McGough v The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McGough v The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner [2022] FCA 523

File number: WAD 188 of 2021
Judgment of: BANKS-SMITH J
Date of judgment: 10 May 2022
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - applicant's mother a care recipient in nursing home run by approved provider under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) - where following certain incidents the approved provider determined to deny applicant access to nursing home to visit mother - delegate of Secretary of Department of Health and Ageing investigated complaint and found approved provider breached access obligation but because conditional access had since been offered, no notice of action relating to the breach should issue - delegate of Aged Care Commissioner carried out examination under Aged Care Act and found no breach of access obligation - recommendation made to Secretary to that effect - where Secretary reconsidered complaint in accordance with Aged Care Act and accepted Secretary's recommendation - where decisions and recommendation made in 2009 and 2010 - where application for judicial review filed over 4,000 days after decisions and recommendation - whether extension of time should be granted under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) - whether relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) should be refused as a matter of discretion - where approved provider deregistered in 2013 - where care recipient has passed away - whether utility in any relief - merits of grounds - whether applicant denied procedural fairness in complaint and investigation process - whether decision makers failed to have regard to evidence - construction of provision (s 23.8 of User Rights Principles 1997) imposing obligation on approved provider to facilitate access - competing statutory obligations to act in accordance with list of stated care recipients' rights - whether decision maker failed to properly understand and apply terms of s 23.8 - where grounds have no reasonable prospect of success - where delay, lack of utility and absence of sufficiently arguable grounds inform exercise of discretion as to both extension of time for purpose of Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act and relief under Judiciary Act
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 3, 5, 11

Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) ss 54.1, 56.1, 63.1AA, 96.1, Division 96, Parts 4.2, 6.4A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 31.01, 31.02

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

ActewAGL Distribution v The Australian Energy Regulator [2011] FCA 639; (2011) 195 FCR 142

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Daley v Child Support Registrar [2020] FCAFC 161

Director of Public Prosecutions v George [2008] SASC 330; (2008) 102 SASR 246

Edelsten v Health Insurance Commission (1990) 27 FCR 56

Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99

Guo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34

Hamden v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2013] FCA 3

Hunter Valley Development Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Kioa v West (1985)…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 523
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In McGough v The Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner, the applicant, Ms McGough, sought an extension of time to institute judicial review proceedings and relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in relation to decisions made by the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commissioner regarding her complaint about being denied access to her mother's nursing home. The court was required to determine whether the applicant's application for an extension of time should be granted under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and whether relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act should be refused as a matter of discretion.

The court found that the applicant's application for an extension of time was not warranted as there was significant delay in lodging the application, the applicant had not demonstrated any prejudice or lack of utility in the relief sought, and the applicant's grounds for review had no reasonable prospect of success. Furthermore, the court found that the decision-makers had properly considered the evidence before them, and the applicant had not been denied procedural fairness in the complaint and investigation process.

The court concluded that the applicant's application for an extension of time in which to institute review proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) was refused, as was the application for remedies under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed by a registrar of this Court if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time in which to institute review proceedings under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) is refused.

2. The application for remedies under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) is refused.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent to be assessed by a registrar of this Court if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Table of Contents

Statutory framework - complaints and the Aged Care Act

[8]

Statutory framework - ADJR Act and Judiciary Act

[23]

The events

[31]

The lead up to 12 October 2009

[31]

The letter of 12 October 2009 denying access

[35]

The approach to SAT and replacement of Ms McGough as guardian

[37]

Access permitted on conditions

[42]

The 26 November 2009 complaint

[43]

The First Decision

[47]

Request for examination of First Decision by Aged Care Commissioner

[52]

Draft recommendation provided

[54]

The Recommendation

[66]

The Second Decision

[69]

Principles - whether impugned decisions and Recommendation amenable to review

[75]

Principles - ADJR Act and extension of time

[86]

Delay

[88]

Prejudice and lack of utility

[100]

Other interests

[109]

Consideration of the merits

[112]

Ground 1 - denial of procedural fairness

[115]

Ground 2 - 'no evidence' ground

[137]

Ground 3 - failure to consider the 'proper requirements' of s 23.8 of the User Rights Principles 1997

[141]

Conclusion with respect to ADJR Act

[160]

Application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act

[161]

Orders

[165]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Therefore, I am not satisfied that the first ground of review has any realistic prospect of success.Ground 2 - 'no evidence' ground It appears that by ground two Ms McGough relies on the principle that if in giving reasons a decision maker makes a finding of fact, they must do so based on some evidence or other supporting material, rather than on no evidence or material, unless the finding is made in accordance with the decision maker's personal or specialised knowledge or by reference to that which is commonly known. The term ‘no evidence' has traditionally been interpreted to mean ‘not a skerrick of evidence': Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41 at [17]. Even a skerrick of evidence will mean that an allegation of jurisdictional error premised on this basis will fail. Ms McGough's argument appears to be that the delegates should not have accepted the submissions made by the Approved Provider that there were valid concerns for the denial of access. Ms McGough contends that her evidence, consisting of documents such as police records, Magistrates Court records and Worksafe records that indicate an absence of any claim brought against her, counter the Approved Provider's evidence, so that it could not be accepted. I have addressed above the difficulties faced by Ms McGough in relying on those documents to counter allegations about her conduct. It could not be said that there was 'not a skerrick of evidence' to support the delegates' findings. To the contrary, there was quite a body of evidence which supported the decision reached by the delegates. Relevantly, the delegates had before them the following documents that evidenced Ms McGough's conduct with respect to staff and in the nursing home, including her explanation for some of that conduct, all of which the delegates were entitled to take into account and weigh as they considered appropriate:(a)letter from Ms Clarke to Ms McGough of 3 September 2009 ([33(d)] above);(b)letter of 23 September 2009 from Ms Sinclair to Ms McGough ([33(g)] above);(c)letter of 6 October 2009 from Ms Sinclair to Ms McGough referring to two staff complaints ([33(h)] above);(d)letter of 8 October 2009 from Ms McGough responding in detail ([33(j)] above;(e)letter of 12 October 2009 from Mr Glass denying access ([36] above);(f)Ms McGough's letter to SAT of 14 October 2009 ([38] above);(g)Ms McGough's letter of 14 October 2009 to the Approved Provider ([39] above);(h)letter of 19 October 2009 from Ms Sinclair to SAT ([40] above);(i)'list of incidents report' prepared by the Approved Provider ([44] above); and(j)site visit report and 'Summary of Incidents related to Ms McGough's Actions and Comments' ([46] above). Weight is pre-eminently a matter for the decision maker to assess, as opposed to this Court on judicial review: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. By this ground, Ms McGough is inviting the Court to turn a judicial review into an exercise in the review of the merits, including by re-assessing the weight to be given such evidence. That is, she asks the Court to consider afresh the evidence and form its own view as to the merits of whether Ms McGough's conduct was such that access to the nursing home should have been limited and whether a notice of required action should have been issued. That is not a task open to this Court on judicial review.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A delegate of the Secretary investigated the complaint, and made a decision on 22 December 2009 (First Decision). Ms McGough was aggrieved by the First Decision and applied to the Aged Care Commissioner for an examination of the First Decision, a course provided for in the Investigation Principles 2007. A delegate of the Commissioner made a recommendation to the Secretary on 5 March 2010 (Recommendation). A delegate of the Secretary then reconsidered the First Decision, and made a further decision on 24 March 2010 (Second Decision). Ms McGough is aggrieved by each of the First Decision, the Recommendation and the Second Decision, and applies to this Court for an extension of time to seek judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act). She also seeks relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The application for an extension of time was filed in this Court on 13 August 2021 and amended on 5 October 2021. Ms McGough seeks an order that the respondent's decisions be set aside, and that the matter be referred back to the respondent for proper consideration of both an alleged breach of the Approved Provider's obligation to provide access and of the delegate's decision not to issue a notice of required action to the Approved Provider. It is apparent that Ms McGough has a deeply-felt commitment to pursue judicial review, fuelled by her clear devotion to her late mother and her disappointment with the events that occurred towards the end of her mother's life. Further, I acknowledge that Ms McGough followed closely and had some involvement in the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety. Many of her submissions referenced the Royal Commission and its findings. I acknowledge that the findings referred to failures in the quality and service of aged care in Australia. However, this Court is concerned with the particular circumstances of the First Decision, the Recommendation and the Second Decision. For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that an extension of time or other relief should be granted.Statutory framework - complaints and the Aged Care Act Before reciting the relevant events, it is appropriate to set out the statutory framework under which Ms McGough's complaints were considered. References to statutory provisions are to the provisions as in force at the time. Division 96 of the Act is headed 'Miscellaneous'. Section 96.1 provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, make Principles providing for specified matters in the Act. Relevantly, s 96.1 provides that the Minister may make 'Investigation Principles' dealing with Part 6.4A of the Act and 'User Rights Principles' dealing with Part 4.2 of the Act. Part 6.4A of the Act is entitled 'Investigations'. Relevantly, the Minister made the Investigation Principles 2007 with respect to that Part. The commencement of the Investigation Principles 2007 includes the following note:Note: Part 6.4A of the Aged Care Act 1997Part 6.4A of the Aged Care Act 1997 is about the investigation of matters relating to the Act or the Principles made under section 96-1 of the Act.These Principles deal with:(a)which matters are to be investigated;(b)how investigations are to be conducted;(c)considerations in making decisions relating to investigations;(d)procedures for the Aged Care Commissioner to examine certain decisions made in relation to investigations and also to examine certain complaints.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

These broader public interest considerations, together with the other matters to which I have referred, weigh against an extension of time being granted.Consideration of the merits I proceed with the analysis taking into account the principles set out at [87] above, but also having regard to the fact that the same grounds are relied upon for the s 39B application. Paragraph 6 of the applicant's affidavit filed 13 August 2021 sets out the grounds of review as follows:(a)A breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision; as I was not provided with procedural fairness from the onset;(b)There was no evidence (provided to me) or other material to justify the making of the decision;(c)There was a failure to consider the proper requirements of section 23.8 of the User Rights Principles 1997 in terms of the provision of access at any time in deciding that the Approved Provider had remedied the breach of section 23.8. For ease of reference I again note that Ms McGough relies upon s 5(1)(a) of the ADJR Act (breach of the rules of natural justice); s 5(1)(e) (improper exercise of power); s 5(1)(h) (no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision) and s 5(1)(i) (the decision was otherwise contrary to law). Whilst Ms McGough did not separately address by her grounds an improper exercise of power, I had regard to it when assessing each of the grounds.Ground 1 - denial of procedural fairness In respect of the complaint of a denial of natural justice, the applicant appears to contend that this arose with respect to the Recommendation, suggesting that: in the course of undertaking the examination under s 16A.24 of the Investigation Principles 2007, the delegate of the Aged Care Commissioner received information from the Approved Provider, including letters between Ms McGough and the Approved Provider of 8 October 2009, and Ms McGough did not know such correspondence had been provided to the delegate; it appears her responsive letter to Ms Sinclair of 10 October 2009 was not provided; she was excluded from discussions between the delegate conducting the examination and third parties; she was not contacted to provide further information; and that the absence of any WAPOL or other report about her conduct was not discussed with her or considered, because the absence of such evidence was a 'problem' for the delegate. To be fair, it is at times difficult to follow Ms McGough's complaints as set out in her affidavit evidence insofar as they are said to disclose an absence of procedural fairness, and accordingly I have described them broadly. Expressed generally, the exercise of statutory power is conditioned by the requirement that it be exercised in compliance with the rules of procedural fairness: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; (2015) 256 CLR 326 at [55] (Gageler and Gordon JJ); and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala at [59] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). What is required to discharge an obligation to afford procedural fairness depends on the particular statutory framework and the circumstances of the case: Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584‑585 (Mason J). The content of procedural fairness is context-dependent and must be approached on the basis of what is necessary to avoid 'practical injustice': Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 at [37]‑[38]; WZARH at [57].