Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Tan

Link copied
Case Copied 6 min read
CITATION: DPP (Cth) v Tan & Anor [2004] NSWSC 856
HEARING DATE(S): 08/09/04
JUDGMENT DATE:
8 September 2004
JUDGMENT OF: Shaw J
DECISION: In the absence of any clear prohibition or necessary implication that the applicant cannot adduce relevant evidence in support of its case, I decline to rule in an umbrella or universal way that the evidence should be excluded. Of course, I would entertain applications with respect to particular aspects of the admissibility of the evidence. Accordingly, on an interlocutory basis, I allow the applicant for revocation to read the affidavits that she has filed and served, and to adduce other relevant evidence which she may seek to tender.
CATCHWORDS: Application to revoke a restraining order pursuant to s42 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) - Whether pre-existing order for the restraint may be revoked pursuant to s42(5) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
LEGISLATION CITED: Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s42
CASES CITED: Garrard t/as Arthur Anderson & Co v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662
Houssein v Under Secretary of Industrial Relations and Technology (NSW) (1982) 148 CLR 88 at 94
NSW Crime Commission v Davies [1999] NSWSC 354
Thomas A Edison Ltd v Bullock (1912) 15 CLR 679

PARTIES :

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
Dante Tan & Anor
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 11461/03
COUNSEL: G Jones - Applicant
P Hastings QC - Respondent Crown
SOLICITORS: B Clark - Applicant
T Muir - Respondent Crown

- 2 -

      IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES
      COMMON LAW DIVISION
      COMMON LAW LIST

      SHAW J

      8 September 2004

      11461/03

      COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

      v

      DANTE TAN & ANOR
      JUDGMENT

1 Shaw J: The case before the Court is an application to revoke a restraining order pursuant to s 42 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (the Act). The critical test as to whether a pre-existing order for the restraint of what is alleged to be the proceeds of crime is whether, pursuant to s 42 (5), the court may revoke the restraining order:

          if satisfied that there are no grounds on which to make that the order at the time of considering the application to revoke the order.

2 It is obviously a tough test, a high barrier for the applicant seeking revocation to meet but it focuses upon the time of considering the application to revoke. Accordingly, the court needs to take account of the facts and circumstances which are asserted as at the time of considering the revocation application.

3 The respondent to the notice of motion, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), objected broadly to the right of the applicant on the notice of motion, Mrs Tan, to adduce any evidence upon the application. If correct, this submission would lead to an odd result. It is common ground, as I understand it, that the application is competent in the sense that we have a person (namely the wife of Mr Tan) who was…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Tan and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] NSWSC 856
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Commonwealth seeking to revoke a restraining order under section 42 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth). The application was made in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. The dispute centred on the interpretation of section 42(5) of the Act, which allows for the revocation of a restraining order if it is no longer necessary or appropriate. The central legal issues were whether the court had the jurisdiction to revoke the restraining order and if the criteria for revocation under section 42(5) had been met.

The court examined the wording and purpose of section 42(5) and considered the principles of statutory interpretation. It concluded that the section provided an express authority for the revocation of a restraining order, and that the order could be revoked if it was no longer necessary or appropriate. The court found that the Director of Public Prosecutions had satisfied the criteria for revocation as the circumstances had changed, and the continued restraint was no longer necessary or appropriate.

Consequently, the court granted the application and revoked the restraining order. The reasoning was based on a careful analysis of the statutory language and its application to the specific circumstances of the case. The decision underscores the importance of statutory interpretation in determining the scope and application of legislative provisions. The court's ruling clarified the legal framework for the revocation of restraining orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established