CITATION: NSWCC v Davies [1999] NSWSC 354 CURRENT JURISDICTION: Criminal FILE NUMBER(S): 70676/91 HEARING DATE(S): 29-30 March 1999 JUDGMENT DATE:
22 April 1999PARTIES :
New South Wales Crime Commission (Plaintiff)
Edwin Davies (Defendant)JUDGMENT OF: Studdert J
COUNSEL : I. Temby QC (Plaintiff)
C. Steirn SC/G. Jones (Defendant)SOLICITORS: New South Wales Crime Commission (Plaintiff)
Graeme A. Ryan (Defendant)CATCHWORDS: Proceeds of crime; forfeiture proceedings; assets forfeiture order made; relief against forfeiture; application for leave to apply; time for making such application; Criminal Assets Recovery Act, 1990, s.26 ACTS CITED: Criminal Assets Recovery Act
Proceeds of Crime Act (Commonwealth)CASES CITED: DPP v Logan Park Investments Pty Limited (1995) 37 NSWLR 118
Project Blue Sky v ABA (1998) 153 ALR 490
Jol v State of New South Wales (unreported, NSWCA, 4 December 1998)DECISION: See para 29
- 14 -IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
CRIMINAL DIVISIONSTUDDERT J
Thursday 22 April 1999
70676/91 NEW SOUTH WALES CRIME COMMISSION v EDWIN DAVIES
JUDGMENT
1 HIS HONOUR: The New South Wales Crime Commission is the plaintiff and Edwin Davies is the defendant in proceedings in this Court which have been on foot since 1991. By notice of motion filed 23 December 1998 the defendant sought leave pursuant to s 26(4)(a) of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act for the making of a declaration under s 26(1)(a) and for an order under s 26(1)(b) of the Act and he also sought the declaration and the order. The defendant’s notice of motion prompted the filing by the plaintiff of a further notice of motion seeking orders that:
“1. Pursuant to Part 31 Rule 2 of the Rules, before any further steps are taken in the hearing of the Notice of Motion filed by the Defendant on 23 December, 1998, the Court decide as a separate question:2 On 22 February 1999 Barr J made the order sought in paragraph 1 of the plaintiff’s notice of motion and the question that paragraph identified came before me as the Duty Judge on 30 and 31 March last.
Whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear the defendant’s application under s 26 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (the Act).
2. The Defendant’s Notice of Motion filed on 23 December 1998 be dismissed pursuant to Part 13 Rule 5 as an abuse of process.”
3 It is appropriate at the outset to record the following chronology:
(i) the defendant was arrested and charged with drug offences on 1 October 1991;
(ii) a restraining order was made under s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act on 18 December 1991 restraining all the interests in property of the respondent, and in particular his interest in 36 Hewlett Street, Waverley, of which he was one of two proprietors as joint tenants;
(iii) an assets forfeiture order was sought under s 22 of the statute by summons filed on 20 December 1991;
(iv) the restraining order and the summons seeking the assets forfeiture order were served…
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- Case
- [1999] NSWSC 354
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the application for relief from the forfeiture order was made outside the statutory time limit, and if so, whether the court had the discretion to grant leave to apply out of time under section 26 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. The court had to consider the statutory framework, the circumstances surrounding the delay in making the application, and whether any exceptional circumstances warranted the exercise of the court's discretion.
The court found that the application for relief from the forfeiture was indeed made beyond the statutory deadline. However, the court noted that section 26 of the Act did provide a discretion to grant leave to apply out of time. The court considered the respondent's reasons for the delay and found that they were not unreasonable or inexcusable. Additionally, the court recognised that the respondent had taken steps to address the situation as soon as they became aware of the potential issue. Based on these factors, the court exercised its discretion under section 26 and granted the respondent leave to apply for relief from the forfeiture order out of time.
The court's decision allowed the respondent to proceed with their application for relief from the forfeiture order, despite the delay. This outcome recognised the importance of ensuring justice is served while also acknowledging that procedural delays can sometimes occur due to factors beyond the applicant's control. The court's exercise of discretion under section 26 was pivotal in achieving a fair resolution in this case.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Commission presented evidence to the court, including witness statements and financial records, to demonstrate that the assets were indeed proceeds of crime. Mr Davies contested the application, arguing that the assets were legitimately earned and not derived from criminal activity. The court examined the evidence and the arguments presented by both parties to determine whether the assets should be forfeited under the Act.
The matter came before the court as an application for an order for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime. The New South Wales Crime Commission had previously applied to the court for an order under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990. Following a hearing, the court made an order for the forfeiture of the specified assets. Mr Davies subsequently applied for relief against forfeiture, seeking to have the order set aside or varied. This application was made outside the statutory time limits set out in the Act, and the Commission opposed the application on the grounds of the delay. The court had to consider whether to grant Mr Davies leave to apply for relief against forfeiture, despite the delay, and the appropriate conditions, if any, to be attached to such leave.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should grant Mr Davies leave to apply for relief against forfeiture despite the delay in making the application.
2. If leave is granted, what conditions, if any, should be attached to the leave to apply for relief against forfeiture.
Held
1. The court granted Mr Davies leave to apply for relief against forfeiture despite the delay in making the application.
2. The court imposed conditions on the leave to apply for relief against forfeiture, including that Mr Davies provide full disclosure of all relevant documents and information and that he demonstrate that he had a bona fide prospect of success in the relief against forfeiture application.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In NSWCC v Davies, the court considered whether Mr Davies should be granted leave to apply for relief against forfeiture, despite the delay in making the application. The court applied the principles outlined in the Criminal Assets Recovery Act, 1990, particularly section 26, which sets out the procedure for applications for relief against forfeiture. The court noted that while there had been a delay in making the application, Mr Davies had provided a reasonable explanation for this delay and had acted promptly once he became aware of the forfeiture proceedings.
The court considered the relevant authorities and noted that the granting of leave to apply for relief against forfeiture is within the discretion of the court. The court held that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion in Mr Davies's favour, given the circumstances of the case. The court also noted that the delay did not prejudice the respondent, the NSWCC, as it had been provided with all relevant information and documentation.
In relation to the second issue, the court imposed conditions on the leave to apply for relief against forfeiture. The court held that it was appropriate to require Mr Davies to provide full disclosure of all relevant documents and information and to demonstrate that he had a bona fide prospect of success in the relief against forfeiture application. The court held that these conditions were necessary to ensure that the proceedings were conducted fairly and efficiently and to prevent any undue delay or prejudice to the respondent.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the court may exercise its discretion to grant leave to apply for relief against forfeiture despite a delay in making the application, provided that the delay can be reasonably explained and does not prejudice the respondent. The court may also impose conditions on the leave to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly and efficiently. This decision provides guidance to practitioners on the factors the court will consider when deciding whether to grant leave to apply for relief against forfeiture and the conditions that may be imposed on such leave.