Criminal Code s 210), which is an offence of indecent treatment of children under the age of 16 years. The Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) in Sch 1 defines a child to mean “an individual is under 18”. In referring to the complainant as a child, the magistrate was accurately referring to a complainant, aged 16 at the time of the offending and 17 years at sentence. In any event, the learned magistrate was not sentencing the appellant for an indecent sexual assault on a child under 16. I have no hesitation in concluding that the learned magistrate’s references to the protection of “children” were appropriate in context, and were not a reference to an aggravating circumstance pursuant to PSA s 9(4).